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Foreword 
A few years ago, the European Union’s institutions promoted the goal 
of increasing the manufacturing sector’s share of EU value added to 20 
percent. Meanwhile, the labels ‘made in Europe’ or ‘made in country 
x’ resonate with many politicians in Europe while US president Donald 
Trump believes that his policies would create “millions of manufactur-
ing jobs”. 
The different chapters of this report suggest that manufacturing is 
indeed a special sector. It scores high in terms of value added, salaries 
in the sector are often higher than elsewhere and innovation is strong. 
But calls for targeted industrial policy ring hollow: what constitutes 
‘manufacturing’ is a fluid concept. New technologies shape industries 
while outsourcing and the breaking up of value-added chains create 
measurement problems. Finally, targeting one sector at the expense of 
others can lead to major distortions in a market economy and would 
likely hurt growth and jobs rather than helping.
This report revisits the old questions of whether we need a special 
industrial policy and if it should target specific sectors, technologies 
or even consumers. In response, the report proposes a more holistic 
approach. In my view, three questions are important. First, what kind 
of framework conditions are missing for different economic sectors 
to thrive in Europe? One aspect is access to a large and single market, 
which all too often is still fragmented by different national standards 
and regulations.
Second, how can policies be shaped that are pre-conditions for suc-
cessful industries? EU policymakers shape the future of industry with 
numerous decisions. They decide what basic research to fund. They 
move more quickly on some regulations than on others. They promote 
specific educations systems, such as apprenticeship programmes.
Third, important decisions on major infrastructure projects underpin-
ning industry shape the future. Is broadband internet access readily 
available? Does Europe need its own cloud computing infrastructure? 
Have we agreed on a single standard for charging electric cars to 
enable the rapid creation of a sufficiently wide network of compatible 
charging stations? 
A ‘hands-off’ approach, as is often propagated by ordoliberal econo-
mists, is thus not the way forward. Instead, the public sector needs to 
focus on intervention where it is necessary while avoiding the promo-
tion of specific technologies at the expense of others. The state cannot 
pick winners but not taking the right decisions on basic infrastructure, 
smart regulation and the best education could leave Europe as a lag-
gard for many generations.
Guntram B. Wolff, Director of Bruegel
September 2017
1 Introduction: Europe and the   
new manufacturing
Reinhilde Veugelers
Manufacturing takes up a central position in the agendas of many 
politicians. It used to provide plenty of jobs that did not require high 
skills. The idea that such jobs could be revived is behind the demand 
that products should be ‘made in…’ the countries that consume 
them, the calls from the European Union for a European industrial 
revolution and Donald Trump’s promise to create “millions of 
manufacturing jobs”.
The problem with such rhetoric is that it has as its reference point 
an old version of manufacturing. The new version of manufacturing 
(sometimes called Industry 4.0) also requires attention from politi-
cians, but for different reasons than the provision of millions of old-
style production-line jobs.
There is some good news from manufacturing that can underpin 
the policy discussion. After a long period of decline in manufacturing’s 
share in total employment, the bottom seems to have been reached 
and the decline has stopped or at least its pace has slowed. The mas-
sive offshoring of manufacturing jobs to Asia has also slowed, with 
even some evidence of reshoring. The manufacturing sector is inno-
vating, using new technologies to meet future demand, bringing new 
kinds of manufactured products to the market, reinventing existing 
products into new offerings and improving the efficiency of manufac-
turing processes. Examples of technologies used by innovative manu-
facturers include 3D printing, robotics, new materials, smart commu-
nication systems and ‘big data’ management. 
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Such innovations have changed how many, where and what type of 
manufacturing jobs are created. Digitalisation and robotics have pow-
ered the automation of production processes. Better transportation 
and information technology has allowed firms to unbundle different 
tasks making it possible to design and coordinate longer and more 
complex supply chains that cross national and firm boundaries. Value 
creation has shifted from the production and assembly of parts to their 
development and design, the management of the supply chain and 
after-sales servicing. 
The trend towards more complex value chains has resulted in offi-
cial statistics, which typically categorise firms according to what their 
largest block of employees does, misrepresenting the changes in the 
number of jobs in the manufacturing sector. A shift of jobs outsourced 
by manufacturing firms to other sectors (such as accounting, market-
ing and after sales services) might look like a loss of jobs for manufac-
turing, but is not a loss to the economy. Some trends cut the other way, 
with manufacturing firms turning themselves into sellers of services. 
Car manufacturers for example are reinventing themselves as provid-
ers of mobility services rather than producers and sellers of machines 
on wheels. Thanks to big data technologies, manufacturers can use the 
amount of data they accumulate on their products to sell related ser-
vices. This has the potential to lead to a growth in jobs within manufac-
turing firms, but in their services departments. Apple is still classified 
as a manufacturer though it owns no factories. 
There are other encouraging trends emerging from the new version 
of manufacturing. Thanks to digital technologies, such as 3D print-
ing, the design and production of manufactured goods are increas-
ingly interwoven, allowing high-tech production to remain close 
to the designers and engineers who thought up the product. Using 
new technologies to keep design and manufacturing tightly coupled 
can shorten lead times, which is particularly relevant in industries 
driven by fashion. Shorter value chains will allow production jobs 
to be located close to markets and/or the sources of technological 
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know-how. This could bring back some of the previously offshored 
jobs. These new production jobs will however no longer be the jobs 
associated with old-style assembly lines.
This potential for growth in manufacturing-related jobs feeds the 
inclinations of politicians to support the revival of manufacturing. But 
the realisation of this potential requires (new) manufacturing firms 
fully to exploit the potential offered by new (digital) technologies and 
incumbent firms to reinvent themselves. These (re)new(ed) manufac-
turing firms will provide good jobs, but these will be jobs of the future, 
not the past; they need skill and adaptability. 
It is clear that the policy discussion on the future of manufacturing 
requires an understanding of the changing role of manufacturing in 
Europe’s growth agenda. Europe needs to know how it can realise the 
potential for industrial rejuvenation. How well are European firms 
responding to the new opportunities for growth, and in which global 
value chains are they developing these new activities? Does Europe 
have the right conditions for its economies to create and capture value 
from the activities that contribute most strongly and sustainably to 
Europe’s growth and external competitiveness? And even if European 
manufacturing is taking up the new opportunities, the question 
remains whether rejuvenation will generate the same number and type 
of jobs as in the past. This discussion goes beyond a discussion about 
manufacturing production activities. It cuts across sectoral boundaries 
and the classic divide between manufacturing and services. 
The evidence in this Blueprint shows that the challenge for 
European policymakers is how to promote and attract those high-value 
added activities within global chains that are the basis for sustaina-
ble growth and competitiveness. Such activities are not necessarily 
production related, but will increasingly have service-like characteris-
tics and do not necessarily require all the activities of the whole value 
chain to be located at home. 
This focus on high-value activities cuts across sectoral bounda-
ries. High-value activities can be identified within all manufacturing 
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sectors, both low-tech and high-tech, and extend into service activ-
ities. We thus need a clearer horizontal perspective on Europe’s 
competitiveness, rather than a sectoral view. The discussion should 
be about establishing the right conditions for economies and firms 
to create and capture value from the activities that contribute most 
strongly and sustainably to Europe’s growth and external competi-
tiveness, wherever their intra-EU geographical or sectoral home base 
might be.
Imposing tariffs and taxes on companies that seek to move jobs 
overseas, as President Trump threatens to do, is not the way to go. 
Most manufacturing jobs that were lost are not going to return because 
they were not shipped abroad in the first place. Rather, they were 
lost because of the introduction of new ways of boosting productivity 
and reducing costs. Restricting trade will only disrupt the complex 
cross-border supply chains on which manufacturing firms rely to build 
global competitiveness. On the contrary, all kinds of trade costs should 
be reduced, and interconnecting infrastructure should be prioritised, 
to allow firms to participate in international value chains whenever 
that allows them to create more value. 
A priority should be a policy framework that removes barriers 
and creates the framework conditions that give firms the incentive 
to develop innovative strategies to create new higher-value activi-
ties. As large, open and interconnected consumer markets remain 
a major motivator for business, an effective internal market and an 
innovation-friendly regulation and competition policy will and should 
remain EU priorities. Completing the single market, particularly the 
single market for supporting business services (including cross-bor-
der transport, digital and energy infrastructure), is perhaps the most 
important policy objective for reinforcing manufacturing’s role in 
driving growth. 
A further challenge is the structural shift from classic production 
jobs towards higher value-added types of jobs, and the implications 
this has for the labour market. Governments will need to facilitate this 
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structural shift. This implies an education policy agenda to ensure that 
engineers and technical workers are in good supply and to provide 
more vocational training and retraining programmes to refresh the 
skills of current workers or laid-off workers.
As the challenges and trends are common for all value-added 
creating sectors, government intervention should be sufficiently 
horizontal. Governments should not succumb to the temptation to 
pick particular sectors.
In 2012, the European Commission published a communication 
on a new industrial policy1 that set out a roadmap for reindustrialising 
Europe, with the aim of “raising the share of industry in GDP from the 
current level of around 16 percent to as much as 20 percent in 2020”. 
Although the Commission stressed the need for a comprehensive 
vision “mobilising all the levers available at EU level, notably the single 
market, trade policy, SME policy, competition policy, environmental 
and research policy in favour of European companies’ competitiveness”, 
the communication returned to a more targeted approach, identifying 
six priority action lines (including key enabling technologies, clean 
vehicles and smart grids). The communication was followed by action 
plans for specific sectors. As argued in a previous Bruegel Blueprint2, 
it is doubtful that targeting a minimum share of GDP for manufac-
turing and focusing on specific sectors and technologies is the right 
approach. The issue is not whether manufacturing is or should be 
important for economies, nor is it how many manufacturing jobs to 
have or save. Rather it is what type of activities Europe should focus on 
in the value chain for goods, which will allow the creation of sustain-
able jobs and growth in Europe. This discussion cuts across sectoral 
boundaries and requires a horizontal approach rather than a sectoral 
1 'A Stronger European Industry for Growth and Economic Recovery’, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0582.
2 This Blueprint updates and complements a previous Bruegel Blueprint: Veugelers, 
R. (ed) (2013) Manufacturing Europe’s future, Blueprint 21, Bruegel, available at 
http://bruegel.org/2013/10/manufacturing-europes-future/.
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view, establishing the right conditions for economies to create and 
capture value from activities that contribute most strongly and sustain-
ably to Europe’s growth and external competitiveness.
Further European Commission communications on industrial 
policy, such as the 2014 communication ‘For a European Industrial 
Renaissance’3 continued with this two-tiered strategy by emphasis-
ing a holistic horizontal approach with “policies and actions for the 
modernisation of the industrial base and for the transition towards an 
ever more innovative, modern and sustainable economy”, while also 
developing sector-specific action plans that support key industrial 
sectors and specific actions directed at specific sectors, such as space 
and defence. Key enabling technologies remain a particular focus of 
the EU’s industrial policy4.
On 29 May 2017, the Council of the European Union called on the 
Commission5 to provide a holistic EU industrial policy strategy in time 
for the spring 2018 European Council meeting. The Council of the 
EU emphasised that this should be based on integrated value chains 
and inter-clustering linkages, encompassing enterprises of all sizes 
operating in the manufacturing industry and related services sectors. 
The Council highlighted that “this should embrace, amongst others, 
human capital, research, development and innovation, digital transfor-
mation, tackling efficiently and robustly unfair commercial practices, 
sustainable and affordable energy sources, resource efficiency, indus-
trial servitisation and better regulation”. While this seems a call for a 
3 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-
:52014DC0014.
4 These are a group of six technologies: micro and nanoelectronics, nanotechnology, 
industrial biotechnology, advanced materials, photonics, and advanced manufac-
turing technologies. They have applications in multiple industries and help tackle 
societal challenges.
5 ‘Conclusions on a future EU industrial policy strategy’, available at http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/05/29-compet-conclu-
sions-future-industrial-policy-strategy/.
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much-needed truly horizontal EU growth policy, as Bruegel scholars 
have already advocated (see footnote 2), it at the same time continues 
to mention the importance of the cumulative effect of policies and 
their consistency and states that “the approach should include, when 
necessary, sectorial initiatives for sectors facing economic change and 
high growth potential sectors”.
The analysis in this Blueprint provides further support for a holistic, 
horizontal EU growth policy, which seems to be the direction taken 
in the latest European Commission communication. The effective-
ness of the deployment of this industrial policy should be closely 
monitored, with regular empirical analyses and feedback to inform 
follow-on policy making. This monitoring should include a sectoral 
perspective, concentrating particularly on how Europe is faring in 
new emerging sectors that are still fragile. Such sectoral monitoring 
would allow assessment of how the multitude of policy instruments, 
from various policy domains and from EU, national or regional levels, 
interact to affect the efficiency of the sectoral eco-system and would 
underpin policy realignment when needed. Sectoral monitoring 
within an effects-based holistic horizontal growth policy can thus 
substitute for ex-ante targeting with specific actions and funding for 
selected ‘strategic’ sectors and technologies. Establishment of a unit 
inside the European Commission dedicated to such monitoring and 
analysis would allow for a long-term commitment and a critical scale 
for expertise building. As the analysis will integrate evidence from 
different Commission directorates, such a monitoring unit should sit 
at a central level within the Commission services, such as within the 
Secretariat-General or the European Political Strategy Centre.
A summary of the issues covered by this Blueprint is as follows:
Chapter 2, European and global manufacturing: trends, challenges 
and the way ahead by Reinhilde Veugelers and Uuriintuya Batsaikhan, 
takes stock of the long-term trends in value added and employment 
in manufacturing. Despite its declining value added and employment 
shares, manufacturing continues to be a vital contributor to the EU’s 
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innovation performance and external competitiveness. But in order 
to sustain manufacturing’s competitive advantage, a sufficient shift 
to higher value-added activities and higher-skilled jobs needs to take 
place. The EU needs to move up the innovation ladder from its current 
position in medium technology-intensive activities to high R&D inten-
sity activities, on a par with the United States and Japan. Investment in 
services sectors is equally important. The chapter shows that market 
services sectors represent an increasing share of value-added growth, 
while non-market services sectors account for large part of within-EU 
productivity growth.
Chapter 3, The competitiveness of European industry in the digital 
era by Carlo Altomonte, Filippo Biondi and Valeria Negri, documents 
how recent productivity trends in European industry are related to 
the adoption of information and communications technologies and 
related investments. The aggregate productivity of manufacturing 
has substantially recovered in Europe, but its contribution to overall 
country productivity is small because the manufacturing sector is 
losing ground in terms of share of hours worked throughout the EU. 
Greater growth in IT capital stock is associated with better productiv-
ity performance, in terms of both labour productivity and total factor 
productivity. However, all indicators at industry or country-level are by 
definition averages, which reflect both leading and lagging firm perfor-
mance and thereby could lead to so-called aggregation and dispersion 
biases. The effects of ICT capital investments are on average positive 
and significant for productivity, but these are essentially driven by the 
most productive companies Thus, while policies aimed at increasing 
digitalisation and the development of ‘Industry 4.0’ are powerful tools 
to foster the competitiveness of EU industry, they are also likely to 
increase the gap between the most successful companies and those 
left behind.
Chapter 4, Firm growth dynamics and productivity in Europe by 
Albert Bravo-Biosca, zooms in on firm growth as an important driver of 
economic growth. Despite the recognised importance of this process, 
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there is limited cross-country comparable data to inform policy. The 
chapter presents a database that measures the distribution of firm 
growth in twelve countries. The data allows measurement of average 
growth and also the growth rate for all the percentiles of the growth 
distribution, broken down by size, sector and age. This shows that 
firms in the US grow and shrink more rapidly than in Europe, which 
has a much larger share of static firms. Having a higher share of static 
firms is associated with slower productivity growth.
Chapter 5, A revival of manufacturing in Europe? Recent evidence 
about reshoring by Dalia Marin, Reinhilde Veugelers and Justine Feliu, 
examines offshoring of European manufacturing jobs. Globalisation 
and the international division of labour have shaped the relocation 
of manufacturing jobs and raised concerns in advanced economies. 
In the era of advanced manufacturing technologies, the factors that 
matter for deciding on the location of manufacturing facilities and 
jobs are quickly evolving. With global value chains not expanding 
since 2011, we might have entered a new period of globalisation in 
which firms reorganise into shorter, regional or local value chains. 
The chapter identifies a slowly changing pattern of offshoring around 
the world driven particularly by reshoring by Chinese companies and 
significantly less offshoring to southern Europe. Activity moved from 
southern Europe to China and central and eastern Europe, leaving 
total offshoring activity mostly flat in most European countries.
Chapter 6, Manufacturing in central and eastern Europe by Maciej 
Bukowski and Aleksander Śniegocki, considers industrialisation in 
central and eastern European countries from a historical perspective. 
After 45 years of communism and centrally planned systems, a pro-
cess of intensive industrialisation in the region and catching up with 
the west took place on the back of a rapid inflow of technology and 
know-how through foreign direct investment. After EU entry, central 
and eastern European countries rapidly integrated into European and 
global value chains. However, full quantitative and qualitative conver-
gence with western Europe is likely to happen only in the next 20-30 
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years. Central and eastern European countries need to help their most 
productive manufacturing industries and services to invest in R&D, 
while continuing to attract foreign investment and know-how to close 
the technology gap, and training and retaining human talent.
Chapter 7, Europe’s comparative advantage in low-carbon tech-
nology by Robert Kalcik and Georg Zachmann, examines low-carbon 
technologies, which have exhibited high growth rates and are pre-
dicted to attract increasing investment. The potential of countries to 
excel in these emerging sectors, specifically photovoltaics, batteries, 
wind turbines and electric vehicle technology, is assessed based on 
their current export and technological specialisations. Even if a coun-
try is currently not good at exporting or patenting in a certain sector, 
it might acquire this capability if it is strong in proximate sectors. A 
regional analysis yields insights into the strength of spillover effects 
and the locations of technology clusters. 
Chapter 8, From big oil to big data? Perspectives on the European 
energy industry of the future by Simone Tagliapietra and Georg 
Zachmann, examines the future prospects of the European energy 
sector, which is going through a profound transformation, driven by 
decarbonisation and digitalisation. European oil and gas companies 
are reacting differently to these new challenges and, in several cases, 
there seems to be a lack of vision about how to adapt to the transfor-
mation towards a low-carbon system. European utilities are also strug-
gling to reinvent themselves to make the best of the transition. While 
some are decisively pushing for a shift in their business models from 
electricity producers to smart-energy services providers, others find it 
more difficult to reshape their traditional business models.
Chapter 9, Fintech in Europe: challenges and opportunities by Silvia 
Merler, examines the future prospects of technology-enabled finance 
(fintech) in Europe. The recent rise of fintech has spurred the interest 
of financial markets and policymakers, and has raised concerns about 
the impact on the traditional banking business. Globally, the balance 
between competitive and collaborate fintech is in favour of the latter 
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but in Europe, competitive fintech seems to prevail. EU countries 
have opted for different regulatory approaches. In the absence of 
internationally agreed regulatory standards for fintech, the distinction 
is between those national authorities that have acted within already 
existing frameworks, and those that have introduced new rules specif-
ically for fintech. Dealing with fintech at EU level would help ensure 
that regulatory requirements are harmonised, which is important in 
light of fintech’s potential financial stability risks.
Chapter 10, Strengthening cross-border e-commerce in the European 
Union by J. Scott Marcus, John Morales and Georgios Petropoulos, 
zooms in on the digital services sector in Europe, specifically online 
sales. The imperfect integration of the European market with regard 
to digital services and online sales represents a substantial lost oppor-
tunity for Europe. Online purchases are growing rapidly within the 
EU, but cross-border purchasing lags significantly behind domestic 
online purchasing. If e-commerce sales within the EU were as easy 
and cost-effective as domestic sales, retail prices would decrease both 
online and offline, while the consumer and producer surpluses asso-
ciated with retail sales in the EU would increase. A coordinated cluster 
of measures will be needed to unlock the full potential of cross-border 
sales in the EU.
All the chapters illustrate how the European economy is taking 
advantage of new technological opportunities, is reshaping into inter-
national value chains to revitalise and refocus on high value-added 
activities,. However, this revitalisation process could take place much 
faster in Europe and could be spread more broadly across more coun-
tries, companies and sectors.
2 European and global 
manufacturing: trends, 
challenges and the way 
ahead
Reinhilde Veugelers and Uuriintuya Batsaikhan
2.1 EU manufacturing: key numbers
Manufacturing’s share of European Union value added has been on a 
continuous decline for a number of years. Manufacturing now repre-
sents about 15 percent of total EU value added and 15 percent of its 
total employment. This drop in manufacturing activities is associated 
with a steady decline in demand for manufactured goods since the 
1970s in the EU. Vihriälä and Wolff (2013) showed that the declining 
ratio is partially a result of the fact that the decrease in the relative 
price of manufactured goods has not been matched by an increase in 
demand for those goods.
This decline persists despite the European Commission setting out 
in 2012 a plan to reindustrialise Europe and “raise the share of indus-
try in GDP from the current level of around 16 percent to as much as 
20 percent in 2020” (European Commission, 2012b). This target now 
seems further away than it was in 2012. However, as already argued in 
a previous Bruegel Blueprint (Veugelers, 2013), this is a case of “miss-
ing the wrong target”: manufacturing will matter for the EU economy, 
not because of the sheer volume of activities and jobs it entails, but 
because of the nature of the activities and jobs it represents. 
Figure 1: Manufacturing in the EU, key numbers, % of total economy
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat for employment and value added, WTO for exports 
and imports and OECD for business R&D. Note: Business R&D latest data is for 2014 
instead of 2015.
Rather than targeting how much manufacturing Europe should 
have, what matters for the EU economy is what manufacturing activ-
ities will offer high value added to EU society, supporting its sustain-
able growth. Figure 1 shows that although manufacturing’s share of 
value added is only 15 percent, it accounts for 64 percent of all EU 
business R&D. In addition to being highly R&D-intensive, manufactur-
ing disproportionately contributes to EU trade and competitiveness, 
with its value added and its exports/imports having a ratio of about 
one to four. 
Although its size keeps declining, the manufacturing sector nev-
ertheless remains an important contributor to overall EU growth, 
precisely because of the shift towards higher value added activities, as 
Figure 2 shows. 
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Figure 2: The contribution of manufacturing to total EU economic growth
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Growth rates are annual average growth 
rates over the periods. Total economy excludes ‘agriculture, forestry and fishing’. Latest 
available sectoral data.
Manufacturing contributed negatively to employment growth in 
Europe throughout the period considered. However, despite losing 
‘weight’, manufacturing still contributes to overall growth in value 
added because of its higher productivity growth compared to the rest 
of the economy. The manufacturing sector displayed a marked dyna-
mism after the crisis years. Although manufacturing saw a big drop 
in value added growth and employment during the crisis period, the 
sector quickly recovered. After the crisis, manufacturing accounted for 
half of the EU’s productivity growth and half of its value added growth, 
despite manufacturing’s declining weight.
Rather than focusing on whether manufacturing will reach 20 
percent of the EU’s GDP by 2020, more fundamental questions are: 
what kind of manufacturing and which firms and sectors will generate 
high value-added, high productivity jobs? Will the EU manufacturing 
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sector be able to adjust to these activities? This requires EU manufac-
turing to be sufficiently creative: to innovate and develop new, higher 
productivity and higher value added activities. At the same time, the 
sector needs to be sufficiently destructive: freeing resources from less 
productive activities.
While the manufacturing sector is an important source for higher 
value added activities in the EU economy, it is not the only source. 
Services, especially digital-technology intensive service sectors can 
and will be important contributors to employment, value added and 
productivity, because of their increasing share of value added and 
because of their scope for generating increasingly higher value added. 
The move to higher value added activities should not be seen as a shift 
from non-manufacturing into manufacturing, but will be the case 
for all economic activities and will continue to blur the boundaries 
between manufacturing and services. Manufacturing firms are most 
likely to create and capture more value added in the pre- and post-pro-
duction services parts of their value chains.
2.2 The decline of manufacturing from global and historical 
perspectives
The decline in manufacturing is not a new phenomenon, but a con-
tinuation of a trend that started in the 1970s in all major advanced 
countries, illustrating its structural and general character (Figure 3). 
Manufacturing’s share of value added declined in the EU from 27 per-
cent in 1975 to 15 percent in 2015, while in the US it gradually dropped 
from 21 percent to 12 percent over the same period. After a notable 
dip during the crisis, the declining trend continued; it flattened out 
somewhat, but has nowhere revived. The situation in Asian countries 
is more variable: developments in Japan resemble those in the EU 
and US, while the decline in China has not been as rapid and manu-
facturing’s share of Chinese value added remains more elevated than 
in other countries. In Korea, manufacturing value added picked up 
markedly after 2000.
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Figure 3: Manufacturing’s share of value added, 1975-2015
Source: Bruegel based on OECD, World Bank and Eurostat. Note: EU, changing com-
position.
The decline in manufacturing’s employment share (Figure 4) in all 
countries also resembles a long-term structural trend, which might 
have bottomed-out lately, but shows no signs of reversing. The decline 
in the US is even more pronounced than in the EU, with a share below 
10 percent in 2015. The decline in employment is greater than in value 
added for the US, indicating a shift in manufacturing to a situation 
in which fewer workers are generating more output (Oldensky and 
Moran, 2016). A similar trend is also observed in Korea, where manu-
facturing’s share of value added is increasing while its share of employ-
ment is decreasing, suggesting that Korea is in a process of moving 
up the value-added ladder. For China, there are unfortunately only a 
limited number of years of comparable data. While the value added 
share of manufacturing in China shows some decline, this is not seen 
in manufacturing’s employment share, perhaps reflecting the diffi-
cult restructuring of employment-intensive state-owned-enterprises 
(SOEs) in Chinese manufacturing. 
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Figure 4: Manufacturing employment as a share of total employment, 
1990-2015
Source: Bruegel based on OECD and Eurostat.
Despite the global nature of the shrinking of manufacturing, the 
pace of shrinkage is different in different economies. As a conse-
quence, the global manufacturing hubs are shifting. Europe’s share of 
global manufacturing value added has shrunk rapidly, especially after 
2009 (Figure 5). Similar to the EU, the US and Japan are losing share. 
Korea is expanding its small share, but most notable is the rise of 
China as a global player, which has become the biggest player in global 
manufacturing, ahead of the EU and US according to 2015 figures. 
Figure 5: Major economies’ shares of global manufacturing value added
Source: Bruegel based on World Bank. Note: Data in current US dollars.
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2.2.1 Manufacturing and services
The decline in manufacturing’s share of total economy employment is 
a combination of a drop in the absolute numbers of those employed in 
manufacturing, together with an increase in in employment in services 
in the EU, US and Japan (Figure 6, panel B). EU services employment 
growth has actually outperformed that in the US and Japan. The drop 
in manufacturing employment was also more tempered in the EU. The 
decline in manufacturing’s share of total economy value added is not 
a consequence of a drop in manufacturing’s value added, but because 
the increase in services value added has outpaced the increase in 
manufacturing value added in the EU, US and Japan (Figure 6, panel 
A). In terms of value added growth, the EU trails the US, in manufac-
turing and particularly in services, with services value added growth in 
the US increasingly outstripping that in the EU. 
Figure 6: Manufacturing vs. service cumulative growth, 1995-2015
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Government 
of Japan Cabinet Office statistics. 
Figure 7 illustrates again the big negative contribution of manufac-
turing to employment growth in the EU, the US and Japan. Pre-crisis, 
EU manufacturing EU services US manufacturing US services
Japan manufacturing Japan services
50
100
150
200
250
300
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
50
70
90
110
130
150
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
20
03
20
05
20
07
20
09
20
11
20
13
20
15
A: Cumulative growth in value added B: Cumulative growth in employment
32 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
the negative contribution of manufacturing to employment growth was 
much smaller in the EU compared to the US and Japan, and overall 
employment growth was more positive. But after the crisis, manufacturing 
accounted for a larger share of the employment decline in the EU, similar 
to the US and Japan. Moreover, in the EU, non-market services, such as 
education, social work and public administration, made a smaller contri-
bution to employment growth compared to the US and Japan. 
Figure 7: Contribution to employment growth by sector, 1995-2015
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Government 
of Japan Cabinet Office statistics. Note: Share weighted averages across periods. The 
numbers show the contribution of manufacturing. 
Figure 8 shows how manufacturing has contributed more to US 
overall value added growth than to EU value added growth, particu-
larly in the later period from 2008 to 2015. All services sectors also con-
tribute more to US value added growth than services sectors in the EU. 
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The EU, therefore, still has scope to increase the contribution of both 
manufacturing and services to its value added. Professional (business) 
services and scientific activities are important sources of value added 
growth in the EU, US and Japan (Figure 8). Financial services lost their 
value added growth potential after the crisis. Non-market services 
remain an important driver of value added growth, but post-crisis the 
EU has trailed the US in this sector. 
Figure 8: Contribution of sectors to value added growth, 1995-2015
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat, US Bureau of Economic Analysis, and Government 
of Japan Cabinet Office statistics. Note: Share weighted averages across periods. Num-
bers for manufacturing’s contribution are shown.
2.2.2 Manufacturing trade in global value chains (GVCs)
As manufactured goods are more tradable than services, manufac-
turing remain an important contributor to economies’ trade balances 
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and external competitiveness. Manufacturing’s share of EU exports has 
been and remains substantially higher than its share of value added 
and employment. Manufacturing exports still represent more than two 
thirds of total EU exports (Figure 9). It should be noted that the contri-
bution of manufacturing to exports has been consistently lower in the 
US than in the EU, with the US being more services-intensive. This is 
in contrast with Asia, where the exports of Japan, China and Korea are 
increasingly more manufacturing based. 
As a consequence of the increased integration of global value 
chains, firms in advanced countries have shifted some of their produc-
tion to emerging markets, resulting in increasing trade volumes and an 
increasing share of trade being taken up by intermediate goods (what 
has been dubbed ‘hyper-globalisation’). Panel B of Figure 9 shows 
the share of manufactured goods in imports. Most striking is the high 
share of manufactured goods in US imports, substantially higher than 
its share of exports. Chapter 5 digs deeper into the increasing integra-
tion of manufacturing into global value chains and comparative trends 
for the EU, US and China.
Figure 9: Manufacturing share of trade, 2000-15, major economies
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.
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2.3 Manufacturing in the EU 
2.3.1 Manufacturing value added and employment
The contribution of manufacturing to the overall economic perfor-
mance of EU countries varies significantly (Figure 10).
In the central and eastern European countries, Germany and 
Ireland, manufacturing value added is above 20 percent of total value 
added, while in Luxembourg, Cyprus, Greece and the UK, the value 
added is below 10 percent. Manufacturing employment is highest in 
central and eastern European countries, especially in Estonia and 
Croatia. In Ireland and to a lesser extent in the Nordic countries, the 
difference between manufacturing’s share of employment and of value 
added is significant, indicating a bigger concentration of manufactur-
ing in higher productivity activities in these countries. 
Figure 10: Manufacturing’s shares of value added and employment, EU 
countries 2015, %
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
Figure 11 looks at the differences between EU countries in terms of the 
trends in manufacturing’s share of value added and employment from 
2000 to 2015). For the EU as a whole, the manufacturing sector during 
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this period saw its shares of value added and employment drop, with the 
latter more pronounced, indicating a manufacturing sector that is at a 
higher level of productivity in 2015 compared to 2000. Most EU countries 
are in line with this EU aggregate trend. No EU country saw an increase in 
manufacturing employment, while manufacturing’s share of value added 
increased only in Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Hungary and the Czech 
Republic. This group of countries also saw the least reduction in manufac-
turing employment, with the exception of Hungary.
The largest reductions in manufacturing employment were recorded 
in Malta, Ireland, Slovenia, Spain, the UK and Finland. In Hungary, 
Slovenia, Germany, Estonia, Denmark, Ireland and Spain, the drop in 
employment has been larger than the drop in value added, indicating a 
restructuring towards higher productivity manufacturing activities.
Figure 11: Changes to manufacturing value added and employment, 2000-15, %
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat.
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Figure 12 further illustrates the shift to higher value added activities 
in manufacturing, which is taking place through the shift from low 
to high technology-intensive manufacturing sectors. In the EU as an 
aggregate and in all EU countries, the drop in employment has been 
greatest in low- and medium-low technology-intensive manufactur-
ing sectors, much greater than the drop in high and medium-high 
technology-intensive manufacturing sectors. In Slovakia, the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Slovenia, high and medium-high technology 
sectors have expanded substantially. 
Figure 12: Change in employment (numbers of employees) by technology 
intensity of the manufacturing sector, 2000-15
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: Data for Croatia is not available .
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groups, albeit to a lesser extent in the EU15. In the later period (2007-
14), the contribution of manufacturing to productivity growth turned 
negative for the EU15 countries but remained positive in countries 
that joined the EU in 2004 and after (panels B and D in Figure 13). 
For both groups of countries, services – particularly non-market 
services, ICT and professional services – are important contributors 
to overall productivity growth. 
A sector’s contribution to overall productivity growth is a combi-
nation of its weight and its productivity growth performance. When 
comparing panels B and D to panels A and C in Figure 13, we see 
that for the EU15, the negative contribution of manufacturing to total 
productivity growth in the later period is because the productivity 
growth in the manufacturing sector, although positive, was not suf-
ficient to compensate for the loss in weight of the sector in the total 
economy. By contrast, in the countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 
after, manufacturing’s productivity growth was sufficiently strong to 
compensate for the loss of manufacturing weight, such that overall, 
the manufacturing sector continued to contribute positively to the 
overall economy’s productivity growth. For services, the outlook 
in terms of the contribution to productivity growth underlines the 
importance of this sector, especially information and communica-
tion, professional, scientific and technical services, and non-market 
services for both country groups.
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Figure 13: Contribution of different sectors to productivity
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2.3.3 Manufacturing output, skill and wages
The shift in manufacturing employment and productivity has had major 
implications for wages (Figure 14). All countries have seen a drop in the 
total hours worked (a combined effect of a drop in the number of employ-
ees and number of hours worked per employee). This reduction in total 
hours worked has been associated with an increase in the productivity per 
hour worked, as reflected in the output/hour series. The increase in hourly 
productivity was smallest in Spain and Italy. It was much larger in the US 
than in most EU countries. Only Sweden, Ireland and the Czech Republic 
outperformed the US in terms of growth in output per hour worked. 
But how much of this higher productivity has translated into a higher 
real hourly wage for those remaining in the manufacturing workforce? 
How much of the higher value added is captured by labour? In all coun-
tries, the real hourly compensation increased, but to a lesser extent than 
the increase in output per hour. The discrepancy is greatest in the US, 
where the output per hour growth is more than four times the growth in 
real hourly compensation. The difference is the smallest in Italy, which 
also is the country with the smallest increase in output per hour. 
Figure 15 shows the contribution of skill composition changes to man-
ufacturing value added growth rates for various EU countries. The labour 
composition change (measured as the change in the share of higher 
skilled workers, proxied by their education, in the total manufacturing 
workforce), contributes positively to manufacturing value added growth 
in all countries and throughout the period, underlining the role of skills as 
a positive and significant contributor. However, the change in skill compo-
sition makes only a small contribution. In contrast, total hours worked is 
a big negative contributor to manufacturing’s value added growth rate in 
France, Italy and Sweden. The exceptions are Germany and the UK in the 
most recent period, total hours worked contributes slightly positively.
Figure 15 also shows the importance of total factor productivity (TFP), 
a proxy for technological progress, as a major contributor to manufactur-
ing value added growth, at least before the crisis period. 
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This is evident for all countries except Italy. TFP has however 
become less important and its contribution even seems to have turned 
negative in the most recent period. This is again a reminder that the 
contribution of manufacturing to value added growth through higher 
value added performance cannot be taken for granted. 
Figure 14: Manufacturing output, compensation and total hours worked, average 
annual change in %, 2000-15
Source: Bruegel based on the Conference Board.
Figure 15: Growth in real value added in manufacturing, decomposed, selected 
countries, %
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS.
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2.4 Manufacturing innovation
To further illustrate the scope for the manufacturing sector to contrib-
ute to overall economic growth through higher value added activity, 
we look in this section at the innovative profile of the EU manufactur-
ing sector, compared to global competitors. 
In contrast to its low shares of value added and employment, man-
ufacturing accounts for almost two-thirds of total EU R&D investment. 
This reflects manufacturing’s high innovation potential compared to 
other sectors (Figure 16). Nevertheless, manufacturing’s share of over-
all R&D is gradually eroding, as service sectors’ share of overall R&D 
increases.
Within the EU, manufacturing’s share of R&D is 70 percent or 
more in countries such as Germany, Finland, Italy and Sweden. But in 
countries such as Estonia, the UK, Ireland, Portugal and Poland, the 
services share of R&D is already greater than that of manufacturing. 
Figure 16: Manufacturing vs. services, shares of total business enterprise R&D 
expenditure, 2014
Source: Eurostat and OECD for the US.
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It is well known that overall the EU has a problem with its innova-
tion capacity, persistently lagging behind, and failing to catch up with, 
the US. Figure 17 clearly shows that the EU’s R&D intensity remains 
stuck around 2 percent (in other words, the EU spends 2 percent of its 
GDP on R&D), consistently below the US and Japanese ratios, and despite 
a 3 percent target, set by the EU, being in place since 2000. This is in con-
trast to Korea and especially China, which have dramatically increased 
their R&D intensity levels. China caught up with the EU in 2014.
Figure 17: Total economy R&D intensity in %, 2000-15
Source: Eurostat. Note: R&D intensity = R&D spending as % of GDP.
The failure of the EU to improve its R&D performance has been 
widely analysed (see for example Veugelers and Cincera, 2015). The 
failure is generally attributed to the EU having its economic structure 
concentrated in medium-technology sectors, and failing to move 
into new, higher technology sectors with more scope for innova-
tion-based growth. The EU’s creative destruction problem holds 
both for the shift within manufacturing from lower-tech sectors into 
higher-tech new subsectors, and for the shift from manufacturing 
into higher-tech services sectors.
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Using data on the largest R&D-spending firms worldwide 
(EC-JRC-IPTS Scoreboard), Table 1 shows that the shortfall in the 
EU’s manufacturing innovation capacity relative to the US is not 
down to the within-sector underperformance of EU manufactur-
ing firms (Cincera and Veugelers, 2010; Moncada, 2016). The R&D 
intensity of EU manufacturers compares well with that of their US 
counterparts within the same sectors (Table 1, left-hand columns). In 
some manufacturing sectors, such as aerospace and automobiles, EU 
firms even outperform their US rivals. The only exception is biotech, 
a small but nevertheless strategic sector, in which the EU has much 
smaller companies that are less R&D intensive compared to their US 
peers. The EU’s biotech R&D gap compared to the US is primarily 
caused by the EU not having enough biotech firms (like Amgen or 
Genentech) that successfully transform into large global champions. 
The overall lower R&D intensity of EU firms relative to US firms is 
rather a result of the lower presence of EU firms in high-tech sectors 
with a higher potential for innovation-based growth (Table 1, right-
hand columns). Within manufacturing, the most R&D-intensive sec-
tors are health (pharmaceuticals and biotechnology) and IT equip-
ment (especially semiconductors and telecom equipments). 
In the high R&D intensity sectors, such as semiconductors, EU 
firms are as R&D intensive as their US counterparts, but the EU 
simply does not have enough of these companies. In the US, the 
semiconductors sector has a share of more than 10 percent of overall 
corporate R&D. In the EU, the sector accounts for less than 3 percent 
and the share is declining. In telecom equipment, EU and US firms 
have comparable R&D intensity rates, but this sector’s share of over-
all R&D is declining as the industry moves to Asia. 
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Table 1: R&D intensity by sector, and sectoral R&D shares in the EU and the US 
(2005-13)
R&D intensity of 
sectors (ICB-4)
Sectoral R&D Intensity 
WITHIN
Sectoral share 
BETWEEN
EU USA EU USA
20
05
20
09
20
13
20
05
20
09
20
13
20
05
20
09
20
13
20
05
20
09
20
13
Se
le
ct
ed
 h
ig
h
 R
&
D
 in
te
n
si
ty Pharma 14.7 14.6 13.4 14.2 14.7 14 17.0 16.2 17.1 18.7 18.4 15.6
Biotech 17.1 17.1 15.1 26.9 23.2 26.4 0.6 0.6 0.7 4.6 5.4 5.7
Software 13.4 14.6 15.6 15.7 14.8 14.9 2.1 2.7 2.7 9.4 10.3 11.6
Semiconductors 17.4 22 18.1 15.6 19.4 18.8 3.1 2.7 2.4 11.5 11.1 11.6
Telecoms 
equipment
13.2 13.3 14.6 12.1 15.1 14.3 8.6 8.7 6.4 7.5 7.6 7.1
Weighted 
average
14.5 14.9 14.3 15.6 16.6 16.7 31.4 30.9 29.3 51.7 52.8 51.6
Se
le
ct
ed
 m
ed
-h
ig
h
 R
&
D
 in
te
n
si
ty
Aerospace and 
defence
8.2 5.8 5.8 2.9 3 3.3 8.0 6.4 6.2 3.9 4.7 3.5
Automobiles 
and parts
4.5 5.6 5.5 3.7 4.1 3.8 24.3 22.4 26.8 11.4 7.3 6.7
Chemicals 3.5 3.5 2 2.5 2.9 3.6 5.8 5.9 3.0 3.1 2.4 2.9
Electronic 
equipment
5.8 6.3 8.1 6.3 7.7 4.4 1.0 1.1 1.7 7.8 6.5 9.0
Industrial 
machinery
2.9 3 3.5 1.4 2.8 2.5 2.2 2.5 3.3 0.2 0.7 0.5
Weighted 
average
5.0 5.2 5.2 4.2 4.8 3.9 41.3 38.3 41.0 26.4 21.6 22.6
Total (all sectors) 3.0 2.9 3.0 4.4 4.8 5.2 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Bruegel adapted from Moncado (2016) on the basis of http://iri.jrc.ec.europa.
eu/scoreboard.html.
The EU concentrates most of its R&D in the medium-high-tech 
sectors, which have lower R&D intensity rates (lower part of Table 1). 
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Automobiles represents about a quarter of EU corporate R&D. In this 
sector, EU firms are outpacing their US counterparts in terms of R&D 
intensity, but this sector offers less scope for technological progress 
compared to high-tech sectors. The same holds for chemicals and 
industrial machinery. At the higher-tech end of the medium-high 
tech spectrum sits aerospace and defence. In this sector, EU firms 
are more R&D-intensive than their US counterparts, and their share 
of overall EU R&D is higher. In electronic equipment, EU firms are 
much more R&D-intensive than their US counterparts, but the EU 
has less weight than the US in this sector. 
The services sector with the highest R&D intensity is software. 
Similarly to the semiconductors sector, EU software firms are as R&D 
intensive as their US counterparts, but the EU simply does not have 
enough software companies carrying out R&D activities compared to 
the US, where the software’s share of overall corporate R&D is more 
than 10 percent, compared to less than 3 percent in the EU. The weak 
innovation position in this high-tech services sector might jeopard-
ise the EU’s potential for innovation-based productivity growth in 
services sectors.
Figure 18 is based on OECD R&D expenditure data and extends the 
comparison between the EU, US, Japan and China. It confirms that the 
US is specialised in high-technology intensive sectors such as com-
puters and electronics and pharmaceuticals, while the EU focuses its 
manufacturing R&D in the medium-technology intensity sectors, such 
as motors vehicles. Japan is spread between high and medium-tech-
nology intensity sectors. China’s profile covers the high-tech computer 
and electronics sectors and other less R&D-intensive sectors (see the 
chapter Appendix for a classification of the technology intensity of 
manufacturing sectors).
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Figure 18: Manufacturing sectors’ shares of total R&D expenditure, 2013
Source: Bruegel based on OECD.
Figure 19 uses patent statistics to look at the position of the EU in key 
technologies. The six technologies are those identified by the OECD as 
responsible for most of the growth in patenting: biotechnology, pharma-
ceuticals, medical technology, nanotechnology, climate and environ-
mental technologies, and ICT. The numbers represent the EU’s degree 
of specialisation in these technologies (as measured by the EU’s share 
of patents in each technology, relative to the EU’s share of total patents). 
Values above 1 mean a specialisation in a technology. 
The EU clearly does not specialise in any of these key technologies, 
and leads in none of them, compared to the US and Japan. The EU is 
slowly increasing its degree of specialisation in most of the technologies, 
but not in digital or clean technologies. In clean technology, Japan has a 
clear specialisation and the US has recently sharpened its focus. 
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Figure 19: The EU’s degree of specialisation in new technologies
Source: Bruegel based on OECD. Note: Figures in brackets are each technology’s share 
of total patents, 2012.
Europe has identified six key enabling technologies (KETs): micro and 
nanoelectronics, nanotechnology, industrial biotechnology, advanced 
materials, photonics and advanced manufacturing technologies. These 
are technology areas with potential applications in multiple industries 
and that could help tackle major societal challenges, and in which the EU 
has the scientific and technological strengths to become a global leader, 
but risks falling behind in the commercialisation of KET-based goods 
(European Commission, 2012a). KETs have become a fundamental part 
of the European Commission’s manufacturing revival strategy and money 
has been earmarked for them under the EU’s Horizon 2020 research pro-
gramme. These KETs also figure prominently in the Industry 4.0 debates in 
the EU member states (Smit et al, 2016). 
All the KETs are new and emerging areas, as shown by their small but 
fast-growing patent numbers. Figure 20 shows the development of patent-
ing of KETs in the EU, the US and Japan in terms of each economy’s share 
of KET patents, relative to its share of total patents. Values above 1 mean a 
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specialisation in a technology. The EU is not specialised and does not have a 
clear leading position compared to US and Japan in any of the KETs. Japan is 
a clear innovation leader in micro nanotechnologies and advanced materi-
als, whereas the US specialises in industrial biotechnology.
Figure 20: Patents in key enabling technologies (KETs)
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT. Note: Advanced manufacturing technologies are 
not included because of data limitations. IPC codes and classifications are based on 
Annex 2 of EC JRC Technical Report (2015). Figures in brackets are each technology’s 
shares of total patents as of 2014.
2.5 Summary of main findings
• The decline of manufacturing value added and employment has 
been ongoing at least since the 1970s in major advanced countries, 
making it a long-term structural trend. At best the decline will 
bottom out, but it is unlikely to be reversed. As such, the European 
Commission’s 20 percent target for manufacturing to contribute to 
EU GDP by 2020 does not look to be attainable.
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• Despite its declining weight in the overall EU economy, manufac-
turing accounts for two-thirds of total R&D, provides half of pro-
ductivity growth and represents 63 percent to 65 percent of exports 
and imports. Therefore, manufacturing will remain a vital sector in 
the EU for its innovation, productivity and trade potential. 
• The importance of European manufacturing in the future and the 
sector’s competitive advantage over major advanced and emerging 
economies will have to come from improved productivity growth 
performance. This will require a shift to higher value added activities.
• To boost EU manufacturing, greater capacity for creative destruc-
tion and reallocation of resources is needed. What matters in this 
process is (i) reallocation within manufacturing to sectors, activities 
and jobs with scope for high value added, and (ii) reallocation to 
higher value added services activities. Equally important is invest-
ing in the services sectors. The non-market services sector, profes-
sional and scientific services, information and communication and 
financial services account for the bulk of the positive contribution to 
value added growth in the EU, US and Japan. Moreover, non-market 
services, professional and information and communication services 
account for a large part of within-EU productivity growth.
• The absolute number of jobs in EU manufacturing has declined. At 
the same time output per hour and, to a lesser extent, real hourly 
compensation have increased in more EU countries and in the US. 
To put it simply, manufacturing is employing fewer workers who 
generate greater output for higher pay.
• Manufacturing is increasingly demanding higher skills. The skill 
composition (share of high skilled workers) has been contributing 
positively to manufacturing productivity growth in major EU econ-
omies since the mid-1990s. In this respect, the EU needs policies 
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to ensure that those who are exiting manufacturing have sufficient 
skills to be able to re-enter the labour force, either by moving to an-
other part of the manufacturing sector, or by entering an altogether 
different sector such as services. EU policies aimed at retraining, 
education including lifetime learning and support for entrepre-
neurial initiatives are crucial.
• When looking at the manufacturing sector’s innovation-based 
higher value added trajectory, the signs are not very promising that 
this restructuring process is taking place sufficiently dynamically in 
the EU, compared to the US and, in some instances, Japan.
• The EU has innovation capacity mainly in medium-high technology 
sectors, particularly motor vehicles, chemicals and industrial tech-
nology, whereas the US is a leader in high R&D intensity sectors 
such as software, biotechnology and computer electronics. In this 
respect, there is room for the EU to expand its innovation poten-
tial by focusing on higher technology-intensive sectors including 
services sectors.
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Appendix 
Classification of manufacturing industries by technology intensity 
based on NACE Rev. 2, 2-digit level
Technology 
intensity
Manufacturing intensity
High-
technology
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and pharmaceutical 
preparations (21);
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products (26)
Medium-high-
technology
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products (20);
Manufacture of electrical equipment (27);
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (28);
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers (29);
Manufacture of other transport equipment (30)
Medium-low-
technology
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products (19);
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (22);
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (23);
Manufacture of basic metals (24);
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and 
equipment (25)
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment (33)
Low-
technology
Manufacture of food products (10);
Manufacture of beverages (11);
Manufacture of tobacco products (12);
Manufacture of textiles (13);
Manufacture of wearing apparel (14);
Manufacture of leather and related products (15);
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, except 
furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting materials 
(16);
Manufacture of paper and paper products (17);
Printing and reproduction of recorded media (18)
Manufacture of furniture (31);
Other manufacturing (32)
Source: Eurostat.
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3 The competitiveness of 
European industry in the 
digital era
Carlo Altomonte, Filippo Biondi and Valeria Negri6
In the current digital era, the competitiveness of European industry is 
strictly dependent on information and communications technology 
(ICT) and related investments. The forthcoming ‘fourth industrial 
revolution’, dubbed Industry 4.0, will further heighten the role of ICT in 
industrial competitiveness. In fact, pervasive use of ICT and the devel-
opment of so-called ‘cyber-physical systems’7 will help firms expand 
their product ranges, customise their services and respond better 
to client demand. Moreover, these developments could help reduce 
inefficiency in the use of capital and labour, for example by reducing 
inventories and transaction costs, which could lead to a more efficient 
matching of supply and demand and enable the growth of new mar-
kets. All these effects should lead to higher productivity growth8.
In this chapter we assess the link between ICT and the competi-
tiveness of EU industry, from macro and micro perspectives. From the 
6 The authors wish to thank Assolombarda Confindustria Milano Monza e Brianza 
for making their firm-level dataset on the performance of European firms available 
to us. Any error, opinion and omission in using this data is our sole responsibility.
7 Examples are smart grid, autonomous automobile systems, medical monitoring, 
process control systems, and robotics systems.
8 Several theories have been proposed to describe the dynamic effects of ICT revolu-
tion on competitiveness and to assess possible differences between countries. See 
in particular Jorgenson, Ho and Stiroh (2002, 2008), Gordon (2000, 2012), van Ark, 
O’Mahony and Timmer (2008) and Acemoglu et al (2014).
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macroeconomic point of view, we show how and to what extent ICT 
has contributed to the value-added and productivity dynamics of the 
EU manufacturing sector. We then move to firm-level information, 
exploring in detail the link between the exposure of companies to digi-
talisation and their productivity, controlling for a number of additional 
characteristics often related to competitiveness, such as companies’ 
internationalisation and innovation activities. We find that the effects 
of ICT are on average positive and significant for competitiveness (at 
the macro level), but that these effects are essentially driven by the 
most productive companies (the right tail of the productivity distribu-
tion at the micro level).
As a result, while ICT and Industry 4.0 are powerful policy tools 
to foster the competitiveness of EU industry, they are also likely to 
increase the gap between the most successful companies and those 
left behind, leading to an increase in territorial and social inequalities, 
potentially making appropriate accompanying policies necessary.
3.1 The macro view: manufacturing growth and its determinants
Starting with a macroeconomic overview, we use a standard growth 
accounting approach to assess the main contributions to value added 
growth in the manufacturing sectors of ten European countries9. 
Growth-accounting exercises typically focus on a given time period 
and are used to quantify how much of the rate of change in output can 
be accounted for by the rate of change in different observable inputs, 
while the residual is interpreted as a measure of the rate of change in 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP, ie unobservable technology). In this 
decomposition, the real value added growth of the manufacturing 
9 In this chapter we rely mainly on the recently updated EU KLEMS Growth and 
Productivity Accounts, which covers only 10 EU countries for the moment. New 
releases for all the other EU member states, the US, possibly Japan, and several 
aggregates are expected to become available in summer 2017. The project has been 
carried out by The Conference Board, with the financial support of the European 
Commission under the service contract ECFIN-163-2015/SI2.716986.
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sector is broken down into the contributions of TFP growth, of ICT and 
non-ICT capital, and an hours worked component and a human capi-
tal component (based on the skill composition of the workforce). 
Figure 1 shows the results of the decomposition of value added 
growth at constant prices between 2000 and 2014, on averages, for a 
number of EU countries.
Figure 1: Growth accounting decomposition of manufacturing real value added, 
2000-14 averages
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision.
Significant differences between countries clearly emerge from 
the data: average value added growth in real terms ranges from 2 
percent in Austria to -1 percent in Italy. The impact of TFP growth 
was positive, though highly variable, in every country except Italy. 
The reduction of hours worked, however, acted as a drag on value 
added growth in all countries. Interestingly, with the exception of 
Italy and Finland, this is the only component that depresses average 
growth. The contribution of ICT capital deepening is smaller but 
positive in every country considered, particularly in Sweden and 
Finland. Finally, the increased availability to workers of fixed assets, 
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machinery and equipment remains a positive driver, particularly to 
growth in Austria, Sweden and Italy. 
These long-term averages, however, mask a great cyclicality of the 
value added generated by manufacturing. This was evident in par-
ticular during the crisis of 2008-09, as shown by Figure 2, which also 
shows great variation in the speed of recovery of different countries 
after the crisis.
Figure 2: Long-term dynamics of manufacturing real value added, 2000=100
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision.
In light of the latter, we replicate the analysis excluding the 2008-
10 period. Figure 3 shows average contributions during the pre- and 
post-crisis periods.
As Figure 3 shows, the post-crisis period has been characterised 
by a general slowdown in the average growth rate of real value added 
in the manufacturing sector. In most of the countries considered, this 
has been mainly driven by a collapse in the contribution of TFP and 
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a substantial decrease of non-ICT capital deepening, direct conse-
quences of a drop in corporate investment. Furthermore, in Finland, 
Spain and Italy, where the depressive effects of the crisis were deeper, 
a remarkable reduction of hours worked (because of both redundan-
cies and closures of firms) further worsened the situation. 
Figure 3: Growth accounting decomposition of manufacturing real value added, 
excluding crisis period
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision. Note: * last year of post-crisis period is 2013.
3.2 Manufacturing vs. total economy: the same output with fewer jobs? 
The aforementioned trends in value added and hours worked drove, 
though in opposite directions, the dynamics of labour productivity 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4: Long-term dynamics of labour productivity in manufacturing, 2000=100
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision.
When the trends before and after the crisis are compared, a slow-
down in productivity growth clearly emerges also for labour productiv-
ity. There is certainly a cyclical explanation for that, as similar dynamics 
were seen after the recession in 2001. In fact, this cyclical slowdown has 
been mainly driven by an ‘decoupling’ of hours worked and produc-
tion: the share of hours worked in manufacturing has fallen by between 
10 and 30 points in Europe since 2000 and has not recovered (with the 
only exceptions being Germany and Italy after 2013), while the share of 
manufacturing output has followed the typical dynamics of the crisis 
(fall and recovery during 2008-13). These trends in turn led to a cyclical 
recovery of manufacturing labour productivity.
To build on this evidence, we have estimated the contribution of the 
manufacturing sector to the growth of labour productivity in the total 
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market economy of each country10. Figure 5 shows our estimates, pro-
viding a comparison of average contributions before and after the crisis.
Since 2011, the manufacturing sector has positively contributed 
to the productivity growth of the overall economy only in Austria, 
Germany and Spain. In France and Italy the manufacturing sector has 
at least stopped being a drag on productivity growth, while in the other 
countries the contribution was zero or even turned negative.
The changes in the contribution reflect both the changes in the 
relative share of hours worked in manufacturing (out of the total market 
economy hours worked) and the changes in labour productivity in 
each industry: in general, the overall contraction of the contribution 
of manufacturing to the economy can be mainly attributed to the 
decreasing relevance of manufacturing in terms of hours worked.
Figure 5: Contribution of manufacturing to labour productivity growth of market 
economy, average pre- (2001-07) vs. post-crisis (2011-14)
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision.
10 In line with the definition of EU KLEMS, the market economy covers all the indus-
tries included in the classification NACE Rev.2 with the exception of: real estate ac-
tivities (cod. L); public administration and defence; compulsory social security (cod. 
O); education (cod. P); health and social work (cod. Q); activities of households as 
employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activities of households 
for own use (cod. T); activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies (cod. U).
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We will now try to understand whether and to what extent the dif-
ferent trends in productivity we have reviewed are related to different 
degrees of digitalisation of manufacturing production across Europe.
3.3 The role of IT adoption in the manufacturing sector 
To provide a macroeconomic overview of digitalisation in manufac-
turing, we use the estimates of capital stock available in the EU KLEMS 
database. In particular, we focus on the accumulated amount of com-
puting equipment and computer software and databases. Figure 6 
shows how the IT intensity of manufacturing has evolved differently 
in different countries over the last fifteen years.
Figure 6: Real IT capital stock per hour worked in the manufacturing sector, 
2000=100
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision. Notes: Real fixed capital stock (2010 prices). Belgium is missing because 
of unavailability of detailed capital input data. 
The increasing adoption of information technology in manu-
facturing has been particularly marked in Finland, Germany and 
Sweden. Investments in IT capital have been significantly lower in 
the manufacturing sectors of Spain, Italy and France.
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To investigate whether and to what extent these differences in IT 
capital deepening correlate with productivity performance, we com-
pare the growth rates of the IT capital stock (divided by total hours 
worked) with productivity dynamics in the manufacturing sector. 
Figure 7 shows scatter plots for labour and TFP, before and 
after the crisis. We find that greater growth in IT capital stock in 
a country is associated with better productivity performance, 
in terms of both labour productivity and TFP. However, it is worth 
noting how the magnitude of this relationship changed after the 
2008-09 crisis. For both labour productivity and TFP, the estimated 
coefficient is lower in the latter period and the same holds for the R2, 
meaning that the relationship between the two variables has been 
affected by other factors. This is not surprising, given the bumpy 
recovery of the European economy in the post-crisis period, with a 
significant contraction in aggregate demand.
Figure 7: Productivity and IT capital stock growth in manufacturing
Source: Bruegel based on EU KLEMS Growth and Productivity Accounts, December 
2016 revision. Notes: TFP for Sweden was not available in 2014.
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We replicate the analysis for different industries within the same 
group of countries. To account for industry-specific characteristics, we 
add to the univariate regressions industry dummies and weights based 
on the value added share of each industry (out of total manufacturing), 
in order to adjust for country-specific industrial composition. Table 
1 shows the results. The positive relationship during the pre-crisis 
period is confirmed also at industry level (though with a slightly lower 
coefficient), while in the more recent years the (decreased) IT adoption 
rate was not correlated with the slowdown in productivity growth.
Table 1: Productivity & IT capital stock growth in manufacturing, industry-level 
correlations
Pre-crisis period (2000-2007) Post-crisis period (2011-2014)
LP growth TFP growth LP growth TFP growth
IT capital 
stock per 
hours 
worked 
growth
0.21*** 0.29*** 0.11*** 0.11*** -0.025 -0.031 -0.02 -0.027
(0.064) (0.015) (0.043) (0.013) (0.0617) (0.019) (0.0662) (0.0217)
Constant 0.11 0.07*** 0.08 0.06*** -0.008 -0.0007 -0.022 -0.02***
(0.077) (0.019) (0.07) (0.017) (0.027) (0.006) (0.029) (0.007)
Observa-
tions
88 88 88 88 88 88 80 80
R-squared 0.36 0.54 0.28 0.40 0.31 0.33 0.25 0.24
Value 
added share 
weights
No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Industry 
dummies
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Source: Bruegel. Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors in pa-
rentheses. TFP for Sweden was not available in 2014. Industry C19 (Coke and refined 
petroleum products) has been excluded.
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3.4 From macro to micro: evidence from a new survey of firms’ strategies
The mixed results in terms of the correlation between ICT invest-
ment and productivity growth in EU manufacturing through the crisis 
can be explored in more detail by looking at firm-level dynamics. As 
acknowledged by the OECD (Van Ark, 2005), “within an industry, some 
leading firms invest heavily in ICT and organisational change and reap 
the accompanying productivity gains. But there are also laggards with 
lower productivity growth. These laggards may have also invested heavily 
in ICT, but were less successful in realising soft savings. Although in time 
these laggards are likely to either exit or catch-up with the leaders due to 
competitive pressures, this inevitably takes time. In the meantime, indus-
try performance will reflect both leading and lagging firm performance”. 
The latter aggregation effect could be particularly relevant in the 
post-crisis context. The weak economic cycle in Europe might in fact 
increase the delay during which ICT laggards are reaping the benefits 
of their investment, leading to the non-significant effect of ICT on pro-
ductivity that we have found in our macro estimates.
In order to shed more light on this issue, we use a new firm-level 
dataset made available to us by Assolombarda, the largest local branch 
of the Italian entrepreneurial association (Confindustria). The dataset 
is a representative sample of manufacturing firms with more than 
10 employees operating in five large European regions: Lombardy 
(Italy), Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria (Germany), Catalonia (Spain) 
and Rhône-Alpes (France) (Box 1).
Box 1: The Assolombarda Benchmark Dataset - 2013
The dataset uses as a methodological benchmark the 2010 EU-funded 
cross-country survey European firms in a global economy: Internal policies 
for external competitiveness (EFIGE). The questionnaire sent to firms covers 
seven different broad areas:
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• Firm structure (company ownership, domestic and foreign control, management);
• Workforce (skills, type of contracts, training);
• Investments and related financing;
• Innovation, patent activity and R&D (and related financing);
• Export and internationalisation processes;
• Financial structure and bank-firm relationship;
• Market structure and competition; 
• Bureaucracy and administrative context.
As the survey was run in early 2015, information is mostly collected as a 
cross-section for the last available budgetary year (ie 2013), although some 
questions cover the period 2011-13 and/or the behaviour of firms in comparison 
to the pre-crisis period or during the crisis. Data is integrated with balance sheet 
information from the Orbis database managed by Bureau van Dijk. For 2013, the 
regional distribution of available firms in the dataset is described in Table A1.
Table A1: Regional distribution of firms in the survey
Region Number of Firms
Baden-Württemberg 99
Bayern 100
Cataluña 103
Lombardy 241
Rhône-Alpes 101
Total 644
To measure the exposure of firms to ICT, we exploit a question in 
the survey that asks firms to state if they adopted in 2013 one or more 
of: internal information management systems (eg ERP), advanced 
management systems (eg CRM or Groupware), systems for automatic 
information sharing between customers and suppliers (eg virtual 
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marketplace)11. We define a variable digit as a dummy equal to 1 if the 
firm has a basic level of digitalisation of its management and market-
ing, ie it adopts at least one of the listed IT technologies. 
We also use other control variables known in the literature to be 
correlated, along with ICT, with the productivity of firms. One of the 
most important is the internationalisation of a firm’s activities – if the 
firm operates only on the domestic market or if it imports, exports, 
outsources or invests in a foreign country. The dummy variable 
int_active will detect whether the firm has pursued at least one of 
the above activities, or, in other words, if it participates in some way 
in global value chains. Another variable we consider is the firm’s 
innovation status. The dummy R&D is set to a value of 1 if a firm per-
formed any R&D activity in 2013. The dummy fam_mgmt meanwhile 
accounts for governance differences between firms: its value is 1 if a 
firm’s board is entirely composed of members of the family that owns 
the company, thus operating a selection between family-managed/
owned firms and others. 
Table 2 reports the distribution of these variables in 2013 for each 
region, size class and industry12, and for the overall weighted sample13. 
Only a small majority of the firms in our sample (55.9 percent) 
adopted at least one IT instrument in 2013, a result that suggests that 
the digital transition is still far from complete. Regarding internation-
alisation, a large majority (68 percent) of surveyed firms are interna-
tionally active, a figure that is likely related to the lower dimensional 
11 Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) is an example of a digital system for the man-
agement of internal information: it integrates all the relevant business processes 
(sales, purchases, accounting, etc) into the same platform. Customer Relationship 
Management (CRM) and Groupware software are two examples of advanced man-
agement tools. Virtual marketplaces are platforms through which digital informa-
tion is shared between vendors and customers.
12  Industry defined as 4 macro‐sector based on Eurostat‐NACE Rev. 2 classification of 
2-digit manufacturing industries by R&D intensities.
13  The weighting scheme adopted is described in the Appendix. 
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threshold of our sample (at least 10 employees); however most sur-
veyed firms participate in international activities at the simplest level 
(only importing or exporting). Finally, most firms did not pursue any 
R&D activity in 2013, though there is an increasing likelihood of this 
kind of investment depending on the industry type. The percentage 
of firms totally managed by family is remarkably high in Lombardy 
and in the two German regions, consistent with known evidence of 
the prevalence of family firms in Italy and Germany.
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables of the survey, by region 
and size class
Region Baden-
Württemberg
Bavaria Rhône-
Alpes
Catalonia Lombardy Total 
Sample
% of 
digitalised 
firms
55.0 50.2 69.9 61.4 52.2 55.9
% of 
internationally 
active firms
58.3 56.7 73.2 80.6 72.7 68.2
% of firms 
performing 
R&D 
40.2 39.2 53.7 28.4 39.9 39.7
% of family 
managed 
firms
47.5 45.8 19.2 41.3 63.5 49.2
Class-size Number of employees
10-49 50-249 250+ Total
% of digitalised firms 51.2 77 96.2 55.9
% of internationally active 
firms
65.1 84.9 98.1 68.2
% of firms performing R&D 35.9 59.4 76.5 39.6
% of family managed firms 53.5 20.1 1.4 49.2
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Industry-type Low 
technology
Medium-
low 
technology
Medium-
high 
technology
High 
technology
Total
% of digitalised 
firms
44.9 59.8 65.3 86.1 55.9
% of 
internationally 
active firms
61.2 67.5 80.9 86.1 68.2
% of firms 
performing R&D
34.9 35.3 54.8 56.6 39.6
% of family 
managed firms
55.9 47.6 43.1 15.2 49.2
Source: Bruegel based on Assolombarda Benchmark data.
Distinguishing by size class, it is not surprising to see that the per-
centage of firms pursuing digitalisation, performing R&D and being 
internationally active increases with size, while the share of firms 
with family management is lower for larger firms. Figure 8 shows the 
distribution of firm labour productivity in our sample (computed as 
the value added of each firm divided by the number of employees) 
relative to the digitalisation variable.
Figure 8: Distribution of labour productivity in 2013, by degree of firm digitalisation
Source: Bruegel based on Assolombarda Benchmark data. 
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This preliminary evidence confirms the idea that the overall 
productivity distribution of firms that adopt at least one ICT tool 
dominates that of firms not using ICT. This is confirmed also by run-
ning a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions 
(results reported in the chapter Appendix). Controlling for different 
levels of ICT adoption (ie one, two or three of the IT tools covered by 
the survey) we obtain the results summarised in Table 3. 
Table 3: Log of labour productivity by number of ICT instruments adopted
No 
digitalisation
1 ICT 
instrument
2 or 3 ICT 
instruments
Median 4.22 4.39 4.54
Top 25% of firms 4.56 4.70 5.03
Std. Deviation 0.61 0.64 0.64
Observations 247 237 128
Source: Bruegel based on Assolombarda Benchmark data.
Not surprisingly the median productivity of firms grows in line 
with the number of ICT tools adopted, with a 4 percent productivity 
increase when adding one ICT tool, and a further increase of 2 percent 
when moving from one to two or more ICT tools. Firm-level data also 
makes it possible to look at these effects for the top 25 percent of firms 
in the productivity distribution. For the top firms, the adoption of one 
ICT instrument generates a 3 percent gain in productivity compared 
to the digitally non-active firms. Interestingly, for those ‘top’ firms, 
adding a second (or more) ICT tool is associated with an 8 percent 
increase in productivity compared to those firms that use just one 
digital tool. This is consistent with the intuition put forward by Van 
Ark (2005) and more recently by Andrews et al (2015), who, also using 
firm-level data, found an uneven process of technological diffusion in 
which global frontier technologies only diffuse to laggards once they 
are adapted to country-specific circumstances by the most productive 
(leading) firms.
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To go beyond simple unconditional correlations, ie assessing 
whether and to what extent the positive relationship between digi-
talisation and labour productivity robustly holds at different parts of 
the firm level distribution, we have run different estimations, adding 
different controls at every step (Box 2). 
Box 2: Econometric approach
The general framework is the following:
The first specification (1) regresses the labour productivity on the three main 
dummy variables we analysed in the descriptive statistics part. Controlling 
for R&D and international activities is coherent with theory and previous 
researches: internationalisation was found to be positively correlated with 
labour productivity and even with digitalisation level via OLS regression. 
Similarly, activities in R&D could be seen as connected to a higher productivity 
firm. Thus, controlling for these two variables helps us to isolate the effect of 
digitalisation on productivity.
In the second specification (2), we add as a control the variable fam_mgmt, 
which describes if a firm’s board is family-based. Adding this control operates 
a selection within our sample, investigating only family-owned firms. Family-
managed firms are known to display on average lower levels of productivity as 
well as lower levels of ICT adoption (see Altomonte et al, 2012). 
In all the regressions, we control for regional, sectoral and firm-size fixed 
effects. To investigate heterogeneous effects beyond the average, and thus 
exploring the different (if any) behaviour of leading compared to laggard firms, 
we exploit a simultaneous-quantile regression (considering the 20th, 40th, 
60th and 80th percentiles of the productivity distribution).
Table 4 shows the results for the two specifications, for the quantiles of 
the productivity distribution. Table 4 also shows the average result for 
the whole sample.
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Table 4: ICT and productivity, quantiles and average effect – productivity levels
Bottom 
20% 
Bottom 
40%
Top 40% Top 20% Average
Specification (1) 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.12** 0.23*** 0.16***
Specification (2) 0.15** 0.17*** 0.16** 0.25*** 0.18***
Note: * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%.  The table reports 
the coefficient of the digit variable in a quantile regression for the different percentiles, 
and a standard OLS specification for average effect. Specification (1) controls for inter-
nationalisation and R&D activities of firms. Specification (2) replicates specification 
(1) on family firms also controlling for a governance model carried out through family 
management. All regressions include regional, sectoral and firm-size fixed effects.
We found that on average, digitalisation (in the sense of adopting at 
least one of the three ICT tools) is associated with higher productiv-
ity levels of firms ranging, on average, from 16 percent to 18 percent 
depending on the underlying specification. The coefficient on digit is 
always positive and significant also for the entire productivity distribu-
tion. Consistent with our initial assumption, results show in particular 
that when ICT is adopted by the top 20 percent most productive 
firms, it is associated with even higher productivity levels. It is easy 
to visually gauge the differences between quintiles by plotting as an 
example the coefficient results for the first specification (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Estimated coefficient and 95% confidence intervals, first specification
Source: Bruegel.
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In order to better link our firm-level analysis to the aggregate 
evidence we have reported, we computed the post-crisis growth rate 
of labour productivity of firms (2010-13), and used it as a dependent 
variable in a similar regression exercise. Table 5 summarises the coeffi-
cient results for the two specifications. 
Overall, the result is positive and significant only for the last quan-
tile, thus confirming the hypothesis that only leading firms are able 
to gain from ICT adoption. There, the gain over three-year growth 
from digitalisation ranges from 8 percent to 11 percent, depending on 
the specification. Interestingly, when we include in the sample only 
family-managed firms (specification 2), the gap between leaders and 
laggards is even larger.
Table 5: ICT and productivity, quantiles and average effect – productivity growth
Bottom 
20% 
Bottom 
40%
Top 40% Top 20% Average
Specification (1) 0.002 0.023 0.015 0.082* 0.008
Specification (2) 0.051 0.057 0.041 0.114** 0.056
Note: * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%. The table reports 
the coefficient of the digit variable in a quantile regression for the different percentiles, 
and a standard OLS specification for average effect. Specification (1) controls for inter-
nationalisation and R&D activities of firms. Specification (2) replicates specification 
(1) on family firms also controlling for a governance model carried out through family 
management. All regressions include regional, sectoral and firm-size fixed effects.
3.5 Conclusion
We have assessed the link between ICT and the competitiveness of 
EU industry, from both a macro and a micro perspective. From the 
macroeconomic point of view, we have shown how and to what extent 
ICT has contributed to the value-added and productivity dynamics of 
the EU manufacturing sector. The productivity of manufacturing has 
substantially recovered in Europe, but its contribution to overall pro-
ductivity is small because the manufacturing sector is losing ground in 
terms of share of hours worked throughout the EU.
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When looking at these dynamics from the perspective of firms, 
we find that the effects of ICT are on average positive and significant 
for productivity, but that these are essentially driven by the most 
productive companies (the right tail of the productivity distribution 
at the micro level). This is in particular the case if we concentrate our 
analysis on productivity growth, and especially for firms that have 
family-based governance.
McKinsey (2016) estimates the EU to be operating at 12 percent 
of its digital potential, with huge differences within sectors and 
countries, and some evidence of the early impact of digitalisation, 
with a correlation in all sectors between productivity growth and 
digital intensity. Our analyses at the macro level are consistent with 
these findings. 
While ICT and Industry 4.0 are powerful policy tools to foster 
the competitiveness of EU industry (the EU Digital Single Market 
is estimated to add €375 to €415 billion each year to the EU GDP), 
our analysis at the firm-level shows that these effects are also likely 
to increase the gap between the most successful companies and 
those ‘left behind’.
This raises a key policy issue: as estimated by McKinsey (2016), 
Europe could add €2.5 trillion to GDP in 2025 if laggard sectors were 
to double their digital intensity, thus boosting GDP growth by 1 per-
cent per year over the next decade. Failing to do so would represent a 
missed opportunity and, in light of our results, might also lead to an 
increase in territorial and social inequalities.
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Appendix
We report the complete estimation results for the different specifica-
tions referred to in the text.
Table 5: First specification on productivity levels
ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp
Quantile P20 P40 P60 P80 linear
digit 0.178*** 0.154*** 0.121** 0.227*** 0.161***
0.066 0.054 0.052 0.068 0.052
rd 0.039 0.018 0.121** 0.101 0.062
0.063 0.052 0.062 0.070 0.052
int_active 0.224*** 0.146** 0.103 0.222** 0.183**
0.078 0.063 0.065 0.089 0.059
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 3.983*** 4.306*** 4.513*** 4.771*** 4.454***
Observations 618 618 618 618 612
Pseudo R2 0.1087 0.1041 0.0904 0.1065 0.1399
 * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%
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Table 6: Second specification on productivity levels
ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp ln_lp
Quantile P20 P40 P60 P80 linear
digit 0.152** 0.177*** 0.162** 0.251*** 0.176***
0.068 0.061 0.069 0.078 0.059
rd -0.024 0.028 0.056 0.018 0.011
0.068 0.066 0.075 0.089 0.061
int_active 0.228*** 0.142* 0.147* 0.157 0.159**
0.079 0.077 0.081 0.104 0.069
Fam_mgmt   -0.191**   -0.118*    -0.116* -0.132 -0.162***
0.082 0.061 0.066 0.092 0.059
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.166*** 4.457*** 4.472*** 4.863*** 4.492
Observations 488 488 488 488 488
Pseudo R2 0.1282 0.1157 0.1005 0.1224 0.5867
 * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%
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Table 7: First specification on productivity growth
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
Quantile P20 P40 P60 P80 linear
digit 0.002 0.023 0.015 0.082* 0.008
0.045 0.036 0.024 0.045 0.033
rd -0.034 0.021 0.005 -0.039 -0.025
0.043 0.033 0.028 0.038 0.032
int_active 0.019 -0.034 0.045 0.036 0.027
0.049 0.040 0.031 0.056 0.038
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.174 -0.019 0.073 0.239* 0.076
Observations 604 604 604 604 604
Pseudo R2 0.0218 0.0134 0.0302 0.0351 0.0273
 * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%
77 | REMAKING EUROPE
Table 8: Second specification on productivity growth
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
growth_
lp_3
Quantile P20 P40 P60 P80 linear
digit 0.051 0.057 0.041 0.114** 0.056
0.051 0.038 0.029 0.047 0.037
rd -0.067 0.006 -0.005 -0.058 -0.032
0.051 0.041 0.032 0.045 0.037
int_active -0.032 -0.031 0.039 0.017 0.038
0.065 0.042 0.031 0.061 0.044
fam_mgmt -0.049 -0.021 0.012 0.034 0.0046
0.062 0.036 0.029 0.049 0.039
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Size class FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant -0.249* -0.003 0.024 0.244 0.022
Observations 474 474 474 474 474
Pseudo R2 0.0232 0.0131 0.0325 0.0498 0.0264
 * Significant at 10%. ** Significant at 5%. *** Significant at 1%
Weighting scheme
Absolute weights have been constructed, splitting the sample into 72 
cells by 2 digit NACE Rev. 2 manufacturing industries and the three 
size classes on which the stratification has been carried out. First, 
from Eurostat Structural Business Statistics (year 2010), we computed 
the composition of each region’s economic activity by industry and 
firm size class (ie the population distribution). Second, we repeated 
the same exercise using the data effectively collected (ie the sample 
distribution). Then, for each region, the absolute weight for firms in 
industry k and size class j was built as follows:
(A1)    
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where Pfirms
kj  
is the number of firms in industry k and size class j 
for the population in a given region; Sfirms
kj  
is the number of firms in 
industry k and size class j in the sample; Pfirms and Sfirms are the total 
number of firms in the population and in the sample, respectively. By 
construction, firms belonging to the same sampling interval (ie to the 
same combination industry/size classes) share the same weight. The 
sum of weights over the firms is equal to the total number of firms in 
the sample by region.
Results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for equality of two distribution functions
We ran a two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to verify the statistical 
significance of the differences between the labour productivity distri-
bution functions of firms with ‘no-digitalisation’, ‘1 ICT tool’ and ‘2 or 3 
ICT tools’.
Smaller Group Diff p-value Exact
A (ie non-digitalised) 0.1638 0.001
B (ie 1 ICT tool) -0.0108 0.972
Combined K-S 0.1638 0.003 0.002
Smaller Group Diff p-value Exact
A (ie 1 ICT tool) 0.1388 0.039
B (ie 2-3 ICT tools) -0.0308 0.852
Combined K-S 0.1388 0.078 0.070
Note: Diff is the measure of the discrepancy between the two empirical distribution 
functions of the two groups. The first line tests the hypothesis that labour productivity 
distribution for group A contains smaller values than for group B. Conversely, the sec-
ond line tests the hypothesis that labour productivity distribution for group A contains 
larger values than for group B. The null hypothesis for the final line is that the distribu-
tions are equal. From the results of the tests, we can clearly reject the hypothesis that 
the two distributions are equal to each other in both cases.
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4 Firm growth dynamics and 
productivity in Europe
Albert Bravo-Biosca14
4.1 Introduction
Creative destruction is one of the driving forces of economic growth. 
But despite the importance of firm growth dynamics in this process, 
limited data is available to compare firm growth dynamics in different 
countries. This chapter summarises the results of a multi-country data 
collection initiative led by FORA and Nesta that aimed to fill this gap. 
We collected harmonised micro aggregated data from official business 
registers, which provide quasi-universal coverage of business activity 
in all economic sectors, and developed a new database of firm growth 
distributions for 12 countries, including the United States and sev-
eral small and large European economies. Based on this, we discuss 
a series of stylised facts, identify differences in firm growth dynamics 
14 This chapter builds on a longer working paper published by Nesta (Bravo-Bios-
ca, 2016) available at: www.nesta.org.uk/wp16-03. The data in this chapter was 
collected as a part of a joint Nesta-FORA project in collaboration with Henrik Lynge 
Hansen, Glenda Napier and Ditte Petersen, and with support from the International 
Consortium for Entrepreneurship (ICE). This initiative would not have been possible 
without the generous collaboration of many researchers and statistical agencies in 
the participating countries that provided the data underlying this database. For this 
I would like to thank Werner Hölzl (Austria), Sonja Djukic, Chris Johnston and Chris 
Parsley (Canada), Henrik Lynge Hansen (Denmark), Henri Kahonen, Petri Rouvinen 
and Mika Pajarinen (Finland), Stavroula Maroulaki and Theano Tyfoxylou (Greece), 
Patrizia Cella and Caterina Viviano (Italy), Rico Konen (Netherlands), Geoff Mead 
(New Zealand), Svein Myro and Christian L. Wold Eide (Norway), Valentín Llorente 
Garcia (Spain), David Brown, Ronald Davis and Javier Miranda (US) and, last but not 
least Michael Anyadike-Danes and Mark Hart (UK).
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in different countries (particularly between Europe and the US) and 
examine the effect of firm growth dynamics on productivity growth. 
Differences between countries in firm growth dynamics have 
attracted much interest, particularly of policymakers. However, most 
cross-country research has focused on firm entry and exit rather 
than firm growth because of data constraints. Bartelsman et al (2004) 
concluded that entry and exit rates in developed countries are fairly 
similar, but that there are substantial differences between the US and 
Europe in the growth rates of surviving new entrants. European coun-
tries have fewer high-growth firms than the US (OECD, 2008). And, 
while the US and Europe have similar numbers of companies in the 
ranking of the world’s 500 largest companies by market capitalisation, 
only three of the European companies on the list were founded after 
1975, in sharp contrast to 25 in the US (Véron, 2008). 
We expand on this work by examining the full distribution of firm 
growth across countries. In other words, we do not just look at the 
‘average firm’ or at a subset of firms, whether the youngest, the largest, 
or the fastest growing, but provide a complete picture of how firms 
expand and shrink in each economy, using comparable data extracted 
on the basis of the same methodology and definitions, in partnership 
with national statistical offices or local researchers. We identify sizea-
ble differences, with US firms growing and shrinking much faster than 
European firms, which are much more likely to remain stable across 
sectors and sizes. 
Firm growth dynamics can help explain differences between coun-
tries in aggregate productivity growth, such as the widening produc-
tivity gap between Europe and the US over the last two decades (Ark et 
al, 2008). The reallocation of output and labour towards more produc-
tive plants accounts for about half of total factor productivity growth 
in US manufacturing (Baily et al, 1992; Haltiwanger, 1997). A more 
dynamic growth distribution implies faster resource reallocation, and 
is also a signal of greater competitive pressure, which force firms to 
improve their performance and raise within-firm productivity growth 
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(Bartelsman et al, 2004). We test whether country-industry pairs with 
fewer static firms are associated with faster productivity growth and 
find this to be case. Larger shares of growing and shrinking firms are 
both associated with faster labour and total factor productivity growth. 
Schumpeterian growth models also predict that experimentation 
and selection become more important as industries converge to the 
global technology frontier (Acemoglu et al, 2006). While firms that are 
far from the frontier can improve their productivity by imitating what 
others have already invented, at the frontier they need to innovate. But 
innovation is risky and the outcome uncertain, so only the successful 
few expand while the unsuccessful shrink. Our findings support this 
hypothesis. A very static business growth distribution has a particu-
larly strong negative effect on productivity growth, the closer indus-
tries are to the global technology frontier.  
4.2 The database
We measured the distribution of firm growth using confidential micro-
data extracted from official business registers in 12 countries: Austria15, 
Canada16, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Norway, Spain, the UK17 and the US.
Business registers are assembled from data collected from social 
security records, tax records, censuses and/or other administrative 
15 The data for Austria is extracted from social security records, in which the admin-
istrative unit can be both the establishment and the firm (the firm chooses how to 
report), so while it is the most internationally comparable source of data available, 
there are some limitations in its comparability.
16 Canada only provided data for firms with 10-250 employees, so any aggregate indi-
cator referring to firms with ten or more employees only includes data for the 10-250 
size class for Canada.
17 This work ccontains ONS statistical data, which is Crown copyright and reproduced 
with the permission of the controller of HMSO and the Queen’s Printer for Scotland. 
The use of the ONS statistical data in this work does not imply the endorsement of 
the ONS in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the statistical data. This work 
uses research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggre-
gates.
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sources18. Thus, they provide the most comprehensive coverage of 
economic activity in any country, covering the universe of firms 
(in contrast to commercial providers, whose coverage of business 
activity is limited and differs in different countries). However, access 
to the data is very restricted, so we followed the approach of other 
researchers (Bartelsman et al, 2004; Brandt, 2004; OECD, 2008) and 
partnered with each country’s national statistical office or, alterna-
tively, with researchers based there with permission to access to the 
microdata. We provided them with a methodology manual and a code 
file to extract data, building whenever feasible on the Eurostat-OECD 
Business Demography Manual (2007), which most business registers 
are required to follow. The datasets submitted were then scrutinised 
to identify potential inconsistencies and, if necessary, subjected to a 
process of revision with each country partner. 
We collected data on employment growth between 2002 and 2005. 
In addition, whenever feasible, we also collected data for other three-
year periods (2004-07 or 2005-08), for longer time periods (5-year 
growth or longer) and for turnover growth. The population of firms 
consists of all active employer enterprises (with at least one employee) 
in the private sector (ISIC sector 10_74) that survived during the meas-
urement period. In addition to non-survivors, enterprises born in the 
initial year were also excluded from the analysis. The overall number 
of firms in the participating countries that satisfy these criteria is six 
million, employing over 120 million people in 2002.
For each firm we computed the average annualised growth rate and 
placed the firm into one of 11 growth categories19. The data was then col-
18 See Bravo-Biosca (2016) for a detailed description of the database and the data 
sources for each country, as well as coverage, exclusions and limitations. The paper 
also includes a separate appendix available online with additional information on 
the database, and extensive supplementary tables and figures, which provide data 
for all the indicators discussed here (and others) at a more disaggregated level.
19 Specifically, growth
j,t,t-3
= [(employees
j,t
/employees
j,t-3
)1/3-1] × 100. The 11 growth inter-
vals considered are: ]-∞;-20[, [-20;-15[, [-15;-10[, [-10;-5[, [-5;-1[, [-1;1[, [1;5[, [5;10[, 
[10;15[, [15;20[ and [20; ∞[.
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lapsed into 11 cells that summarise the growth distribution, containing 
the number of firms for which the growth rate falls within the interval. 
In addition, for each cell, the initial and final number of employees (and 
turnover, whenever feasible) were also computed. Overall statistics on 
the number of employer-firms surviving from time t-i to t relative to the 
total number of employer-firms at time t-i were also produced. 
Growth distributions were constructed at the aggregate country 
level and also broken down for up to 51 sectors, 10 size classes and 10 
age intervals. Any cell containing a number of firms below the confi-
dentiality threshold established by each national statistical office was 
blanked out and codified as missing to avoid the release of legally-pro-
tected confidential information.
While business registers provide some of the most accurate firm-
level data available, there are also limitations to the data collected. In 
particular, our measures of firm growth are substantially more accu-
rate than the data on job creation. Therefore, we focus most of the 
discussion here on the dynamics of firm growth and how this impacts 
productivity, rather than delving into issues of job creation20. 
4.3 Some stylised facts about firm growth dynamics
Figure 1 shows the distribution of firm growth across different size 
classes and countries21. Each column indicates the share of firms with 
average annual employment growth rates over a three-year period 
falling within that growth interval (with the range covering 11 inter-
vals from less than -20 percent to more than +20 percent employment 
growth per annum).
20 Anyadike-Danes et al (2015) and Calvino, Criscuolo, & Menon (2015) provide a 
more thorough answer to the question of who creates jobs. 
21 For brevity, the figures in this section focus on the cross-country average and 
present only the data collected for the first period (2002-05). In order to avoid the 
cross-country average being driven by extreme values, the highest/lowest values 
are replaced by the second highest/lowest values when computing the average.
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Figure 1: Distribution of firm growth - shares
The growth distribution looks very similar in all the covered countries, 
with the exception of the UK (Figure 1.b)22. Extreme bursts of growth or 
decline occur quite regularly. This high level of growth and contraction 
leads to very high job reallocation rates across surviving incumbents, 
22  We follow the ECB’s recent practice of generally referring to the new bank super-
visory policy framework in the euro area as ‘European banking supervision’, and 
to its own supervisory arm as ‘ECB banking supervision’: see ECB (2016a), page 4, 
footnote 1. 
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with the share of jobs created or destroyed by incumbents over a three-
year period around 30 percent on average.
The top panel in Figure 2 shows the up-or-out dynamic already 
documented in the literature (for example Haltiwanger et al, 2010). 
Young firms have lower survival rates than more mature firms. But 
conditional on survival, they experience higher growth on average. 
This up-or-out dynamic is particularly strong for very young firms (1-2 
years). They are 25 percent more likely to exit than the average firm, 
but conditional on surviving, they grow 3.5 times faster.
However, the up-or-out pattern is much less evident when looking 
at the full growth rather than only averages. The last two plots in Figure 
2 show that there is a large share of firms which neither expand nor 
contract over a three-year period. Whether young or old, about 40 per-
cent of surviving firms are static, with an average annual employment 
growth rate between -1 and 1 percent.
Figure 2: Firm dynamics by age (1+ employees)
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in a minority of firms. Most firms experience small changes in 
employment, so aggregate employment growth is disproportionally 
driven by large employment changes in a small number of firms. 
Firms in the top growth interval, which corresponds to the share of 
high-growth firms according to the OECD definition23, only represent 
4.5 percent of surviving firms with 10 or more employees, yet they 
account for about 40 percent of all jobs created by all firms with ten 
or more employees (even if there are some important differences 
between countries). Job destruction is also concentrated. Less than 
10 percent of firms decline by more than 20 percent a year on average 
over the period, yet they account for 45 percent of jobs lost by surviv-
ing firms with 10 or more employees. 
4.4 Firm growth dynamics: differences between countries
Next we briefly consider some of the differences in firm dynamics 
that emerge in different countries. Differences are substantial for sev-
eral of the metrics. Figure 3 summarises the full growth distribution 
for the US and the average for the European countries included in 
the sample. Each bar in the lower panel indicates how much higher/
lower in percentage terms the share of firms with a growth rate falling 
within that interval is, relative to the US. European countries have on 
average larger shares of static firms and lower shares of both growing 
and shrinking firms. In other words, the US displays a more dynamic 
firm growth distribution than the average European country included 
in the sample.
23 The OECD and Eurostat define high-growth firms as all enterprises with 10 or more 
employees at the beginning of the observation period with average annualised 
growth in employment (or turnover) greater than 20 percent over a three-year peri-
od. See Bravo-Biosca (2011) for additional evidence on high-growth firms using this 
database.
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Figure 3: Europe vs. US firm growth distribution (10+ employees)
Figure 4 plots the growth distribution relative to the US by coun-
try. The same pattern emerges: firms in the US grow and shrink 
more rapidly than in European countries, which have a much larger 
share for which employment does not vary much (up or down). This 
pattern holds for a majority of countries, sectors and sizes classes. A 
similar pattern emerges when comparing the growth distribution for 
young firms in the US and in the European countries for which we 
have data.
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Figure 5 considers two other metrics that also capture the differ-
ences between countries in business dynamism. The left panel shows 
excess job reallocation for all firms with one or more employees, 
which (partially) controls for business cycles effects by taking out 
job churn that results from economy-wide net employment changes. 
This is higher in the US than in all continental Europe countries, with 
the surprising exception of Greece, suggesting that there is a much 
more active process of resource reallocation across incumbent firms 
in the US. The right panel plots the percentiles of the growth distribu-
tion, the interquartile range and the range between the 90th and the 
10th percentile (p90-p10) by country, sorted according to the inter-
quartile range. There are also sizeable differences, both when looking 
at the percentiles at the extremes of the distribution and when 
looking at the interquartile and p90-p10 ranges, with the US ranking 
higher than most European countries.
Figure 4: Firm growth distribution relative to the US by country (10+ employees)
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Figure 5: Business dynamism in different countries
One of the potential effects of a less dynamic growth distribution is 
that it becomes more difficult to challenge incumbents. Figure 6 looks 
at the differences in performance of SMEs compared to large firms and 
young firms compared to old firms in different countries. Specifically, 
the two measures considered are the average employment growth rate 
and job creation as a share of initial jobs (in other words, net and gross 
job creation rates). Each bar corresponds to the difference in percent-
age points between the rate for SMEs/young firms and the rate for 
large/old firms. Again, the differences are substantial, with countries 
like the US displaying a much larger gap than most European coun-
tries in the sample.
One possible interpretation is that a larger gap is a signal that 
the country’s institutional framework makes it relatively easier for 
younger and smaller firms to challenge incumbents. However, this is 
not the only possibility. In some circumstances a poor institutional 
background can also lead to large gaps in the growth rates of younger 
and smaller firms relative to large firms, which could help explain the 
position of countries such as Italy and Greece in Figure 624.
24 For instance, Arellano et al (2009) show that small firms grow disproportionally 
faster than larger firms in less financially developed countries, because limiteda 
access to external finance constraints their growth to what their current cashflows 
can fund.
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Figure 6: Challenging incumbents – gap by country (1+ employees)
4.5 Firm growth dynamics and productivity growth
We next examine whether differences in the distribution of firm growth 
impact productivity growth. There are several channels through which 
a more dynamic firm growth distribution could potentially lead to 
faster productivity growth. From a pure accounting perspective, a 
more dynamic firm growth distribution speeds up the reallocation of 
labour and capital, most likely from unproductive incumbents towards 
innovative firms that have successfully developed superior practices. 
It might also have an additional indirect effect, increasing competitive 
pressures that force firms to improve their internal practices or else 
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signal an environment in which firms are willing to experiment and 
put new ideas into practice, while being able to backtrack and shrink 
without major consequences if they do not succeed. Hence there is 
also a dynamic effect, since knowing that it will be easy to scale up 
tomorrow if an invention is successful increases the incentives to 
invest in innovation today. By contrast, a large share of static firms 
might indicate instead an unwillingness to take risks to innovate, 
since trying out a new business model, exploring a new technology or 
launching a new product often requires a firm to expand its capabili-
ties, even if only temporarily and with no certainty of success (Saint-
Paul, 1997; Bartelsman et al, 2008). 
These effects are however not unambiguous. High levels of resource 
reallocation might not lead to higher productivity if, for instance, resource 
allocation is directed towards the more unproductive firms, either 
because they have better access to finance, they are well-connected, their 
managers are prone to mistakes or care more about empire-building 
than improving performance, or when a speculative bubble distorts the 
allocation process. Even when this is not the case, resource reallocation 
also generates significant adjustment costs for firms and workers. Firms 
might lose the intangible capital embedded in their workers, deter them 
from taking risks and face disruption in their organisations, resulting in 
lower productivity. Employees are likely to lose firm-specific knowledge 
and skills and face significant uncertainty (Hall, 1995). Moreover, a more 
dynamic growth distribution can increase frictional unemployment 
because of job search and matching frictions, particularly in poorly func-
tioning labour markets with high unemployment rates (Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994). Finally, too much competition can also reduce incen-
tives for experimentation (Aghion et al, 2005). 
Which of these effects dominate can depend on the position of the 
country relative to the world technology frontier. As countries get closer 
to the frontier, experimentation and selection become more important 
(Acemoglu et al, 2006). First, at the frontier, innovation replaces imita-
tion as the main driver of productivity growth, so experimentation is 
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more important. Second, the reallocation of resources to more produc-
tive firms might also play a more significant role at the frontier, since 
only a fraction of the firms that attempt to innovate succeed, while 
many others fail to improve their productivity. In contrast, imitation is 
less uncertain and does not require as much skill, so further from the 
frontier, within-firm productivity improvements across the board are 
more feasible (Acemoglu et al, 2006). Finally, the effect of competition 
on innovation and productivity growth is also stronger at the frontier 
(Aghion et al, 2005; Aghion et al, 2009). Altogether, these different 
channels suggest that the impact of a more dynamic growth distribution 
should be stronger, the closer the country is to the technology frontier. 
We use standard OLS to test whether a more dynamic growth dis-
tribution is associated with faster productivity growth, as the literature 
suggests it should. Firm growth dynamics are clearly endogenous, so the 
results need to be interpreted with this in mind25. 
The baseline specification regresses annual total factor productivity 
(TFP) growth for industry j in country i from 2002 to 2005 on the share of 
static firms, which is a measure of the (lack of) dynamism of the firm 
growth distribution. The share of static firms is defined as the share of all 
surviving firms with 10 or more employees26 with annual average 
employment growth between -1 percent and 1 percent (>1 percent are 
growing firms, <-1 percent are shrinking firms). We include country (μ) 
and industry (τ) fixed effects in the regression to mitigate omitted 
25 An alternative approach would have been to use standard productivity growth 
decompositions (Bartelsman et al, 2005), which compute the share of productivity 
growth accounted by within-firm improvements, the entry and exit of firms and the 
reallocation of resources across continuing firms. They however require firm-level 
productivity data and, in addition, do not capture the indirect effect that a more 
dynamic firm growth distribution may have on within-firm productivity growth 
arising, for instance, from stronger competition.
26 The distribution of firm growth is less informative when firms with 1-9 employees 
are included, since growth rates for very small firms are of a different order of mag-
nitude by construction, and they dominate the distribution. Therefore here we only 
consider the distribution for firms with 10 or more employees. 
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variables concerns, and control for the distance to the frontier to 
account for potential convergence effects. Industry-country specific 
shocks can also shift the distribution of firm growth, so we control for 
employment growth at the industry-country pair level. 
We use EUKLEMS data for industry-level productivity measures. 
Annual TFP growth is value-added based and annual labour produc-
tivity growth (which we use as a robustness check) is defined as gross 
value added per hour worked by persons engaged (O’Mahony and 
Timmer, 2009). We exclude outliers, which are defined as those indus-
try-country pairs with TFP growth of more than two standard devia-
tions away from the industry or country mean27. Employment growth 
corresponds to the average annual growth in the industry’s number of 
employees over the period, also from EUKLEMS. Distance to frontier is 
defined as -ln(TFP
ij
/TFPleader(j)) at the beginning of the period, in which 
TFPleader(j) corresponds to the highest TFP level for industry j across 
countries (as long as it is within two standard deviations from the 
mean for the industry)28. TFP levels data is obtained from the GGDC 
Productivity Level Database (Inklaar and Timmer, 2008), which also 
builds on EUKLEMS, and specifically corresponds to value-added 
based (double deflated) multi-factor productivity. 
Table 1 reports the results of this exercise. Each of the 144 observa-
tions corresponds to an industry-country pair, with eight countries29 
and up to 22 industries included in the regressions. All regressions are 
estimated using OLS, with standard errors in parentheses clustered 
both at country and industry level. Column 1 reports the results of the 
27 The main conclusions remain if outliers are not excluded (although interactions 
with distance to frontier lose their significance).
28 Any TFP level data point higher than the industry mean plus two standard devia-
tions is coded as missing and not used to determine the frontier.
29 TFP data at the industry level is only available for a subset of countries: Austria, 
Denmark, Finland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, UK and US.
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baseline specification, with country and industry effects but without 
any additional control. The coefficient indicates that a 1 percentage 
point increase in the share of static firms is associated with -0.187 
percentage points lower annual TFP growth, and is significant at the 1 
percent level. Controlling for convergence effects with the industry’s 
distance to the technology frontier and for potential industry shocks 
with employment growth does not make a difference (column 2)30.
Table 1: Firm growth dynamics and productivity growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
 
TFP 
growth
TFP 
growth
TFP 
growth
TFP 
growth
TFP 
growth
LP 
growth
LP 
growth
Share of 
static firms
-0.187*** -0.193*** -0.265*** -0.220**
(0.068) (0.065) (0.080) (0.107)
Share of 
growing 
firms
0.251*** 0.342*** 0.352**
(0.082) (0.119) (0.136)
Share of 
shrinking 
firms
0.171** 0.233*** 0.164*
(0.070) (0.078) (0.093)
Average 
employment 
growth
-0.123 -0.154 -0.142 -0.177*** -0.393*** -0.452***
(0.115) (0.100) (0.094) (0.064) (0.125) (0.093)
Distance to 
frontier
0.0315 0.0513 -2.009 12.67** -2.239** 12.86***
(0.563) (0.580) (1.240) (5.719) (1.061) (4.644)
Distance to 
frontier x
30 Controlling in addition for average firm size in the industry also leads to the same 
conclusions.
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Share of 
static firms
0.143** 0.144***
(0.064) (0.054)
Share of 
growing 
firms
-0.177* -0.209**
(0.097) (0.082)
Share of 
shrinking 
firms
-0.124* -0.107
(0.073) (0.067)
Observations 144 144 144 144 144 144 144
R-squared 0.538 0.544 0.555 0.561 0.574 0.616 0.647
Notes: Each observation corresponds to an industry-country pair, with 8 countries 
and up to 22 industries included in the regressions. All columns are estimated with 
OLS, with standard errors in parentheses clustered both at country and industry level. 
EU KLEMS data is used for productivity measures. Annual TFP growth is value added 
based and annual labour productivity growth is defined as gross value added per hour 
worked by persons engaged (O’Mahony and Timmer 2009). The share of static firms 
is the share of all surviving firms with 10 or more employees with annual average 
employment growth between -1% and 1% (>1% are growing firms, <-1% are shrinking 
firms). Annual employment growth at the industry-country pair level controls for po-
tential business cycles effects. Distance to frontier is defined as -ln(TFP
ij
/TFPleader(j)) at 
the beginning of the period. TFP levels used to compute distance to frontier are value 
added based and double deflated (Inklaar and Timmer 2008). Columns 4-7 include 
interactions between distance to frontier and the share of static/growing/shrinking 
firms. All regressions include country and industry fixed effects. *, **, *** indicate sig-
nificance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
A low share of static firms could be driven both by a high share 
of growing and/or shrinking firms. Therefore, the results could just 
be picking up some positive correlation between growing indus-
tries and TFP growth not captured by average employment growth, 
with no relationship to selection processes. Column 3 replaces the 
share of static firms with the shares of growing and shrinking firms. 
While the coefficient for the growing share (0.251) is higher than 
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for the shrinking share (0.171), they are both large and significant. 
Consequently, this supports the hypothesis that industries with a 
higher degree of selection, that is, with a higher share of growing 
and shrinking firms and fewer static ones, experience faster pro-
ductivity growth. 
Experimentation and selection may become more important 
the closer to the technology frontier an industry is. Columns 4-5 
examine this hypothesis. The interactions between distance to 
frontier and the shares of static, growing and shrinking firms are 
significant and with the right sign. Far from the frontier, a large 
share of static firms is not associated with lower TFP growth, while 
at the frontier it is. The same finding arises when looking at the 
share of growing and shrinking firms. Thus, this evidence suggests 
that a dynamic firm growth distribution becomes more important 
for productivity growth the closer countries get to the technology 
frontier, as predicted by Acemoglu et al (2006). 
A variety of methodological issues arise when estimating TFP, 
which could potentially affect comparisons between countries and 
industries. Therefore, for robustness we also consider labour produc-
tivity growth as an outcome variable, since it is subject to relatively 
fewer measurement issues. Columns 6-7 show that the same patterns 
emerge, even if with somewhat lower significance levels. 
Summing up, these results suggest that a 5 percentage point higher 
share of static firms is associated with 1 percentage point lower annual 
productivity growth (both for TFP and labour productivity), and that 
this negative effect becomes stronger as countries converge to the 
technology frontier. 
Is this a big or small effect in economic terms? In the decade prior 
to the financial crisis, Europe’s annual TFP growth lagged the US by 
1 percentage point on average (Ark et al, 2008), while differences 
between countries in the share of static firms averaged several per-
centage points. Alternatively, a one-standard deviation increase in 
the share of static firms is associated with 1.1 percentage points lower 
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annual TFP growth. Therefore, the magnitude of the coefficient and 
the implied correlation are non-negligible.
4.6 Final remarks
There are at least three takeaways from our analysis. First, the firm 
growth distribution displays a very regular pattern in different coun-
tries and sectors, with a small minority of firms accounting for the 
majority of job creation and destruction. There is a limited up-or-out 
dynamic, with a large number of companies neither growing nor exit-
ing. The average growth rate and its dispersion falls with firm age and 
size, but not in an equal way. 
Second, there are also significant differences between countries. 
Much of the policy debate in Europe around business growth has been 
framed around its lacklustre performance in generating high-growth 
firms that become global champions. This evidence clearly shows 
that differences go beyond that. The US has more high-growth firms 
than Europe, but this is only one part of the picture. European coun-
tries have a less dynamic firm growth distribution overall, with slower 
growth and slower contraction, and unless this is recognised, we are 
likely to draw the wrong policy conclusions.
Third, differences in the dynamism of the growth distribution can 
have a substantial impact on a country’s productivity performance. 
Specifically, a 5 percentage point higher share of static firms is asso-
ciated with 1 percentage point lower productivity growth, whether 
measured using TFP or labour productivity. Moreover, this relation-
ship becomes stronger as countries converge to the global technology 
frontier and innovation becomes more important.
It is important to understand the institutional drivers behind 
these differences in firm growth dynamics, and what policy levers 
exist to address them. While there is a growing body of work looking 
at some these questions, much of this work has focused exclusively 
on entrepreneurial activity. Two recent exceptions are Bravo-Biosca 
et al (2016), who use this data to examine the impact of labour 
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regulation and financial institutions on firm growth dynamics, and 
Calvino et al (2016), who show that poor polices and framework con-
ditions disproportionally hinder start-ups relative to incumbents.
There are still many unanswered questions, but also some clear steps 
that policymakers could take to unlock the potential of European firms. 
First, policymakers should improve the regulatory framework, 
making it easier for businesses to scale up across Europe and 
enabling faster resource reallocation between firms. While it would 
be difficult in the current political environment, creating a new 
European single market for entrepreneurs (or a common EU 29th 
regime for start-ups) would probably be the most impactful reform. 
Sitting alongside the 28 national regimes without replacing them, 
this new regime would give new start-ups the option, but not the 
obligation, to operate under the same set of simplified rules and 
procedures across the EU (or the countries that chose to participate 
in this regime), while still preserving member states’ rights over 
issues such as tax rates or employment rights, among others. It 
would be an opportunity to rethink how business activity is regu-
lated and how this regulation is implemented and enforced, and 
would open the door to the creation of a new system adapted to the 
twenty-first century, not one inherited from the nineteenth century 
as we have today. 
Second, better ways to protect workers should be found. While a 
more dynamic business environment will help to accelerate productiv-
ity growth, the benefits will not be shared equally, so there will be win-
ners and losers. A world in which people switch jobs regularly will lead 
to increased uncertainty for workers, higher frictional unemployment 
and faster depreciation of firm-specific human capital. Therefore, a 
more dynamic firm growth distribution will not be sustainable unless 
we rethink our safety nets. Adopting the Scandinavian flexisecurity 
model (protecting individuals rather than jobs) or the Austrian labour 
regulation system (which allows portability of severance packages 
across companies) are alternatives worth considering.
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Third, measures should be taken to improve the ecosystem, since 
businesses don’t operate in a vacuum. Without good access to talent, 
knowledge, infrastructure and finance, it is difficult for businesses to 
grow. Rethinking our approach to industrial policy, with more active 
participation from businesses themselves, could help to address some 
of these gaps. Almost 25 years ago, Paul Romer suggested the idea of 
self-organising industry boards (Romer, 1993), in which firms in an 
industry collectively determine what industry-specific public goods 
to support and pay for them through a government-mandated levy. 
It might be time to revisit this idea, taking advantage of collective 
intelligence tools that didn’t exist a quarter of a century ago (such as 
crowdsourcing and crowdfunding platforms) to create a more flexible 
levy that overcomes the weaknesses of the original proposal.
Fourth, more impactful government support schemes should 
be developed, which requires more experimentation with new 
approaches and better learning. Every year European governments 
spend €150 billion on different forms of business support. It is impor-
tant to make sure that it actually has the intended effect. Despite 
recent initiatives such as the LSE-based What Works Centre for Local 
Economic Growth or the Nesta-led Innovation Growth Lab31, we still 
know very little about what works and what doesn’t. More experi-
mentation with new support schemes and better evidence about their 
effectiveness should therefore be an important priority. There are 
several measures that governments could take to achieve that, such 
as embedding an experimental mindset in their own programme 
development activities, setting up a European experimentation fund 
for innovation and growth, and making much better use of the data 
already available.
31 See www.whatworksgrowth.org and www.innovationgrowthlab.org.
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5 A revival of manufacturing 
in Europe? Recent evidence 
about reshoring
Dalia Marin, Reinhilde Veugelers and Justine Feliu
5.1 Introduction
The shipping of manufacturing jobs out of western Europe and the 
United States, particularly to Asia and China, continues to provoke 
strong views. Some claim that offshoring will continue to charac-
terise the manufacturing sector in the west; offshoring might even 
become more important. Others claim the digital revolution will lead 
to a revival of manufacturing jobs in Europe. With robots, artificial 
intelligence, 3D printing and other advanced manufacturing tech-
nologies, the cost of labour will be a less important factor in deciding 
where to locate manufacturing facilities and jobs. As a result, pro-
duction of industrial goods might as well take place in high-wage 
western countries. If this is indeed happening, we should see in the 
aggregate data an end to offshoring and even signs of reshoring, 
at least of the return of jobs that were offshored in search of lower 
labour costs. In this chapter we look at the most recent trends in 
offshoring to provide more evidence about this important aspect of 
European manufacturing.
5.2 Global value chains, offshoring and reshoring
The relocation of manufacturing jobs to low-wage countries has been a 
defining feature of globalisation since the 1990s. The last two decades 
have witnessed deep changes to the international division of tasks 
(see, for example, Baldwin, 2009). The new model of international 
division of labour evolves around global value chains, ie the sourcing 
of goods and services from around the globe to take advantage of dif-
ferences in costs and quality of factors of production, even to the level 
of individual tasks. This structural change in the productive economy 
has occurred as a consequence of the substantial reductions in trade 
barriers, tariffs and transportation costs (Feenstra, 1998), but perhaps 
more importantly because of the development and diffusion of infor-
mation and communication technologies (Milgrom and Roberts, 1990; 
Nordas, 2004). Rapid advances in ICT have resulted in a marked reduc-
tion in the costs associated with coordination of complex activities 
within and between companies over long distances.
Global value chains and international specialisation at the level of 
tasks have led firms to adopt much more complex sets of internation-
alisation strategies, involving offshoring.  Offshoring firms outsource 
parts of their value chains internationally to other companies (inter-
firm) or to affiliated companies located abroad (intra-firm). They 
import components and export finished goods or semi-finished goods 
for further processing and trade (see for example Saliola and Zanfei, 
2009; De Backer et al, 2013). 
This fragmentation of manufacturing across borders in global value 
chains is associated with unprecedented growth in trade since 1990. 
Arvind Subramanian and Martin Kessler of the Peterson Institute have 
labelled this ‘hyperglobalisation’, in which world trade has soared 
much more rapidly than world GDP. According to Subramanian and 
Kessler’s (2013) estimates, overall trade in goods and services rose 
from about 19 percent of world GDP in the early 1990s to an unprece-
dented 33 percent in 2011. 
One way of measuring the rising importance of global value chains 
is to look at the share of intermediate goods and components in trade, 
or the share of imported components in exports (Feenstra and Hanson, 
1996; De Backer et al, 2013). These estimates range from 30 to 40 percent 
of world trade (see for example Hummels, Ishii and Yi, 2001). 
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For Europe, international value chains have a specific regional 
character: De Backer et al (2013) showed that EU member states 
are strongly integrated into European value chains, concentrated 
in the 15 pre-2004 EU members (with Germany as a central player). 
Also, most offshoring by French firms went to other EU countries, 
primarily to the 15 pre-2004 EU members (Fontagné and D’Isanto, 
2013). Marin (2011) showed that intra-firm trade – trade between 
parent firms in western Europe and their affiliates in eastern Europe 
– accounts for between 20 percent and 70 percent of total trade 
between these two regions. 
A much discussed phenomenon for the revival of manufacturing 
in the west is reshoring, ie the relocation of production from abroad 
back home. Several trends might be driving reshoring. First, the cost 
structure of production is changing in emerging countries. Wages have 
been increasing, eroding these countries’ cost advantages in labour-in-
tensive activities. Companies can respond to these rising labour costs 
by automating factories in emerging countries or by relocating pro-
duction to other emerging countries where labour costs are still low. 
But they can also re-shore specific activities. Second, technological 
advances support reshoring. Digitalised and additive manufacturing, 
which relies on automation combined with new materials and new 
production technologies, will cut the cost of producing smaller batches 
of a wider variety of products, making ‘manufacturing on demand’ 
(more) economically feasible. This also enables manufacturing to take 
place closer to demand. With the share of labour costs reducing and 
the increasing importance of being close to demand, firms are increas-
ingly setting up often shorter value chains in higher-cost countries 
close to their major markets. 
The growing appeal of reshoring does not imply a large number of 
extra jobs at home, however. The expectation is that reshored produc-
tion will create only a limited number of additional jobs and these jobs 
will increasingly be high skilled (De Backer et al, 2016). Nor would 
reshoring automatically mean the end of offshoring (De Backer et al, 
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2016). Offshoring to emerging countries is likely to remain an impor-
tant strategy, even when costs are rising in these countries, because 
emerging countries and their growing middle classes offer large and 
rapidly growing markets for manufactured products. Rather, compa-
nies seem to be developing more diversified sourcing strategies and 
considering more options in structuring their production processes, 
tempering long and complex value chains with a regional rebalancing 
(De Backer et al, 2016).
Company surveys and anecdotal evidence suggest the reshoring 
trend is becoming stronger. For instance, the Boston Consulting Group 
(2011) suggested that reshoring could lead to a manufacturing renais-
sance in the United States. A PwC survey in 2014 found that two-thirds 
of 384 euro-area firms said that they had relocated some activities 
during the past 12 months and 50 percent planned to do so in the next 
12 months. Evidence for reshoring in aggregate statistics is hard to 
find. De Backer et al (2016) find no evidence of reshoring or of an end 
to offshoring. Marin (2014) used World Input-Output Data and did not 
find any evidence of reshoring. IMF research attributes the slowdown 
in the growth of trade since 2011, at least partly, to a decline in the 
growth of global value chains. 
The World Input-Output Data was updated at the end of 2016 (see 
Timmer et al, 2016). In this chapter we revisit the reshoring versus off-
shoring question by looking at the pattern of off- or re-shoring in more 
recent years. 
5.3 Recent evidence on off- and re-shoring
To measure offshoring, we use, in line with the literature, the extent 
to which firms, sectors and countries use imported intermediates 
(see the chapter Appendix). The intermediate import ratio (IIR) 
(Feenstra and Hanson, 1996) is the share of imported intermediates 
in total intermediates used by a sector or country. Firms, sectors 
and countries that are heavily import-dependent for their interme-
diates are assumed to be more involved in global value chains. 
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As we cannot identify whether or not imports of intermediates 
are within-firm, our offshoring analysis cannot distinguish out-
sourcing (ie between firms sourcing internationally) and insourcing 
(ie within firms, between affiliates sourcing internationally), and 
will cover both. 
We calculate the intermediate import ratio (IIR) per country 
using the World Input-Output Data (WIOD). The WIOD was created 
and collected by Timmer (see Timmer, 2012, and Timmer, 2015). 
It records the amount of intermediates consumed by ISIC Rev.4 
(NACE 2.0) industry, country of origin and destination country for a 
sample of 43 countries. 
We look at the patterns of offshoring in manufacturing for the 
major EU economies (Germany, France and the UK) and the US as 
offshoring countries, being the destinations for imported interme-
diates. We also look at China as an offshoring nation.
As offshoring destinations (or countries of origin for imported 
intermediates) we consider: 
• Southern Europe (Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece), 
• Central and eastern Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria), 
• Emerging economies (China, India, Indonesia, Brazil and Mexico). 
Among these, we look specifically at China as a major destination 
for offshoring. 
Most of these destination regions can be considered as comprising 
countries with lower labour costs, compared to the origin countries. 
But some, like China, are also important as a destination market for 
consumption.
5.3.1. Recent trends in the overall volume of offshoring
We first look at the absolute size of the flows of imported intermedi-
ate goods for a selection of importing countries (Figure 1). Imports of 
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intermediate goods in billion US$ have been increasing since 2000. 
The 2008 crisis caused a dip, but the increase in intermediate goods 
imports resumed its rise soon after. In Europe, Germany accounts for 
the largest inflow of imported intermediates. Germany’s intermediate 
imports doubled from 2000 to 2014 from, respectively, $300 billion 
to over $600 billion. France increased its intermediate imports from 
$200 billion to $400 billion. But the largest flows of imported interme-
diates go the US. The US increased its flows from $500 billion to $1050 
billion. China is typically considered a destination for offshoring by 
western firms. But China has also undergone a large increase in flows 
of imported intermediates. China’s imported intermediates increased 
fivefold after 2001 to about $1000 billion in 2013. Figure 2 shows more 
clearly how over the last 15 years China has become a major offshorer 
matching the US, thus establishing itself as a pivotal anchor in global 
value chains. 
Figure 1: Imports of intermediate goods into selected countries in US$ billions, 
2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 2: Imports of intermediate goods into the United States and China as a 
share of total worldwide imported intermediate goods, %, 2000-14 
Source: Bruegel.
To characterise the offshoring phenomenon we need to look at 
imported intermediates relative to domestically sourced intermedi-
ates. Figure 3 shows the IIR for the largest EU countries, the US and 
China. Several features are noteworthy: 
• Although the US and China are responsible for the highest flows 
of imported intermediates, their IIRs are much lower than those of 
European countries, reflecting the greater integration of European 
countries into global value chains. With over 25 percent of import-
ed inputs, Austria is most integrated into value chains followed by 
Germany (almost 20 percent) and France (17 percent), compared 
to the US and China with about 8 percent and 5 percent of import-
ed inputs, respectively. 
• Before the financial crisis of 2008-09, offshoring expanded in all 
countries except China where it already started to drop in 2004 
(and then again in 2010). 
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• The financial crisis of 2008-09 was a short period when offshoring 
fell substantially in all countries. But after the financial crisis the 
share of imported intermediates quickly recovered.
• Offshoring started to drop in China in 2010. But already in 2004 
China started to reorient its offshoring activity back to the domestic 
market, using domestically produced rather than foreign-sourced 
intermediates. Perhaps this early reshoring activity was already an 
expression of China’s overall reorientation away from outside activ-
ity towards domestic value chains. 
• Most importantly, offshoring stopped expanding more recently in 
all countries. In the UK, we see clear signs of reshoring. 
Figure 3: Countries’ imports of intermediate goods as a share of total 
intermediates consumption in %, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
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5.3.2 Offshoring destinations 
In this section we examine how European countries and the US used 
the low-cost destinations in central and eastern Europe, southern 
Europe and China for their offshoring activities. Figure 4a shows that 
although flows of intermediates from all three regions have increased, 
the growth of intermediates imports from China has been the most 
marked, while southern Europe has lagged. While in 2000 southern 
Europe was much more important than either China or central and 
eastern Europe as an offshoring destination, in 2014 it was only mar-
ginally ahead of central and eastern Europe, while China has doubled 
in size. 
Figure 4a: Imports of intermediate goods from selected regions to the world, 
US$ billions, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.3.2.1 Offshoring to China
Figure 4b illustrates the offshoring pattern into China from the various 
western countries. Offshoring to China from all western countries has 
increased dramatically over the last 14 years. But Germany in particu-
lar stands out. It imported 1.2 percent of its inputs used in production 
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from China in 2014, a substantial rise compared to 0.3 percent in 2000. 
In 2014 the US, the UK and France imported about 0.9 percent of their 
inputs from China (from 0.2 percent in 2000). Thus, in contrast to the 
anecdotal evidence, firms in rich countries, with the possible recent 
exception of the UK, show no evidence of reshoring from China, but 
are rather increasing their offshoring to China. 
Figure 4b: Imports of intermediate goods from China, % of total consumption of 
intermediate goods, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 4c shows the offshoring pattern for central and eastern Europe, 
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and Germany’s value chains and is growing in importance. In 2013 
Austria imported over 5 percent of its inputs from central and east-
ern Europe, and Germany imported over 3 percent (in 2000, Austria 
imported 2.6 percent and Germany 1.3 percent from the region). In 
contrast, for the UK, central and eastern Europe as a location for global 
value chains was already of minor importance, and has become less 
important since 2012. 
Figure 4c: Imports of intermediate goods from central and eastern Europe, % of 
total consumption of intermediate goods, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.3.2.3 Offshoring to southern Europe 
Figure 4c shows the offshoring pattern with respect to southern 
Europe. As a location for offshoring activity, southern Europe has lost 
out. Austria, the UK and China in particular have withdrawn from 
southern Europe since 2011. For France, southern Europe was and 
remains an important offshoring destination. 
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Figure 4d: Imports of intermediate goods from southern Europe, % of total 
consumption of intermediate goods, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.3.3 Sectoral Patterns
Figure 5 examines imports of intermediate goods by sector. The sector 
with the highest offshoring ratio is computer, electronic and optical 
products: at its peak in 2006, about 50 percent of intermediate goods 
used in this sector were imported from abroad. But more recently, the 
sector has seen some reshoring, a trend that already started before the 
crisis. Another offshoring-heavy sector is chemicals, with a peak IIR of 
40 percent in 2004, though the sector’s offshoring ratio has been slowly 
declining, reflecting a mild reshoring trend. Electric equipment and 
machinery has a smaller but still substantial offshoring ratio, which has 
also been declining for some time. In contrast to chemicals, the phar-
maceutical sector was typically less intensively involved in offshoring. 
But this has been changing, as this sector has seen an increase in its 
IIR from below 15 percent in 2000 to about 25 percent in 2014, bringing 
it more into line with other sectors. 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
Austria
France
Germany
Spain
Italy
UK
China
US
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
115 | REMAKING EUROPE
In all sectors, China is becoming more important as an offshoring 
destination, even for these sectors for which on average there is a reshor-
ing trend. Hence, when sectoral reshoring takes place, it is not from China. 
Southern Europe has not been able to benefit from increased offshoring 
by in any sector, which was already evident before the 2008-09 crisis. 
Figure 5: Imports of intermediate goods by selected sectors, % of total 
consumption by that sector of intermediate goods, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.4 An analysis of recent offshoring/reshoring trends for selected 
countries
We close the analysis by exploring the offshoring trends for Germany, 
France, the UK, the US and China32. A distinct pattern of value chains 
emerges from the analysis of individual countries. 
32 An analysis by sector and for other European countries can be found on the Bruegel 
website, www.bruegel.org.
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Figure 6: Total imported intermediate goods as % of total consumption of 
intermediate goods in Germany, by selected regions/countries, 2000-14
5.4.1 Germany 
Overall Germany is a major importer of intermediate goods, the largest 
importer in the EU. Germany imports about 20 percent of its interme-
diate consumption in manufacturing, a ratio that has been gradually 
increasing over time. The aggregate numbers show no signs of reshor-
ing to Germany. There have been some shifts however in the regions 
from which Germany imports intermediate goods. In 2000, the major 
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region for Germany was still southern Europe, with Italy by far the most 
important offshoring region for Germany. But by 2014, although Italy is 
still the largest offshoring destination for German manufacturing, China 
had steeply risen as an offshoring destination for German manufac-
turing, as have Poland and the Czech Republic. China’s is particularly 
remarkable considering that in 2000 it constituted only 0.27 percent of 
Germany’s total imports of intermediate goods. Germany’s offshoring to 
central and eastern Europe surpassed its offshoring to southern Europe 
in 2005 and the trend is continuing, making central and eastern Europe 
by far the main offshoring region for Germany in 2014. 
5.4.2 France 
France is the second largest importer of intermediate goods into the 
EU. Its IIR has been around 15 percent, below the German ratio. It 
has only slightly increased over time, by less than Germany. Also for 
France, the aggregate numbers give no signs of reshoring. Unlike 
Germany, for France, southern Europe is the most important offshor-
ing region, with Italy and Spain its main offshoring destination coun-
tries. This remained fairly stable from 2000 to 2014. At the same time, 
we see an increasing role for emerging markets as offshoring destina-
tions, because of a steep rise in the importance of China as an off-
shoring destination. To a lesser extent, the role of central and eastern 
Europe has increased. Although China is becoming more important as 
an offshoring destination for France, it is still less important than it is 
for Germany. 
5.4.3 United Kingdom 
The UK overall has a similar IIR to France (around 15 percent), below 
German levels. But since 2011, the UK’s IIR has dropped slightly, 
reflecting a small reversal of offshoring. This reshoring seems to come 
from southern Europe, which used to be the major destination of UK 
manufacturing offshoring. Italy and Spain have dropped significantly 
as sources of imports of intermediate goods for UK manufacturing. 
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Central and eastern Europe has risen somewhat (see eg Poland), but 
most spectacular is the rise of China as an offshoring destination for 
the UK. It became in 2009 the largest source of imported intermediate 
goods for UK manufacturing. Therefore any reshoring taking place to 
the UK is not coming from China (with perhaps the latest year as an 
exception), but mostly from southern Europe. 
Figure 7: Total imported intermediate goods as % of total consumption of 
intermediate goods in France,  by selected regions/countries 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
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Figure 8: Total imported intermediate goods as % of total consumption of 
intermediate goods in the UK, by selected regions/countries, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.4.4 The US
Although the US accounts for the largest volume of imported inter-
mediate goods, its IIR is below 10 percent, which is much lower than 
EU countries (see Figure 3). This ratio has remained fairly stable over 
time, ie no signs of major increases in offshoring, but also no strong 
evidence of reshoring in aggregate. 
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For the US, inarguably Mexico has been a main destination for 
offshoring throughout the period under analysis. At the same time, the 
data shows the remarkable rise of China as an offshoring destination 
for the US. The rise was so rapid that in 2008 China’s share reached that 
of Mexico, and has kept on growing since 2009. 
Figure 9:  Total imported intermediate goods as % of total consumption of 
intermediate goods in the US, 2000-14, by selected countries
Source: Bruegel.
5.4.5 China
While China has figured prominently in the discussion about offshor-
ing as a destination, it is also a major source of offshoring demand, 
almost on par with the US in absolute volume of imports of interme-
diate goods. But like the US, China is much less offshoring-intensive: 
it imports less than 10 percent of its intermediate goods and seems to 
have been gradually but consistently reshoring since 2004, with less 
than 5 percent of its consumption of intermediate goods imported 
from abroad in 2014. The sector with the highest share of imported 
components in 2000 was computer, electronic and optical products 
(around 40 percent). This sector has witnessed a reshoring trend but 
still has the highest ratio (above 20 percent in 2014) compared to other 
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sectors. China’s reshoring is in line with its ambition to catch up and 
move up the value chain and produce key components for its manu-
facturing sectors locally rather than import them from abroad.
Japan, Taiwan and Korea are the main countries from which 
China imports intermediate goods, but all three countries have 
become less important in this respect. The US has remained fairly 
stable as an offshoring destination for China. The numbers are 
negligible for European countries as origins for Chinese imports. 
Because of data limitations, we cannot analyse the developments in 
the low-wage countries in south and Southeast Asia as offshoring 
destinations for China. 
Figure 10: Total imported intermediate goods by country, % of total consumption 
of intermediate goods in China, 2000-14
Source: Bruegel.
5.5 Conclusions
Global value chains around the world have not expanded substantially 
since 2011. This suggests that we are approaching a new era of globalisa-
tion in which firms reorganise into shorter, regional or local value chains. 
Can we interpret this as a sign of a revival of manufacturing in Europe? 
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We find that the curtailment of the expansion of global value chains 
since 2011, as shown by the trends in IIRs, has been particularly driven 
by reshoring activity in the UK and China, while in all other countries 
offshoring has remained flat or has even increased slightly. 
When we examine the regions from which countries have with-
drawn their offshoring activity, southern Europe stand out. All major 
importing countries retreated from southern Europe. 
Central and eastern Europe has been able to maintain its position 
as a destination for offshoring, except for the UK. But the expansion of 
offshoring to central and eastern Europe has slowed in all countries.  
This stands in contrast to China as a destination for offshoring. All 
countries continued to expand their offshoring to China after 2011 
except for the UK (most recent years available). Interestingly, Germany 
has the strongest link with China via its global value chains, surpassing 
the US and the UK, while France has the weakest link. 
Thus, the slowdown in the expansion of value chains around the 
world is not driven by China becoming less important as an offshoring 
destination. It has more to do with China reshoring back to its large 
home market. 
To conclude: we find a change in the pattern of offshoring around 
the world that is driven in particular by reshoring to China and a 
withdrawal of most countries from southern Europe as a destination 
for offshoring. Activity moved from southern Europe to China and 
central and eastern Europe, leaving total offshoring activity flat in most 
countries. It remains to be seen whether these changes in the pattern 
of offshoring continue or go into reverse. Answering this question will 
require a more detailed analysis of the ultimate drivers of offshoring. 
We leave this for future work.
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Appendix: Measuring offshoring and reshoring
The traditional definition of offshoring is based on the concept of 
moving an activity from the domestic market to a location abroad. 
A firm is said to offshore when it exports a part of its productive 
activity to another country. Estimating offshoring trends using data 
about imported intermediate goods might therefore sound a bit 
counterintuitive. 
The idea behind using imported intermediate goods data to 
measure offshoring is the following. Each country’s use of imported 
intermediate goods is assumed to come from previously offshored 
activities. Adding up the total amount of imported intermediate goods 
(ie the sum of intermediate goods produced abroad – excluding the 
domestically sourced intermediate goods) and dividing this amount 
by the total consumption of intermediate goods gives us the share 
of imported intermediate goods in percent of total consumption of 
intermediate goods. Imported intermediate goods are assumed to be 
the result of a supply chain’s decomposition and we can therefore treat 
the share of imported intermediate goods as a measure of offshoring, 
ie the percentage of intermediate goods consumed/used domestically 
but that are produced abroad. This gives us the following expression:
Where  is the country and  stands for intermediate import ratio. 
Countries that spread different production stages across different coun-
tries will need to import the refined inputs from other countries and 
thus are expected to experience a higher share of inputs from imports.
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6 Manufacturing in central and 
eastern Europe
Maciej Bukowski and Aleksander Śniegocki
6.1 The legacy of the past
6.1.1 Delayed industrialisation
Central and eastern Europe remained on the peripheries of European 
industrialisation for nearly the entire twentieth century. Compared to 
western Europe, central and eastern European countries were distin-
guished primarily by the intermittent nature of their development, 
the main cause of which was major institutional breaks that affected 
the region several times over the period. Nevertheless, today’s level 
of industrialisation in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia 
and Romania largely reflects patterns already visible in the nineteenth 
century. Because of coal deposits and a favourable geographic loca-
tion, Silesia started to industrialise in the mid-nineteenth century and 
participated in the second industrial revolution more or less at the 
same time as western Europe. Other territories of eastern Prussia and 
Austria-Hungary industrialised more slowly, which was linked to their 
unfavourable position within these larger political organisms and to 
the delayed construction of transport and energy infrastructure. The 
least-industrialised parts of central and eastern Europe are the former 
territories of the Russian Empire (eastern Poland, Lithuania, Latvia 
and Estonia), and Romania and Bulgaria, which in the nineteen cen-
tury separated from the largely underdeveloped Ottoman Turkey. In 
the nineteen century, growth in these areas was slowed by the combi-
nation of poor institutions (late end of serfdom), poor human capital 
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(high illiteracy), absence of transport infrastructure (lack of roads, 
railways and ports) and very low urbanisation. 
Figure 1: Share of manufacturing in total employment, selected countries 
(1850-2010)
Source: Edvinsson (2005), NBER, World Bank WDI.
Figure 2: Employment structure around 1900
Source: Kuklo et al (2013).
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In general however, by the outbreak of the first world war, central 
and eastern Europe has already started to industrialise (Figures 1-2), in 
line with a standard sequence of development (Broadberry et al, 2008): 
from light (primarily cotton and food processing) to heavy indus-
try (coal, steel, mechanical and chemical). Without the crises of the 
interwar period, which were particularly painful for the region, its level 
of development in the mid-twentieth century would certainly have 
exceeded that of Spain, Portugal or Greece, where industrialisation 
started several decades later. 
By the outbreak of the second world war, Poland, Romania and 
Czechoslovakia had managed to rebuild their industrial bases to where 
they had been prior to the interwar period, though with visible changes 
in the branch structure and geographical allocation of production, and 
with the state as the main engine of development. However, the level of 
development of Poland, Hungary and Romania relative to western Europe 
changed little between 1920 and 1939. Poor infrastructure, limited export 
opportunities, low urbanisation and significant human capital deficits 
slowed downed the industrialisation process. State policy could not 
effectively counterbalance these shortfalls as its ambition was rather to 
build heavy industry from scratch, whereas the comparative advantage of 
central and eastern Europe lay rather in the development of less capital- 
and skill-intensive branches. It can be said that the interwar industriali-
sation attempt was confronted with the limitations of the technological 
leap model in an unfavourable external environment with strong internal 
structural and institutional constraints (Leszczyński, 2013; Koryś, 2015).
6.1.2 The Socialism era
During the second world war, the industrial base in the territo-
ries of the future Polish People’s Republic, eastern Germany and 
Czechoslovakia was largely removed or destroyed and transport infra-
structure was decapitated, though – for Poland – the shift to the west 
resulted in access to much better capital stock than that which was lost 
in the east. Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, where no large-scale mil-
itary action took place escaped war damage to a great extent. However, 
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the entire region came under Soviet rule, determining the course of its 
economic development for another 45 years. 
Figure 3: Industrial production in the Polish People’s Republic 1950-90
Source: Kuklo et al (2013).
Unsurprisingly, industrialisation in central and eastern Europe during 
the 1950s followed the Soviet pattern (Bałtowski, 2009): companies were 
nationalised, and pre-war industrial elites were deprived of influence over 
their own enterprises, which started to operate within the logic of mul-
ti-year production plans designed by the communist party nomenclature. 
Because of exclusion from international financial markets, the accumula-
tion of capital had to rely on local resources. Therefore industry developed 
at the expense of agriculture, whose surplus was taken over by collectiv-
isation or compulsory purchase of food at artificially low prices. These 
funds were directed to the development of the mining sector, steel pro-
cessing and the military complex, bending the production structure even 
more strongly than before the war towards resource-intensive production. 
This was accompanied by an increase in macroeconomic productivity as 
hidden unemployment in agriculture was replaced by more productive 
employment in manufacturing. However, the intra-sectoral effects of 
Stalinist industrialisation were rather small and the labour productivity 
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of individual industries remained substantially below western standards. 
Nevertheless, after about five years, central and eastern Europe managed 
to return to levels of production and industrial employment last seen in 
the late 1930s. As this recovery was based on the resources inherited from 
the pre-war period – buildings, machines, infrastructure – the regional 
and international differences, running from the south-east (Romania and 
Bulgaria) to the northwest (Czechoslovakia, Polish Silesia, Pomerania, 
Warmia and Masuria) were maintained. 
Figure 4: Industrial production per capita, selected countries, relative to the USA 
1970-2013
Source: Own estimates based on data from Groningen Growth and Development 
Centre, OECD, UN.
The thaw of the 1960s did not change this situation very much 
despite the reorientation of resources towards a model much better 
suited to social needs (Bukowski et al, 2015). The means of production 
remained under state control, but the production structure shifted 
towards light industry (Figure 3) equalising the impact of industri-
alisation on regional development. In the least urbanised countries 
(Poland, Bulgaria and Romania) the migration from rural to urban 
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areas continued, leading to certain improvements in the quality of life 
and providing industry with a greater number of workers.
The development gap between the two sides of the iron curtain did 
not shrink however. When the market economies of the European south 
– Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal – were effectively catching-up with 
the more industrialised north (Eichengreen, 1995), the eastern countries 
were severely constrained by the limitations of central planning (Figure 
4). In the absence of market competition and private property, the 
ability of the socialist enterprises to absorb and disseminate innovations 
was so low that the technological gap dividing the east and the west wid-
ened. The USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Hungary and the 
German Democratic Republic struggled to produce substitutes for most 
western consumer goods, and eastern European cars, television sets and 
household appliances clearly fell behind the west in terms of technolog-
ical sophistication, production quality and variety.
Deficiencies in quality control, discipline and organisation of work, 
marketing and distribution isolated even the most industrialised parts 
of the Eastern Bloc from the global economy. Without the market 
test, they could sell only to the uncompetitive COMECON (Council 
for Mutual Economic Assistance) market, but even there they were 
– because of very low labour productivity – largely unable to satisfy 
the demand. By the internal logic of a centrally planned economy 
it was impossible to reward individual effort, productivity and cre-
ativity, and therefore socialist industry was unable to approach the 
standards required by western customers amplifying the mistakes of 
central planners when they decided to import outdated technologies 
instead of attracting private foreign investment (Bałowski, 2009). In 
the 1980s the economic bankruptcy of the socialist system became 
apparent throughout the Eastern Bloc when economic growth visibly 
slowed down. In some cases (Poland and Romania) this led to signif-
icant supply shortages and a visible reduction in the average quality 
of life. An attempt to spur domestic production through large-scale 
investment programmes financed by foreign loans was unsuccessful, 
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whereas limited reforms that created some space for individual entre-
preneurship were too small to make a difference.
6.1.3 Economic transition
From 1989, Poland and shortly thereafter the remaining satellite states 
of the USSR began to make a sequence of intense political, social 
and economic changes collectively called the Transition. As a con-
sequence, central and eastern Europe was reintegrated with the rest 
of Europe and the global economy, resulting in spectacularly intense 
industrialisation accompanied by the deep restructuring of the indus-
trial base. At first these processes advanced in the fastest-reforming 
states: Slovenia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. 
Later they reached Romania, Bulgaria and the Baltic states. Because of 
the numerous failings of the socialist economy, even relatively small 
organisational changes and limited investment in new machinery and 
equipment could significantly increase the value of industrial produc-
tion wherever market expectations were easy to meet.
At the same time, the international competitiveness of many indus-
trial sectors was very low. The new economic reality required manu-
facturing enterprises to rapidly improve their production efficiency, 
and also their quality and structure, distribution channels, manage-
ment methods and the discipline and organisation of work. Most 
of the socialist workplaces employed a very large number of poorly 
managed and, as a rule, low-skilled workers, making the employment 
restructuring one of the most obvious efficiency reserves. This resulted 
in a sharp increase in unemployment, but also in significant resource 
management improvements. Not all branches of the post-socialist 
industry could cope with the reality of the market economy and much 
more developed external competition. Excessive production capacity 
in the mining, metallurgy and defence industries matched the needs of 
the material-intensive socialist economy, but did not meet the expec-
tations of the market for economic, technical and environmental rea-
sons. Consequently, employment in heavy industry in central Europe 
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dropped by several hundred thousand workers, and many of the least 
efficient or most environmentally harmful plants were closed.
Figure 5: Manufacturing value added per capita in central and eastern Europe 
1995-2015 (EU28 = 100)
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
Figure 6: Manufacturing value added per worker in central and eastern Europe 
1995-2015 (EU28 = 100)
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
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A deep crisis affected the parts of the manufacturing sector in 
central and eastern Europe that was exposed to global competition, 
especially from Asia. Many textiles, clothing or electronics companies 
in central and eastern Europe failed because of competition from 
cheaper or better-quality imports. This had major regional repercus-
sions, translating into high unemployment in traditional industrial dis-
tricts. The macroeconomic dynamics of central European manufactur-
ing, however, were very different: the output of closed plants was soon 
made up for by increased output from privatised enterprises or new 
companies founded by emerging entrepreneurs and foreign capital. 
The post-transition crisis in the fastest-reforming countries – Slovenia, 
the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary – was short-lived, 
and their economies in just a few years returned to the pre-transition 
level of development. 
The structure of central European industry changed. Manufacturing 
employment shrunk by 20-30 percent, largely mirrored by higher 
labour productivity and product quality. Exports started to grow, as did 
the level of industrialisation (measured by the value of industrial pro-
duction per capita) from an initially very low level. The gap compared 
to western Europe was however so great that even those countries like 
Poland and Slovakia, which have rapidly increased their productivity 
(Figures 5 and 6), still have not reached the western level. Currently, 
the Polish and Hungarian manufacturing sectors produce in per-cap-
ita terms about 50 percent of the EU average (measured at market 
exchange rates). For Slovakia and Slovenia, the figure is 70 percent and 
for the Czech Republic 96 percent. For comparison, at the start of the 
transformation, per-capita industrial production varied between from 
10 percent to 15 percent of the EU average in Bulgaria, Romania and 
Poland, was 25 percent in Hungary and Slovakia, and about 30 percent 
in the Czech Republic and Slovenia.
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Figure 7: Contribution to economic growth of manufacturing and other sectors in 
central and eastern Europe 1995-2015
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
Figure 8: GDP per capita and manufacturing value added per capita growth rates 
1994-2014
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
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The intensive industrialisation of central and eastern Europe has 
clearly marked its economic growth (Figure 7). Each additional per-
centage point of industrial output growth can be estimated to have 
translated into about 0.7 percentage point of additional GDP growth. 
The fastest growing economies in the region have been Poland, 
Slovakia, Lithuania and Estonia, where industrialisation has also 
been most rapid. However, only the Baltic countries have taken full 
advantage of the economic potential of the industrialisation process, 
though they do not belong to the most industrialised parts of central 
Europe. GDP growth in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic was 
about 1-2 percentage points lower than could be expected based on 
the growth rate of industrial output in these countries (Figure 8). The 
reason was slower productivity growth in other sectors of the econ-
omy: construction, mining, agriculture and public services. These 
countries have succeeded in shaping an institutional order that 
sufficiently supports the natural convergence of productivity and the 
growth of production volumes in the industrial sector, but does not 
fully tap the economic potential of the service industries, the agri-
cultural sector or construction. In Latvia the process was reversed; 
relatively slow industrialisation was compensated for by the rapid 
increase in service efficiency. Obstacles could in both cases be struc-
tural: low urbanisation and fragmented structures of land ownership 
and agricultural production in Poland, the small scale of the Latvian 
economy and traditional structure of its industry and, in both cases, 
deficits in human capital. 
6.2 Manufacturing today in central and eastern Europe
6.2.1 Scale and internationalisation
The rapid industrialisation of central and eastern Europe between 
1990 and 2015 had four main features. First, the expansion of pro-
duction capacity increased the volume of manufactured goods. 
Second, investment in new machines and equipment, organisational 
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improvements and transfer of industrial know-how from the west 
gradually increased labour productivity in the manufacturing 
sector. Third, quantitative changes were accompanied by qualita-
tive improvements in the form of rising complexity and diversity 
of products. Fourth, the regions that benefited from the post-1990 
industrialisation were largely the same as those that industrialised 
first in the nineteenth century and retained their industrial charac-
ter during socialism.
These phenomena are well illustrated by the automotive sector. 
Towards the end of socialism, the automotive sector was domi-
nated by a few plants located in the present day Czech Republic and 
Poland, which produced a total of about 600,000 vehicles per year. 
This production was poor quality and its technical sophistication was 
several decades behind western standards (Bukowski et al, 2015). 
After ten years this picture had changed. The number of cars leaving 
central European factories doubled and their production expanded 
to Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia. This was thanks to international 
automobile producers that settled in central Europe, reallocating 
there the most labour-intensive elements of their value chains. 
After the accession of central and eastern European countries to the 
European Union, this process was reinforced by Asian and American 
companies. Currently factories located in central and eastern Europe 
produce about 3.6 million passenger cars per year, about 25 percent 
more than plants located in Italy and France combined. Moreover 
– in contrast to the final assembly model that dominated in the late 
1990s – central and eastern European car plants are technologi-
cally no different to their western counterparts. Their presence has 
attracted to the region major investment in other sectors. In par-
ticular central Europe has become a major producer of automotive 
components and spare parts that are manufactured by smaller local 
companies as well as multinationals. 
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Figure 9: Manufacturing value added per capita and per hour worked in the EU 
2015
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
The automotive industry was not the only branch of central and 
eastern European industry to significantly expand its manufacturing 
capabilities. A similar boom touched, among others, the production 
of household appliances, consumer electronics, lighting, furniture, 
medicines, chemical and metal products, and industrial and con-
struction machinery and equipment. In all cases, the role of foreign 
investment for the development of manufacturing capacity was 
crucial. Foreign owned companies account for more than 70 percent 
of manufacturing value added in Slovakia and Hungary, about 60-65 
percent in Romania and the Czech Republic and about 40-55 percent 
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in Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states (Figures 9 and 10). The 
smallest share of foreign capital in industrial production is found in 
the countries of the former Yugoslavia – Slovenia and Croatia – which 
already during socialism had companies capable of exporting medi-
um-tech goods to western markets.
Figure 10: Relative productivity of foreign-controlled manufacturing companies 
and their share of manufacturing value added
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
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to a lesser extent Poland and Romania, do not reflect this pattern. In 
Romania, the gradual convergence of labour productivity between 
domestic and foreign-owned companies is visible, although exports 
are still dominated by large (250-999 employees) and very large (more 
than 1000 employees) foreign companies. Domestic manufacturing is 
more oriented towards the internal market and its contribution to the 
export boom after Romania’s accession to the European Union was 
limited to medium-sized enterprises. 
6.2.2 Economic complexity
In the last 30 years, the rollout of global value chains has significantly 
contributed to the international division of labour, changing the 
employment structure of high and middle income countries, includ-
ing those of central and eastern Europe. The countries of central and 
eastern Europe joined the global economy exactly at the point that 
globalisation accelerated. 
From the point of view of an industrialising country, the most 
important consequence of globalisation is the need to adapt its 
production profile to the closest industrial centre – the main source 
of final demand, investment capital and component supply. For 
central and eastern Europe, this means the European Union and in 
particular its industrial core stretching from northern Italy, through 
Austria, Switzerland and the French-German border to Belgium 
and the Netherlands. From this perspective it is worth looking at the 
structural changes in central and eastern European industry after the 
collapse of communism in 1989. In the centrally planned economy, 
employment in manufacturing per unit of production was clearly 
higher than in the west (Figure 1). In the first years of transforma-
tion this led to large-scale restructuring of the overbuilt production 
capacity in mining and steel production and low-tech branches that 
like textiles or leather manufacturing migrated to Asia. Today the 
share of low-tech manufacturing in central and eastern European 
employment is much lower than in some of the southern European 
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middle-income countries, such as Portugal and Greece. This is 
related not to the retention of a large number of workers in low-tech 
sectors in southern Europe, but rather to its inability to build a large 
industrial base in mid- and high-tech branches of manufacturing, 
and thus to reallocate employment to them. 
Figure 11: Share of imported components in the manufacturing export value
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
The employment structure in central Europe today resembles those 
of Italy or Spain, rather than those of Greece or Portugal. However, 
medium and high-tech sectors such as electronics, optical equipment 
and pharmaceuticals are on average under-represented in the region, 
compared to Germany and other highly industrialised economies 
such as Austria, Sweden and Switzerland. The revealed comparative 
advantage of central Europe is in the industries that were already 
present there before 1990 but which are complementary with the 
western European manufacturing base. Poland illustrates this. After 
joining the EU, Poland recorded a rapid increase in the production of 
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machinery (16 percent per annum), metal (13 percent per annum) and 
transport equipment (9 percent). The major source of this boom was 
the functional integration with the single market and the rapid devel-
opment of trade with the industrial centre of Europe. In fact after 2004 
the hallmark of central and eastern European manufacturing was its 
internationalisation. Currently, almost 60 percent of the value added 
created by Polish industry is generated by foreign demand (Figures 
11 and 12). This value is typical for large export-oriented economies 
such as Germany and South Korea. For smaller countries such as 
Estonia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, this ratio 
exceeds 70 percent, and in some cases, such as Ireland, Hungary and 
Luxembourg, even 80 percent. 
Figure 12: Manufacturing value added dependent on foreign demand
Source: Bukowski and Śniegocki (2017).
The Hausmann and Hidalgo (2014) economic complexity index 
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of technologically advanced and rare goods, and that have networks 
of trade links with other equally advanced countries, score high. At 
the opposite extreme are economies that focus on production of 
relatively simple goods and that trade with partners that also produce 
easily accessible products with a low degree of technical complexity. 
The changing Hausman and Hidalgo index for the period between 
1990 and 2015 shows that the complexity of the central European 
economies gradually increased throughout the period of economic 
transition. Companies located in central and eastern Europe gradually 
built up trade relationships with much more industrialised western 
Europe and through that increased their technological sophistication. 
Poland managed to close the complexity gap from 60 percent in the 
early 1990s to 30-40 percent today. Even more progress was made in 
other central European economies such as Hungary, Czech Republic 
and Slovakia which – thanks to greater exposure to foreign invest-
ment – have visibly higher levels of economic complexity than Poland. 
On the other hand Poland is the only country in the region that, over 
the last two decades, managed to nurture a few globally competitive 
domestic manufacturers. Most of these businesses were started in the 
early 1990s and, through cooperation or competition with much larger 
multinationals, have been able to achieve significant presence in their 
industrial niches, at least in Europe. 
6.2.3 Productivity and wages
Despite structural similarity, the economic efficiency of central and 
eastern European industry is still below that of southern Europe. 
Particularly noteworthy is an almost complete absence of sectors 
with labour productivity exceeding €60,000. In Spain about one 
third of the manufacturing sector exceeds this level. As a result, 
from the perspective of foreign investors, manufacturing labour 
costs in central and eastern Europe have been and still are very low 
compared to Europe’s industrial core. This promotes ‘near-shoring’ 
within the EU and encourages Asian and American producers to 
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invest in the region. When choosing to invest in fully automated 
assemblage in the west or in semi-automated processes in central 
Europe, multinational companies often chose the latter.
Central European industrialisation after 1990 was primarily 
based on labour-intensive technologies. One reason for this might 
be the relatively slow convergence of price levels within the EU and 
the visibly undervalued currencies of those central and eastern 
European states that haven’t joined the euro area. In addition, the 
region as a whole has not had enough time to create many medi-
um-sized and large productive companies, either in industry or ser-
vices. The presence in the economic structure of a large number of 
high-performing enterprises looking for the best staff has increased 
the wage pressure in the economy, forcing low-performing firms to 
seek productivity improvements. If the number of high-performing 
companies is limited, median wage levels are shaped by smaller 
establishments with modest economic quality. The observed con-
centration of manufacturing productivity around €24,000 (com-
pared to €53,000 in Spain) even in the most industrialised central 
and eastern European countries might be a decisive factor behind 
the wage compression in the region, which results in a relatively 
low average personnel cost in manufacturing of about €13,000 
(varying from €6,000-7,000 in Bulgaria and Romania to €13,000-
16,000 in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and the Baltic 
States to €24,000 in Slovenia) per employee per annum (compared 
to €37,000 in Spain). The difference in productivity between central 
and eastern Europe and Spain or Italy is therefore smaller than the 
pay gap (Figures 13 and 14). 
This might be due to the weaker market power of central and 
eastern European producers, which suffer from a shortage of well-
known international brands and lack well-developed pan-Euro-
pean sales and distribution channels. On the other hand central 
and eastern European entrepreneurs can, thanks to the favourable 
terms-of-trade and relatively low cost of labour, accumulate capital 
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and acquire industrial know-how without having to undertake 
rapid technological leaps. This allows them to gradually invest in 
better equipment, expand their sale networks, develop better mar-
keting and brand promotion and even to innovate. These processes 
are delayed in comparison to the western part of the continent or 
to the production capacity development in the region. As a conse-
quence, full convergence of European manufacturing, with respect 
to both the volume and efficiency of industrial production, might 
take about 15-30 years longer than the convergence of indus-
trial output only. The Czech Republic is a good illustration of this 
phenomenon. It has already reached the average European level 
of industrialisation, despite its manufacturing sector being half as 
productive as that of northern Europe. Nevertheless the change 
since 1990 has been substantial. Value added per worker in Czech 
manufacturing increased between 1990 and 2015 from 20 percent 
to 46 percent of the EU28 average. Even faster change was observed 
in Slovakia (18 percent in 1990 and 47 percent in 2015) and Poland 
(15 percent and 38 percent respectively). 
Figure 13: Manufacturing productivity distribution in selected countries, 
western Europe (left panel) and eastern Europe (right panel)
Source: Bruegel based on Eurostat. Note: In the right panel, one point represents one 
NACE 4-digit industry sector; in terms of productivity distribution, manufacturing in 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, which are not shown, are very similar to 
Poland, which is related to the similar stage of development of these countries.
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Figure 14: Manufacturing productivity and personnel costs in selected 
countries, western Europe (left panel) and eastern Europe (right panel)
Source: see Figure 13.
6.3 Lessons for the future
The rapid pace of industrialisation in central and eastern Europe after 
1990 was rooted in general structural and institutional change, which 
followed the pattern of countries in the south of Europe. Industrial 
development has been driven by the strong inflow of foreign investment 
and exports stimulated by integration with Europe’s industrial core. 
Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, and later Romania, 
Bulgaria and the Baltic states, adopted the principle of openness to for-
eign trade and capital flows and made a number of institutional reforms 
that opened their economies to domestic and foreign competition. This 
accelerated the transfer of market know-how, and helped initially vul-
nerable domestic producers to integrate into global value chains.
Countries of the former Soviet Union (Ukraine, Russia and Belarus) 
acted differently. They created native oligarchies, which, after taking 
over most of the assets of privatised companies, only grudgingly 
promoted institutions that enhance market competition and trans-
parency of economic processes. As a result, for a long time they have 
been unable to increase their manufacturing capacity over the capital 
inherited from the USSR, and their economic growth has had to rely on 
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the exploitation of natural resources and the global raw materials boom.
Most of the non-Soviet central and eastern European states have 
exploited three main advantages they already had at their disposal: 
(i) relatively well-educated and young populations, (ii) geographical 
proximity to the European industrial centre, and (iii) already existing 
though nascent industrial cultures. The central European political class 
perceived accession to the EU as an opportunity for development and 
also as a genuine guarantor of independence from Russian influence. 
EU accession has led to many economically advantageous reforms that 
essentially fit into the Washington Consensus but are much broader and 
deeper. It can be assumed that without this external stimulus it would 
have been much harder to carry out so many large-scale reforms in such 
a short time. The strategy of Serbia and those parts of former Yugoslavia 
that chose an alternative path of economic and institutional develop-
ment has not produced equally good results. Their economies were 
initially at a similar level of development to Poland and Slovakia but 
are today much poorer. The gap between the former Yugoslavia (except 
Slovenia and Croatia) and the central and eastern European average is 
both qualitative and quantitative. 
The period of economic transition in central and eastern Europe, and 
with it a set of specific challenges resulting from the complex heritage of 
the centrally planned economy, is already closed. However, the east-
west industrialisation gap is still there, although central and eastern 
European manufacturing has managed to move beyond the low-tech 
profile that dominated the socialist period. The productivity differences 
between the east and the west of the EU now result more from the 
smaller size of median producers and continuing shortfalls in human 
capital and organisational know-how, rather than from the disadvanta-
geous sectoral structure of industry. The first stage of industrialization 
– a ‘big push’, creating a relatively large, yet diversified manufacturing 
base capable of competing in the global economy – is therefore com-
pleted. This clearly distinguishes central and eastern Europe from other 
emerging markets and makes today’s challenges in the region more 
148 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
like the problems of the industrialised world than those of developing 
countries. The main development challenge today is not to implant 
new types of industrial activity into the region but rather to increase the 
scale of the most productive industries and companies that are already 
present. This requires maintaining the current trend of development for 
the next 20-30 years and retaining the readiness to implement gradual 
reforms that constantly encourage domestic and foreign capital to invest 
in central and eastern European countries. 
Based on international experience, it can be argued that such policies 
(Aghion et al, 2011; Núñez and Primi, 2009) should be horizontal and 
should include:
• Restructuring of declining industries; 
• Providing regulatory support to competitive financial and capital markets;
• Building R&D infrastructure in enterprises and universities and re-
inforcing research in research institutions and private companies;
• Supporting the emergence and identification of talents through 
higher education;
• Facilitating the mutual cooperation between companies and be-
tween business and the scientific world;
• Attracting high-tech foreign companies and supporting their inte-
gration with national sub-contractors;
• Developing the training and dissemination institutions that can sup-
ply SMEs with information on export markets and key technologies.
Any public initiatives that target industrial development should 
always be responsive to market needs and, therefore, must not arise 
without close cooperation with industry itself. The main emphasis in the 
design of industrial policy instruments in central Europe should be on 
the competition with, and further integration into, the rest of the conti-
nent. This means leaving plenty of room for potential support not only 
by incumbent beneficiaries but also by the new players, as well as pro-
moting the strong presence of the region within the EU and euro area.
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7 Europe’s comparative 
advantage in low-carbon 
technology
Georg Zachmann and Robert Kalcik33
7.1 Introduction
Given the global decarbonisation push, the wide array of low-carbon tech-
nologies now available offers significant growth potential for manufactur-
ing in the European Union. Some EU countries have already been able to 
develop a comparative advantage in wind turbines and electric vehicles, 
though the EU has been less able to develop a comparative advantage 
when it comes to exporting solar panels and batteries. Based on an anal-
ysis of patenting activity, we find the potential in some EU countries and 
regions to further specialise in all of these four low-carbon technologies.  
A regional overview is valuable because it can help in targeting public 
investment (eg in infrastructure, research and education) to enable devel-
opment in the most promising sectors and regions.
The low-carbon technology sector is going through a period of disrup-
tive innovation (Figure 1) and strongly increased investment (Figure 2), 
which is likely to continue (Figure 3). In addition, the share of low-carbon 
exports in all EU exports is increasing (Figure 4). The share of electric vehi-
cle technology patents in all patents has increased fourfold since 2000, 
while it has doubled for wind turbines and has grown by half for photo-
voltaics. In the same period, the share of exports of wind turbines and 
electric vehicles in global gross exports increased sixfold, while exports of 
33 The research underlying this chapter was financially supported by the European 
Climate Foundation’s Industrial Innovation for Competitiveness initiative (i24c).
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photovoltaic cells increased threefold, despite massively falling prices.
Figure 1: Share of certain low-carbon patents in total patents worldwide (index: 
2000=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat. Note: to keep it manageable we use throughout this 
chapter one International Patent Classification (IPC) code per technology: for electric 
vehicles we use B60L Propulsion of electrically propelled vehicles; for wind turbines 
we use F03D Wind motors; for batteries we use H01M Processes or means, eg batteries, 
for the direct conversion of chemical energy into electrical energy and for photovol-
taics we use H01L Semiconductor devices; electric solid state devices not otherwise 
provided for.
Figure 2: Global new investment in renewable power and fuels ($ billions)
Source: Bruegel based on REN21 (2016).
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fuels has quadrupled over the last decade. And this development 
is only starting. Global investment in renewable power and fuels 
reached a new record of $286 billion in 2015 (Figure 2)34. While wind 
and solar power needed big subsidies everywhere 10 years ago, they 
have started to be competitive under specific conditions that are 
mainly defined by the climatic conditions, the structure of the incum-
bent system and local fuel and emissions costs. By 2015, wind and 
solar had become a mainstream option for power generation invest-
ment, accounting for more than 60 percent of investment in genera-
tion capacity globally35. This trend will continue as long as technology 
cost keep falling (which they have massively in the past decade) and/
or as long as countries continue to support renewables to reduce the 
negative effects of fossil fuels, including greenhouse gas emissions. 
The political momentum to combat climate change was recon-
firmed and reinforced in 2015, when for the first time all countries 
agreed in the Paris Agreement to limit carbon emissions and to aim for 
carbon neutrality in the second half of the century. According to most 
current projections, deep decarbonisation will coincide with massive 
investment in renewable electricity generation and the parallel elec-
trification of transport and heating. Together with growing electricity 
demand in emerging countries, the market for low-carbon energy 
will continue to increase36. But low-carbon technology investment 
34 Between 2005 and 2015, renewable energy investment in developing countries grew 
steadily – especially in China, Brazil and India –overtaking for the first time in 2015 
the total investment in renewables of OECD countries. Starting from $3 billion of 
investment in 2004, China overtook the US as largest investor in renewable energy in 
2012 and accounted for more than a third of global commitments in 2015 (FS-UN-
EP/BNEF, 2016).
35 According to REN21 (2016, footnote 80), 63 gigawatts of wind power, 50 GW of PV, 
28 GW of hydro and 3.8 GW of other renewable generation were installed in 2015, 
compared to 42 GW of coal, 40 GW of natural gas and 6.5 GW of nuclear.
36 Low-carbon technologies typically refer to very different types of technology that 
all compete with high-carbon alternatives. Examples are energy generation tech-
nologies such as renewables, but also nuclear, energy consumption technologies 
such as clean fuel vehicles, and technologies to make more efficient use of energy, 
such as smart meters.
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will not be limited to power generation. Goldman Sachs (Kooroshy 
et al, 2015) estimates the market opportunity for electric vehicles and 
plug-in hybrids to be in the order of $240 billion by 2025. On top of that, 
there will be investment in other areas, such as $200 billion per year in 
energy efficiency of buildings. The International Energy Agency in its 
450 ppm scenario –  keeping the concentration of greenhouse gases 
in the atmosphere below 450 parts per million of CO2 equivalent, and 
hence global warming below 2°C above preindustrial levels – forecasts 
a need to ramp up annual investment in wind, solar, electric vehicles 
and carbon sequestration to about $750 billion after 2030 (Figure 3)37.
Figure 3: Global investment in variable renewables, carbon sequestration (CCS) 
and electric vehicles in the 450 scenario ($ billions, 2013)
Source: IEA (2015).
We picked four technologies deemed essential for the low-carbon 
transition: electric vehicles, batteries, wind turbines and photovoltaic 
(PV) cells. All four are tradable; trade in them (apart from batteries) 
has grown faster than total international trade (Figure 4) and patenting 
37 While globally the increase in demand for low-carbon technologies is clear, Euro-
pean markets for wind and PV might expand less fast because of over-capacity and 
past investment in these technologies. However, the EU might still be a competi-
tive producer of these technologies despite stagnant domestic markets, because 
the markets are global.
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activity has also outpaced activity in other areas (Figure 1). While the 
four categories do not perfectly fit into past trade and patenting statis-
tics, existing statistical categories provide good proxies38.
Figure 4: Share of certain low-carbon exports in total global gross exports 
(index: 2000=100)
Source: Bruegel based on Comtrade. Note: to keep it manageable we use through-
out the chapter one Harmonised System (HS) code per export category: for Electric 
vehicles we use 870390 Automobiles including gas turbine powered; for Wind turbines 
we use 850231 Wind-powered generating; for Batteries we use 8506 Primary cells and 
primary batteries; for Photovoltaic we use 854140 Photosensitive/photovoltaic/LED 
semiconductor devices
38 The four technologies are at different states of maturity, while wind-power is (close) 
to a mature technology with the share in patenting declining, batteries seem to be at 
an earlier stage.
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7.2 In which low-carbon technologies are EU countries 
competitive?
Countries that specialise in the production and export of goods associ-
ated with higher productivity levels perform better in terms of economic 
growth. If a country manages to export a wide range of goods that are 
typically exported by highly-productive countries, it is more likely to 
grow (Hausmann et al, 2005). Moreover, open market economies would 
not focus on exporting goods that they are not relatively good at produc-
ing. Hence, we assess the competitiveness of EU countries in low-carbon 
technologies using export specialisation as an indicator.
To control for the size of the countries and the size of the market 
segments we use the Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) to make 
the strength of countries in different products comparable39. The RCA 
is defined as the share of a good in a country’s overall exports, divided 
by the share in all global exports of global exports of this good. The 
RCA is greater than 1 if a country exports more of this good than one 
would expect relative to the volume of its overall exports. For example, 
between 2004 and 2009, Germany, Denmark and Spain exported more 
than twice as many wind turbines (RCA>2) as one would expect from 
the volume of each country’s total exports. By contrast, France, Poland, 
Italy and the United Kingdom exported less than half (RCA<0.5) as 
many wind turbines as one would expect from the volumes of each 
country’s exports.
When moving into new sectors, countries tend to move to those 
that are related or ‘nearby’ the goods in which they already have a com-
parative advantage, in order to take advantage of their current produc-
tive structure strengths. This should give an important indication to pol-
icymakers by showing that the current productive structure of a country 
is a fundamental factor to take into consideration when deciding on 
support for the production of new technologies (Barabási et al, 2007).
39 Note that a comparative advantage in a good does not necessarily mean that a 
country exports more of this good than other countries. It only means that relative 
to all other goods exported by a country, it is better at exporting this good.
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In the past decade, developments within and outside the EU 
have changed the comparative advantage of EU countries in the four 
low-carbon products of interest:
• No change was observed for wind turbines: the comparative 
advantage enjoyed by Denmark, Germany and Spain has been 
maintained40. 
• Poland had a comparative advantage in electric vehicles, which 
was a very narrow niche market in 2004-0941. Then the west Euro-
pean car-making countries – primarily Germany, France, Belgium 
and Spain, but also the UK, the Netherlands and Finland – gained 
a competitive edge in the emerging segment. Poland’s comparative 
advantage vanished when the market grew. Slovakia is an interest-
ing case. Slovakia’s electric car exports grew fast: from $12 million 
in 2012 to $68 million in 2015. And with Volkswagen, PSA and Kia 
having major operations in Slovakia, the country is by far the global 
leader in car production per 1000 inhabitants (178 compared to 
68 in Germany). In 2013, the Volkswagen plant in Bratislava began 
to produce the group’s first fully electric-powered vehicle – the 
Volkswagen e-up! – making Slovakia one of the main European 
producers of electric vehicles.
40 Some small countries have highly volatile wind turbine exports: Bulgaria had 
virtually no exports up to 2010, but $190 million in 2011, $14 million 2012 and 
$500,000 in 2014. Greece’s wind turbine exports stood at $10-20 million up to 2010, 
then $55 million in 2011 and $32 million in 2012.
41 Melex has been producing electric vehicles for niche applications (golf courses, 
hotels) in Poland since 1971. Poland’s exports in this category were $240 million 
before 2010, but dropped to $1.4 million in 2011 and thereafter, indicating an 
apparent data issue.
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Figure 5a: EU revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in four product categories, 
2004-09
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade
• The picture is very different for photovoltaic cells. Despite signifi-
cant support for solar PV deployment in many EU countries (most 
notably the feed-in tariffs in Germany, Italy and Spain), none has 
been able to defend its comparative advantage in this technolo-
gy. The early comparative advantages enjoyed by Germany and 
the Czech Republic vanished after 2010, when Asian suppliers 
managed to undercut EU production costs. Croatia’s comparative 
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advantage has arguably also vanished, with only one remaining 
manufacturer reported in 201542.
• For batteries the EU as a whole has no comparative advantage. 
Only Belgium – with a global chemical industry cluster (including 
Umicore and Solvay) – has remained a main battery exporter (2005: 
$750 million; 2010: $720 million; 2015: $640 million)43. Luxembourg 
seems to have lost its battery exporting business (2005: $46 million, 
2010: $3 million). The largest Luxembourgish battery producer we 
found, ACCUMALUX, had by 2010 outsourced battery production 
to the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. Battery exports are currently 
concentrated in a few Asian countries which are relatively special-
ised but also dominant in terms of absolute export market shares. 
Among them are Indonesia (RCA = 5.0), Singapore (4.0), Hong 
Kong (2.6) and China (2.2)44. 
We assess the potential of countries to develop an export specialisa-
tion in one of the four low-carbon technologies by examining whether 
they are specialised in similar products. We also look at the export pat-
terns of similar countries. Hausmann et al (2014) show that a country’s 
future comparative advantage in a product category can be estimated 
from its comparative advantage in technologically related products, 
even if the country does not yet export these products. This has been 
shown to be highly predictive of long-term industry growth.
42 http://www.enfsolar.com/directory/panel/other_europe only reports SOLVIS. 
Other companies previously reported (http://www.cres.gr/biocogen/pdf/cou-
tries/Croatia.pdf ), such as Solar Cells LTD and SOLARIS, seem to have left the 
market.
43 Also hidden champions such as Prayon – a €700 million turnover phos-
phate-chemicals company – moved into battery technology.
44 China hosts the largest lithium ion manufacturer globally, Tianqi Lithium. This 
follows its acquisition of Talison Lithium in 2012 and Galaxy’s Jiangsu processing 
facility in 2015 (IEEFA, 2017). 
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Figure 5b: EU revealed comparative advantage (RCA) in four product categories, 
2010-15
Source: Bruegel based on UN Comtrade.
The similarity measure is based on the RCA of country-industry 
pairs. Two products are assumed to be similar if the correlation of 
RCAs in these categories across countries is high. For example, export 
specialisation in photovoltaic devices often appears together with 
the export of transistors (r = 0.86) or diodes (r = 0.85). Analogously, 
two countries are similar if the RCAs correlate across industries. 
Geographically proximate countries often exhibit similar export spe-
cialisation, such as Japan and South Korea (r = 0.74) or Lithuania and 
Latvia (r = 0.73). A weighted sum of RCA indicators in similar export 
sectors and similar countries is used to determine the potential RCA. 
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Figure 6: Export specialisation in related product categories and similar 
countries, 2010-15
• Between 2009 and 2014, several car manufacturing countries were 
able to develop a revealed comparative advantage in exporting 
electric vehicles. Italy is an exception because it has not special-
ised in exporting electric vehicles. However, given its exports in 
related products, and the patterns seen in similar countries, such 
as Germany or France, Italy has the potential to develop an export 
specialisation in electric vehicles. 
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• Although wind turbine exports are dominated by Spain, Ger-
many and Denmark, an examination of the export patterns of 
similar countries and industries indicates that several central 
and eastern European countries might develop specialisations 
in the future. In particular, Poland’s and Lithuania’s exports of 
related products reveal greater potential for specialisation than 
has so far been realised.
• For batteries and photovoltaic cells, the analysis shows that 
export patterns in Europe and similar countries do not suggest 
that any EU country has the potential to specialise in these 
technologies. 
7.3 In which low-carbon technologies might EU countries become 
competitive? 
In a market economy, current strength is a good predictor of future 
strength in producing and exporting certain products. Current 
strength indicates that crucial factors are available and their prices 
are appropriate, that knowledge and a network of suppliers are 
established and that the regulatory environment is conducive. But 
the absence of a revealed comparative advantage does not imply 
that a country is unable to develop new strengths in the future. One 
of the building blocks of future comparative advantage – especially 
in new technologies – is innovation. Thus, countries that focus 
their innovation activity on specific technologies are more likely 
to develop/strengthen a comparative advantage in exporting the 
corresponding products. 
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Figure 7a: Technology specialisation (RTA) and number of patents in four 
technologies 2003-08
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat. Note: Colour depicts RTA, numbers show patent 
counts. Only countries with at least 300 patents in the period of observation are included.
In line with this, we expect that some countries that specialise in 
innovation in certain technologies might manage to build comparative 
advantages in these areas. Thereby, the revealed technology advantage 
(RTA) is the equivalent to the revealed comparative advantage in terms 
of patenting. The RTA is defined as the share of a technology in a coun-
try’s overall patents, divided by the global share of this technology in 
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all patents. Hence, the RTA is greater than one if a country is patenting 
more in this technology than would be expected from the total number 
of patents from the country45. 
Figure 7b: Technology specialisation (RTA) and number of patents in four 
technologies 2009-14
Source: Bruegel based on Patstat. Note: Colour depicts RTA, numbers show patent counts.
45  The number of patents attributed to a country is based on the location of the inven-
tor of patents applied for from the European Patent Offices or international patents 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty. The patent holder might be in a different 
country from the inventor. The earliest application of individual patent families is 
used and attributed in fractions to all inventor countries and technology codes. Only 
countries with at least 300 patents during the analysed periods are included. 
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For example, Greece’s patenting related to wind turbines 
(RTA>2 in 2003-08) was accompanied by the development of a 
comparative advantage (RCA < 1.0 in 2004-09 versus RCA > 1.1 
in 2010-15). We cannot establish causality because many fac-
tors influence the development of competitiveness (eg deploy-
ment and presence of similar technologies – see Huberty and 
Zachmann, 2011) and companies that produce/export a certain 
product are also more likely to generate patents in this area. 
However, RCA and RTA are complementary indicators for the 
potential of future competitiveness. 
In some low-carbon technology areas such as batteries and 
photovoltaics, the number of patents is high, because they are 
types of technology for which there is more patenting, commercial 
interest in the technologies is high and the categories are broadly 
defined. Much less patenting occurs in relation to electric vehi-
cles and wind turbines, though EU member states have embarked 
more on specialisation in the latter two fields. Patenting data is no 
perfect measure for innovative activity. It only measures a specific 
step in the innovation process and, because patents are a legal 
instrument to enforce intellectual property, they are only applied 
for if an inventor requires this protection. Not all innovation is 
patented. However, companies might also decide to patent very 
minor technological improvements in order to enjoy protection 
for their intellectual property. Thus the quality of patents can be 
quite variable46.
As expected, countries that are good at exporting certain prod-
ucts are often also good at patenting in related technologies.
46 The use of additional data sources and patent quality indicators (such as cita-
tions or patent family size) is warranted in order to increase the reliability of the 
analysis. This, however, often implies working very far from real time – because the 
quality of a patent is only revealed over time. This calls for improved innovation 
statistics at EU level, for example through a European energy information service, 
which would collect and administer energy innovation statistics. 
165 | REMAKING EUROPE
• For electric vehicles, we find that almost all EU countries 
have significantly increased the number of patents in electric 
propulsion technology. This has helped France and Germa-
ny keep pace with the growing patenting field and develop a 
comparative advantage in exporting electric vehicles. Austria 
and Sweden are also responsible for relatively more patents 
in electric propulsion than in other technology fields but are 
yet to develop a comparative advantage in exporting electric 
vehicles47. 
• With a few notable exemptions, most EU countries have a 
technology advantage in wind turbines. This is even true for 
countries such as the UK, which were not strong exporters of 
wind turbines. Many central and eastern European countries 
also patent relatively more in wind turbine technology than their 
small number of total patents would suggest. Then there are the 
global wind powerhouses Denmark, Germany and Spain, which 
together accounted for 43 percent of worldwide wind turbine 
patents from 2000-14. The most notable exception is France, 
which has only filed about half as many patents as the average 
country in wind turbines, relative to its overall patenting activity. 
Belgium, Sweden, Finland and the Czech Republic also do not 
focus on wind turbines. 
• The picture is completely different for battery technology. No 
EU country has a revealed technology advantage – not even 
Belgium, which has done relatively better at exporting batteries. 
The reason is the dominance of South Korea (RTA = 2.54) and 
Japan (RTA = 2.28), which both have more than twice as many 
47 This is also true for Romania. However, given the small number of patents pro-
duced by Romania, these numbers have to be interpreted with caution. A relative 
technology advantage (RTA>1) is already driven by a small number of patents 
during the analysed period.
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batteries patents as one would expect from their overall pat-
enting activity48. Furthermore, thanks to their patenting legisla-
tion and sectoral focus49 Japan and South Korea are among the 
strongest patent producers in the world. Japan has 43 percent 
and Korea 14 percent of all patents considered (by comparison 
France accounts for 3 percent). However, if these two battery 
patent powerhouses are excluded from the analysis, several EU 
countries have an above-average share of battery patents in total 
patents such as Germany (RTA = 1.56), Austria (RTA = 1.19) or 
France (1.14).
• Photovoltaic technology patents illustrate well that our RTA 
measure does not capture absolute patent numbers, but coun-
tries’ relative specialisations. Germany and France generate 
many photovoltaic patents – many more than for wind turbines 
– but that is largely because the patent category is much wider. 
The photovoltaic patents category accounts for almost 4 per-
cent of global patents, while wind turbines accounts for only 0.4 
percent. So although between 2009 and 2014 France produced 
1,450 patents and Germany 3,800, the only EU country with a 
small revealed technology advantage in this technology class is 
Belgium (RTA = 1.16). The most specialised countries are Japan 
(RTA = 1.74), South Korea (RTA = 1.69) and Singapore (RTA = 
1.59), while interestingly China is under-specialised in this cat-
egory (RTA = 0.90). If the top-three Asian countries are dropped 
from the sample, only Belgium (RTA = 1.52), Austria (RTA = 
48 South Korea and Japan, however, do not exhibit a revealed comparative advantage 
in exporting batteries, mostly driven by the concentration of the export market in 
other Asian countries. 
49 Japan’s patent figures are likely to be inflated by the greater tendency to patent 
incremental innovations, as well as the concentration in Japan of patenting-in-
tensive sectors, such as manufacturing and, in particular, electronics. See ‘Mother 
of invention – Why is Japan the source of so many bright ideas?’ The Economist, 3 
August 2007.
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1.18) and the Netherlands (RTA = 1.11) have an advantage in the 
photovoltaics technology category. The strong Dutch position is 
partly explained by the strong position of Philips, which ap-
plied for at least a fifth of the patents in this category50. Despite 
massive solar subsidies, Germany has not strongly specialised 
in photovoltaic technology innovation (RTA = 0.67). Interesting-
ly, China is also responsible for fewer patents in solar PV than 
would be expected for a country with China’s total number of 
patent applications.
Almost all EU countries are, in global terms, disproportionally inno-
vative in either electric vehicles and/or wind turbines, while almost 
no EU country has a technology advantage in battery and photovoltaic 
technology. But this picture could change because countries can alter 
the focus of their innovative activity51. We want to determine which 
countries might have some of the prerequisites for developing an 
advantage in the four technologies of interest.
We build on the fact that countries find it easier to innovate in tech-
nologies that are related to technologies they are already good at, or 
those that are developed in countries with similar patenting patterns. 
Using an analogous method to the assessment of potential RCA in 
the previous section, we estimate potential technological specialisa-
tion from a weighted sum of RTAs in similar technologies and similar 
countries52. Although many indicators of technology proximity exist, we 
50 Includes lighting technology because the PV category H01L also includes LEDs. 
A quick inspection of the only partly-cleaned data shows that Philips applied for 
about 300 of about 1,500 patents that included the H01L technology code in the 
Netherlands between 2000 and 2014.
51 For example, Austria developed a technology advantage in electric propulsion and 
Ireland in wind turbines between 2003-08 and 2009-14.
52 The top 4 percent related technology codes are used, resulting in 26 technologies. 
The relationship between technology codes leads to weights that are not country 
specific. 
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use the relative frequency with which two technology classes (in fact 
technology codes) are developed within individual countries53.
Figure 8: Technology specialisation in related technologies and similar 
countries 2009 - 14
 Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
To give one example, to establish Poland’s potential for wind tur-
bine innovation, we look at related technologies, such as ‘machines 
or engines for liquids’ and ‘dynamo-electric machines’, and related 
53 For a recent discussion on different measures of technology proximity see Alstott et 
al (2016).
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countries, such as Romania. We find that the potential RTA of Poland 
for wind turbines is rather high, because it is already specialised in the 
two nearby technologies. In fact, Poland is also already specialised in 
wind turbines. 
In general we find that countries that specialise in nearby tech-
nologies are already also specialised in the low-carbon technology of 
interest – somewhat validating our approach. The interesting cases 
are, however, those countries that are good at innovating in nearby 
technologies, but which have not yet developed a specialisation in the 
technology of interest.
• The EU’s innovative activity and export specialisation in electric 
vehicles both increased between the early 2000s and 2015. How-
ever, only France and Germany have consistently demonstrated 
comparative advantages in export and patenting activity. Austria 
and Sweden also have the potential to increase their comparative 
advantage. Italy, among the big car manufacturing countries, lags 
in terms of developing export or innovation specialisations in elec-
tric propulsion. Although the analysis of exports in related products 
and similar countries showed that Italy has the potential to increase 
its export specialisation, this was not found to be the case for its 
technological specialisation. 
• For wind turbines, Denmark, Germany and Spain (but also 
Greece) have revealed comparative advantages, revealed technol-
ogy advantages, and also the potential to increase their technol-
ogy advantages based on specialisation in related technologies 
and similar countries. Portugal, the UK, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania have both a revealed technology advantage 
in wind turbines and a revealed technology advantage in related 
technologies. France so far has not excelled in patenting or export-
ing wind turbines – but the specialisation in innovation in near-
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by technologies and similar countries suggests that some of the 
technological prerequisites for strengthening innovation in wind 
technology are present.
• For batteries, the initial finding – that EU countries are neither 
good at exporting nor at patenting batteries – is largely confirmed. 
Only Germany appears to be slightly stronger than its EU partners 
at patenting technologies that are close to battery technologies. 
• For photovoltaic cells the picture is even less encouraging – no EU 
country is strong in patenting photovoltaic cells technology or in 
closely related technologies. 
7.4 Clusters matter
Innovative activity is not evenly distributed within countries. It largely 
follows the concentration of industrial activity. Consequently, patent 
data is helpful in identifying regional industrial strengths (clusters). 
The advantage of patent data over other types of data is that patent 
data is available for concrete locations (the address of the inventor), 
with a narrowly categorised technology description (the IPC code). 
The data is also rather consistent over many years. To properly ana-
lyse patent data we applied a machine-learning algorithm (Peruzzi et 
al, 2014) to attribute individual patents to companies, to categorise 
the inventors into different types (companies, individuals, univer-
sities) and to locate the inventors. This was done by combining the 
sometimes sketchy patent data with the comprehensive up-to-date 
company database Orbis. The algorithm in general works very well in 
attributing 2.6 million patents to about 150,000 inventors and fixing a 
location for 1.5 million of the patents. 
When we plot the location of patents in our four technology cate-
gories, significant regional clusters emerge. For electric vehicles in 
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France, for example, the automotive clusters around Lyon (Renault), 
Paris (PSA and Renault) and Lille (Renault) stand out. These innova-
tive clusters feature large companies and also smaller competitors 
and an ecosystem of suppliers. In Germany, the entire south-west 
(Daimler, Porsche, Bosch), the Ruhr (Opel, Mercedes, Ford) and the 
area around Munich (Audi, BMW, Siemens) are clusters of electric 
propulsion innovation. 
For wind turbines the three largest innovation cluster are 
Midtjylland (Denmark: Vestas, Siemens), Hamburg (Germany: Nordex, 
Senvion) and Oviedo (Spain: EDP Renováveis). But we also observe 
numerous smaller clusters of wind turbine innovation in other parts of 
Germany and Spain, and in the UK, Belgium and the Netherlands.
Not completely unexpectedly, the clustering of innovative activity 
related to batteries matches the innovation clusters for electric pro-
pulsion, with the addition of a cluster south of Berlin (the Daimler sub-
sidiary Li-Tec Batteries in Kamenz54) and around London. In contrast 
to the country view there appear to be several smaller innovation hubs 
on a regional level that might develop further.
Among our four technologies, photovoltaic innovation appears 
least densely clustered, with a large number of small clusters across 
western Europe. This might partly be because the photovoltaic tech-
nology category is broadly defined – but could also be a consequence 
of the industry structure, which consists of more smaller-scale compa-
nies than the car or the wind industries.
54 https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Li-Tec_Battery. But Li-Tec might also serve as a warn-
ing. Despite public support and strong initial investment, production was stopped 
in 2015. Because of its location, Li-Tec was unable to build on a cluster in similar or 
nearby technologies or a strong academic research centre focusing on correspond-
ing technologies.
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Figure 9: Regional clusters of innovation 2000-13
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT. Note: In the map that plots absolute numbers of 
patents, the concentration of low-carbon research activity in particular countries/
regions appears even stronger than in the RTA maps (Figure 7). This is mainly because 
we previously plotted the specialisations (RTA) of countries, which imply that a coun-
try can be good at a certain low-carbon technology even if it does not produce many 
patents in this technology class just because it produces few patents overall (so its 
specialisation in this low-carbon technology is nevertheless high).
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Regional clusters of patenting activity in certain technologies are 
not just a result of clustered industrial activity. They also point to inno-
vation spillovers – the most fascinating example being Silicon Valley55.
To understand the importance of geographic spillovers for our 
four technologies, we analysed the distance between inventors 
and other inventors that they cite in their patents. Such citations, 
which identify significant previous patents on which the new patent 
builds, are part of patent filings. Our findings are in line with the 
literature56, indicating a strong concentration of spillovers within 
clusters. For all four technologies, between a quarter and a half 
of the cited patents are applied for by person or company whose 
address is less than 50 kilometres away from the address given in 
cited relevant patents57. Innovators tend to climb on the shoulders 
of nearby giants. 
The four technologies benefit from different types of knowledge 
spillovers. We can observe more significant technological clusters 
for batteries and solar panels, while this is less evident for electric 
vehicles and wind turbines. Solar panels are the technology with 
the greatest geographical concentration of citations. Solar PV and 
electric vehicles are more reliant on related technologies, while 
batteries and wind turbines mostly cite patents within the same 
technology class.
It is too early to make specific policy recommendations such as 
“focus policy support for electric vehicles to regions that already excel 
in related technologies because regional spillovers matter” or “sup-
port national champions in photovoltaics as the within company 
55 http://www.grips.ac.jp/r-center/wp-content/uploads/12-18.pdf.
56 For a summary of the literature see Carlino and Kerr (2014).
57 Compared to the academic literature, such as Jaffe et al (1993), Carlino et al (2012) 
and Murata et al (2014), we do not control for self-citation and other characteris-
tics, and thus potentially overestimate the spillover effects, which those papers also 
found.
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spillovers are so large” based on our limited analysis. But our results 
indicate that geographic knowledge spillovers matter and that these 
spillovers differ markedly between technologies. Therefore, cluster 
policies should be differentiated depending on the technology.
Figure 10: Histogram of geographic distance to other patents cited in patent 
applications
 Source: Bruegel based on Patstat.
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7.5 Conclusion
Europe’s business model of selling more of the same in new markets 
is reaching its limits as the pace at which new markets emerge slows, 
while new competitors that sell the same products emerge quickly. 
One strategy to restore economic growth in Europe would be to export 
new products that promise higher value added and growing markets. 
One such area could be low-carbon technologies. In the framework of 
global decarbonisation and the desire to reduce resource consump-
tion, the market for low-carbon technologies has been growing fast – 
and is likely to continue to do so. 
In terms of Europe’s potential, we assessed different criteria: 
1. Strength of current exports: Strong exports are a powerful signal 
that a country is (relatively) better at producing certain goods or 
services. Different EU countries already have comparative advan-
tages in a number of low-carbon technologies. For example Den-
mark, Germany and Spain are major exporters of wind turbines. 
2. Export strength in nearby products and similar countries: 
Exports strength tends to be systematically correlated between 
countries and industries. Given current production patterns, sever-
al central and east European countries could have the potential to 
specialise in electric vehicle and wind turbine exports. 
3. Strength of current innovation: Other EU countries might have 
the potential to develop comparative advantages based on their 
specialisation in innovation in these new fields. For example, Ger-
many is already strong in patenting electric vehicle technology and 
might turn this into a comparative advantage.
4. Innovation strength in nearby technologies and similar coun-
tries: France has so far neither excelled in patenting nor in ex-
porting wind turbines – but France’s specialisation in innovation 
in nearby technologies suggests that some of the technological 
prerequisites for strengthening innovation in wind technology 
and ultimately boosting exports are present. Although modest in 
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absolute terms, some central and east European countries exhibit 
specialisation in technologies related to electric vehicles and 
wind turbines. 
5. Regional clusters: Finally we find that – while only Belgium is 
good at exporting batteries and no EU country is good at inventing 
batteries – several regional clusters exist that produce significant 
battery technology patents. These clusters might be the nuclei of 
future growth.
We can therefore conclude that the EU has potential, but that one-
size-fits-all policies would ignore the complexity of the task of support-
ing the EU economy to gain a competitive edge in new products and 
services that will form the basis for future growth and jobs.
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8 From big oil to big data? 
Perspectives on the European 
energy industry of the future
Simone Tagliapietra and Georg Zachmann58
8.1 Introduction
Energy is a cornerstone of the European Union’s economic architec-
ture. In 2015, the EU spent €1.6 trillion on energy, or 11 percent of its 
GDP59. This represents about €3,000 per person. Energy system costs 
are expected to increase up to 2020 as large investments are under-
taken driven by current decarbonisation policies. Overall, energy 
system costs are estimated to rise by 2020 to 12.3 percent of EU GDP. 
Between 2020 and 2030 this share is expected to remain stable, and to 
only decrease thereafter as the system reaps benefits from the invest-
ments undertaken in the previous decade, notably in the form of fuel 
savings. Between 2030 and 2050, the share of GDP of energy system 
costs is forecast to gradually reduce, reaching levels close to those in 
2005 by 2050 (Figure 1).
58 The authors are grateful to Enrico Nano for excellent research assistance.
59 The PRIMES model reports on costs from the perspective of final energy consumers; the 
sum of these costs gives the total energy system cost. It includes: i) capital cost (ie annu-
ity payment for capital or energy saving investment); ii) variable costs for operation and 
maintenance; iii) fuel/electricity/steam purchase costs (including taxes, carbon costs, etc.); 
iv) renewable energy subsidy; v) disutility costs (< decrease in useful energy demand). En-
ergy system costs exclude ETS auction payments, given that they result in corresponding 
auction revenues.
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Figure 1: Evolution of energy system costs relative to GDP (%)
Source: PRIMES (2016).
The profound transformation of the EU energy system over the 
next few years will be shaped by two trends: decarbonisation and 
digitalisation. Based on strong public policies, decarbonisation 
is changing the European energy mix, while innovation in digital 
technologies is enabling disruptive change in the way energy sys-
tems are operated. Digitalisation should lead to the European energy 
system becoming more decentralised, with an increasing interaction 
of services (electricity, heat, transport, data) that used to be largely 
separated60.
In this context, the European energy industry must quickly rethink 
its long-lasting business models in order to adapt to, and make the 
best of, the new reality. We first outline the two trends and then 
explore possible future scenarios for the EU energy industry, with 
a particular focus on oil and gas companies and utilities. We then 
60 For a wider discussion of the decentralisation and convergence trends, see Tagliapi-
etra and Zachmann (2016).
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consider what EU policies needed to govern the transformation, and 
to ensure the stability needed by investors to deliver the annual €379 
billion in investment required between 2020 and 2030 to turn the EU 
2030 energy and climate targets into reality61.
8.2 Decarbonisation and digitalisation are reshaping the EU 
energy system
The European Union’s energy and climate policy architecture has at 
its core the aim to deliver decarbonisation. On the basis of a long-
term objective to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 80-95 percent 
by 2050 compared to 1990 (Figure 2), the EU adopted a binding 40 
percent emissions reduction target to be achieved by 2030 compared 
to 1990. This target is also the basis of the EU’s international com-
mitment to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change Paris Agreement62.
Figure 2: EU greenhouse gas emissions reduction scenario under current 
policies: not yet in line with the 2050 target (1990=100%)
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2016).
61 European Commission (2016h).
62  See Latvian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (2015).
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Turning these targets into reality is challenging. It requires 
radical changes to Europe’s power, heating and cooling, industry 
and transport sectors.
The task can become even more challenging if the global effort 
against global warming is further strengthened63. The current EU 
2050 decarbonisation trajectory is calibrated against the target of 
keeping the global temperature rise this century below 2 degrees 
Celsius compared to pre-industrial levels. This is also the central 
aim of the Paris Agreement. But the Paris Agreement also pledges 
to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees 
Celsius (a significantly safer defence line against the worst 
impacts of a changing climate) (United Nations, 2015).
Digitalisation, by making the overall energy system smarter 
and more efficient, can be an important catalyst for decarbon-
isation. Digital technologies give consumers more control over 
their energy use and offer benefits from additional services. At the 
same time, suppliers can optimise their operations and develop 
new offers, and system operators can benefit from new tools to 
manage their grids more efficiently and to integrate an increas-
ing amount of variable renewables into the system. Interaction 
between intelligent appliances, smart grids and home platforms 
– mediated by or on behalf of consumers – can usher in a new era 
with radically different consumption patterns centred on automa-
tion and remote controls.
From a technological perspective, energy is already going 
digital. The share of patents in which energy and IT appear on the 
same patent application has boomed since 2006, largely outpacing 
traditional patents in IT and energy taken individually (Figure 3).
63  Carbon Market Watch (2016),
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Figure 3: Share of IT and energy tech in total patents, EU28, index=1995
Source: Bruegel based on PATSTAT (2014). Note: The graph shows the share of pat-
ents related to specific IPC codes among all PCT patents with at least one Europe-
an inventor in a given year indexed in 1995. Share of patents in total patents, first 
priority application under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), classified with IPC 
codes H02 or G06 with at least one inventor from the EU28. The graph is based on in-
ternational patent applications under the PCT retrieved from the PATSTAT database. 
Counts are derived using the priority date (first date of filing of a patent application) 
and the inventors’ country of residence, where at least one inventor came from the 
EU28. The International Patent Classification system (IPC) is used to distinguish pat-
ents relevant to energy generation technology and IT. In particular, the classification 
codes H02 – ‘Generation, Conversion, or Distribution of Electric Power’ – and G06 
– ‘Computing; Calculating; Counting’ – were taken into consideration. All inventions 
in the database are classified with at least one IPC code but classifications in mul-
tiple groups is common. In the latter case, the patent is counted in equal fractions 
towards each technology. 
This rapid technological evolution means digitalisation is set to be 
a key enabler for the transformation of the European energy system, 
from the traditional static and centralised model, into a more dynamic 
and decentralised eco-system within which a wide range of players 
interact in a flexible system.
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8.3 Oil and gas companies
Oil and gas companies are the biggest part of the European energy 
industry by market capitalisation (eg around 60 percent, vis-à-vis the 
40 percent of utilities) and also represent the sector with traditional 
business models put most at risk by decarbonisation. 
The International Energy Agency sets out every year three scenarios 
for global energy: i) the current policies scenario, which assumes no 
changes in policies; ii) the new policies scenario, which assumes that 
national pledges to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions will be trans-
lated into national policies; iii) the 450 scenario, which sets out an 
energy pathway consistent with the goal of limiting the global increase 
in temperature to two degrees Celsius (with 450 referring to the parts 
per million of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere).
As Figure 4 shows, over the next three decades EU demand for oil is 
projected to decrease in all scenarios, though at different rates (by 26 
percent in the current policies scenario between 2014 and 2040, com-
pared to 60 percent in the 450 scenario). Meanwhile, gas demand is 
projected to grow (in the current policies and new policies scenarios) 
or to maintain (in the 450 scenario) its role. As a result, European oil 
and gas companies, which in the past enjoyed almost uninterrupted 
growth in oil and gas demand, will need to transform in all scenarios.
Figure 4: EU total primary energy demand, with oil and gas highlighted: 
scenarios to 2040 
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency (2016).
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These three scenarios illustrate the key role of EU energy and cli-
mate policy in shaping the future of the oil and gas industry. This point 
is further emphasised by the fact that European oil and gas companies 
generate a major share of their revenues in Europe (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Selected European oil and gas companies’ revenues by geographical 
area
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg, accessed in November 2016.
Policy signals: the key to the future strategies of oil and gas companies
Clear public policy signals are needed to incentivise EU oil and gas com-
panies to transform their traditional business models in light of decarbon-
isation. Without strong policy signals – such as sensible carbon pricing 
– EU oil and gas companies are likely to avoid a structural transformation 
of their business models. EU energy and climate policy thus has a key role 
to play in shaping the future industrial choices of oil and gas companies in 
Europe. In the absence of such signals, some oil and gas companies might 
bet against deep decarbonisation, instead of embracing it.
i) Betting against deep decarbonisation and refocusing only on gas
In the absence of strong policy signals on decarbonisation, and particu-
larly in absence of meaningful carbon pricing, oil and gas companies 
might decide to continue in a business-as-usual mode, and to progres-
sively refocus their activities on gas.
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Figure 6: Oil and gas reserves possessed by leading European companies 
(2010-2015)
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg, accessed in November 2016.
This switch might respond to the general expectations, also 
illustrated by previous scenarios, of declining demand for oil and of 
rising (or stable) demand for gas. In the absence of strong signals of a 
deep commitment to decarbonisation, oil and gas companies might 
well base their strategies on: i) the assumption of a rising role for gas 
in the energy mix, as a substitute for more-polluting coal and as a 
back-up for variable renewables; ii) the assumption of a more diffi-
cult outlook for oil, particularly because of the expected progressive 
electrification of transportation.
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The most recent developments of reserves possessed by Europe’s 
leading oil and gas companies might provide a first indication of this 
oil-to-gas switch. As Figure 6 shows, oil reserves possessed by EU 
companies decreased by 2.4 percent per year between 2010 and 2015, 
while gas reserves maintained their level.
As reserves are mainly a function of investment in explora-
tory activities64, it is possible to assume that European oil and gas 
companies already invest more in gas and less in oil. This trend 
preceded the fall in oil prices that started in June 2014 indicating a 
longer-term strategy being adopted by European oil and gas com-
panies to promote gas as a transition fuel in the decarbonisation 
process.
ii) Embracing deep decarbonisation and transforming from oil and gas to energy 
company
But European oil and gas companies could also adopt proactive 
strategies, embrace deep decarbonisation and embark on a trans-
formational process of diversification to new clean energy busi-
nesses. In particular, oil and gas companies could accompany their 
oil-to-gas switch with the opening up of new areas of activity on 
renewable energy.
Over the last few years, leading European oil and gas com-
panies have often pledged to commit to new energy solutions. 
However, as Figure 7 illustrates, these companies have yet to 
translate declarations into action. Only Total and Statoil have 
made significant investments in new energy solutions. In 2011, 
Total acquired 60 percent of SunPower, a global leader in solar 
panel manufacturing, and acquired in 2016 Saft, a French battery 
manufacturer. Statoil in 2016 acquired 50 percent of the Arkona 
offshore wind farm in Germany.
64 Statistical re-calculations also influence reserves levels.
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Figure 7: European oil and gas companies’ investments in new energy solutions
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg, accessed in November 2016. Note: the follow-
ing Bloomberg categories are included: M&A, Investment, Joint Venture, Spin-off, 
Buyback. Acquirer are companies categorised as: oil&gas, oil&gas Services, Pipelines. 
Target or seller: Energy-Alternate Sources, Batteries/Battery Systems.
The EU oil&gas companies’ pledge to new energy solutions further 
strengthen in the run-up to the 2015 Paris climate conference. In that 
moment leading EU and international oil&gas companies tried to 
coordinate a common response to climate change, also by establish-
ing the  Oil and Gas Climate Initiative65. In that context, four EU oil 
and gas companies established in 2015 ‘New Energy’ divisions, and 
two also consecutively committed to investments in both new energy 
projects and research (Table 1).
65 Oil and Gas Climate Initiative (2015).
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
€ millions
Total's aquisition of Saft (€950mn)
Total's aquisition of Sunpower (€1.3bn)
Statoil's aquisition of 50% of Arkona wind project (€600mn)
188 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
Table 1: Leading European oil and gas companies’ new renewable energy 
initiatives 
Eni 2015
2016
Establishment of ‘Energy Solutions’ division
Commitment to invest EUR 1 billion in projects and research 
(2017-19)
Repsol 2015 Establishment of ‘New Energy’ division
Shell 2015 Establishment of ‘New Energies’ division
Statoil 2015
2016
Establishment of ‘New Energy Solutions’ division
Launch of USD 200 million ‘Energy Ventures’ fund
Source: Bruegel based on companies’ reports, accessed in November 2016.
However, these diversification strategies appear to be still timid, 
particularly if put into the perspective of overall capital expenditures. 
For instance, Total’s acquisition of Saft represented about 3 percent of 
the company’s annual capital expenditure66. An annual expenditure on 
renewables of €500 million represents for Eni also about 3 percent of 
its total capital expenditure67, while $200 million represents for Statoil 
1.4 percent of its capital expenditure68.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that could make 
a considerable contribution to the decarbonisation of industry (in 
particular of the production of iron and steel, chemicals and cement) 
and, to a certain extent, also of fossil fuel-based power generation. 
According to IEA scenarios, CCS is critical to achieve the 2 degree 
target, and becomes even more important in a more ambitious 1.5 
degree scenario. Oil and gas companies might play an important role 
in the development of CCS, particularly considering their technical 
expertise in terms of operating underground. However, European 
oil and gas companies do not seem to bet on the future of CCS. In 
66 Total’s capital expenditure amounted to USD 24 billion in 2015. Data source: www.
total.com
67 Eni’s capital expenditure amounted to EUR 11.5 billion in 2015. Data source: www.
eni.com
68 Statoil’s capital expenditure amounted to USD 14.7 billion in 2015. Data source: 
www.statoil.com
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November 2016, ten of the world’s largest oil and gas companies 
pledged to invest $1 billion over the next 10 years in climate invest-
ments, with a specific focus on CCS69. This represents less than 1 
percent of the companies’ total annual capital expenditure, and this 
pledge thus casts doubts on companies’ actual commitment to the 
development of CCS.
8.4 Electricity utilities
Most scenarios70 assume that low-carbon electricity supply will be 
a major contributor to economy wide decarbonisation. This entails 
three parallel developments: i) a significant reduction in electricity 
consumption of appliances (eg lighting); ii) replacement of fossil fuels 
in power generation by mainly renewable electricity sources; iii) a 
shift in transport and heating fuels from oil and gas towards electricity 
(electric vehicles and heat pumps) – all of which will increase elec-
tricity demand in the longer term. On the basis of these assumptions, 
under current policies EU electricity demand is projected to grow by 
25 percent between 2015 and 2050 (Figure 10).
Figure 8: EU reference scenario 2016: the outlook for electricity
Source: European Commission (2016).
69 http://www.oilandgasclimateinitiative.com/
70 For example International Energy Agency, European Commission, European Cli-
mate Foundation.
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Over the same period, the share of renewables is expected to 
increase from 18 percent to 45 percent. Scenarios that model more 
ambitious policies necessary to meet the 2°C target foresee an even 
more rapid shift towards renewable electricity (Figure 9).
Figure 9: Scenarios for share of EU electricity produced by renewables 
(excl. hydro)
Source: Bruegel based on International Energy Agency (2016).
This expected increase in electricity consumption (notably from 
renewables) sounds like great news for electricity utilities that dom-
inated the electricity sector for many decades. However, the market 
capitalisation of the EU’s largest electricity utilities71 declined by 
more than €286 billion (or 72 percent of their value) from 2007 to 
201672 (Figure 10).
This downward trend is the result of the economic crisis, but also 
of the rapid emergence of new market and policy conditions that have 
created unprecedented pressure on European electricity utilities’ 
traditional business models. The emergence of strong decarbonisation 
policies, the rise of renewable energy and improved energy effi-
ciency favoured by technological development, the rise of distributed 
71 EDF, Engie, Enel, E.ON and RWE.
72 Data source: Bloomberg, accessed in December 2016.
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generation and new developments in demand response and storage 
capacities, all put pressure on conventional generation assets.
Figure 10: Market valuation of leading European electricity utilities
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As Gray (2015) outlines, a crucial role here has been played by the 
utility ‘death spiral’ underpinned by the development of solar PV. 
In a nutshell, the more electricity generated by distributed solar PV 
(eg rooftop solar panels), the fewer customers there are to share grid 
maintenance and transmission costs, which in turn pushes the retail 
price of electricity higher and thus further incentivises the uptake of 
distributed solar PV, demand reduction and distributed residential 
storage applications.
As a result, total impairments of generation assets between 2010 
and 2014 amounted to $44 billion73. In such a complex situation, each 
company has developed its own response. Two contrasting strategies 
have emerged so far: i) Defending the existing business model; ii) 
Becoming a driver of the transition.
73 Catoire, G. and Coneybeare, D. (2015).
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i) Defending the existing business model
A number of European electricity utilities understand that their coal and 
gas units might be needed for several decades to come. In the EU refer-
ence scenario (Figure 10), more than a third of electricity in 2040 will still 
come from coal and gas – and this electricity will cost to the consumer 
an above-average price because it will only be produced when wind and 
sun are insufficient to meet demand. It remains unclear what technol-
ogy could replace fossil fuels during a week-long low-wind period in 
winter, when demand is high and solar irradiation low.
Consequently, these utilities seek to convince governments that they 
require continued cash-flows for their fossil fuel plant fleets in order 
to keep the lights on. Corresponding capacity mechanisms – that pay 
power plants for being available (instead of for the actual electricity they 
produce) – have been implemented in several EU countries and are now 
about to be somewhat harmonised at EU level. 
Other electricity utilities see that under the current set of rules they 
are still more competitive than renewables. In particular, some incum-
bent utilities from central and eastern Europe hope that their strong 
position in their home countries can help them to prevent too intrusive 
decarbonisation policies – be they a high emissions trading price, emis-
sion performance standards or renewables subsidies.
ii) Becoming a driver of the transition
Some electricity utilities have built-up a significant portfolio of wind 
and photovoltaic generation capacities, invested in networks and 
divested from fossil fuels.
They clearly trust that European energy policy will continue to be highly 
favourable to the fast deployment of wind and solar capacities. Iberdrola is 
leading this trend in Europe, followed by Enel and E.on (Figure 11).
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Figure 11: Leading European electricity utilities’ generation portfolios (2008 
and 2015)
Source: Bruegel based on Bloomberg, accessed in December 2016.
Returns from the network business and renewables are largely 
policy driven. Regulators explicitly decide on the rate of return for 
electricity networks and policymakers decide on the remuneration 
schemes for renewables. A change in regulations can cost regulated 
businesses billions of euros. Therefore, understanding and managing 
the political environment is probably more important for the success 
of renewables and network electricity companies than good internal 
management or efficient supply chains. The split-up of, both, E.on 
and RWE in a fossil-fuel generation company (called UNIPER and 
RWE) and a renewables and electricity grids company (called E.on and 
Innogy) is partly justified by the difficulty of the traditional full-portfo-
lio energy companies to deliver consistent policy messages.
But new players might also emerge in the electricity business, 
as decarbonisation and digitalisation drive convergence of services 
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(electricity, heat, transport, data) that used to be largely separated74. In 
this new context, new industrial players might establish themselves in 
the market, breaking through traditional sectoral boundaries and inte-
grating energy, transport and telecom businesses. Tesla is one exam-
ple of this emerging trend. Started in 2008 as an electric luxury car 
maker, the US company rapidly expanded its business into battery and 
electric drivetrain technologies, auto-driving technology, supercharger 
networks and ‘solar roof’ technology. This has been done on the basis 
of the vision of providing an integrated clean energy service package to 
future customers, entailing renewable electricity production, domestic 
electricity storage and electric mobility.
The emergence of this kind of new player in Europe should be 
incentivised, because this could represent a considerable opportu-
nity to re-launch European industry at global scale, particularly if 
first-mover advantage can be secured. In order to facilitate – and not 
hamper – this transformation, a structural rethinking of the design of 
the EU energy market is needed. This should also involve a rethinking 
of EU competition, regulatory and fiscal policies.
8.5 Conclusions
Policy-driven decarbonisation and market-driven technological 
innovation are profoundly and rapidly reshaping the European energy 
system. In this context, the European energy industry is under great 
pressure, because it needs to quickly rethink its long-lasting busi-
ness models to adapt to, and ideally make the best of, the new reality. 
The cases of oil and gas companies and electricity utilities illustrate 
the need for strong and consistent public policy frameworks. These 
represent a fundamental prerequisite to provide long-term signals to 
investors. Without clear and credible policy guidance investors are 
unlikely to take the action required to achieve the EU decarbonisation 
targets. These signals are important to enable long-term investment 
74 For a wider discussion of these trends, see Tagliapietra, S. and Zachmann, G (2016).
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(which energy projects are) in a highly uncertain environment. This 
uncertainty can, for example, be illustrated by the strikingly different 
projections for renewables and gas in the EU energy mix of 2030 made 
by the European Commission in 2004, 2010 and 2016 (Figure 12).
Figure 12: EU energy scenarios to 2030: different visions on renewables and gas
Source: Bruegel based on European Commission (2004, 2010 and 2016c).
Considering the number and the order of magnitude of the chal-
lenges ahead, we consider that providing just partial fixes to the 
current European energy regulatory system (eg through the reform of 
the ETS or the reform of electricity market design) is not sufficient to 
provide the appropriate policy guidance to the energy industry.
Instead, Europe urgently needs a high-powered platform – rep-
resenting all major stakeholders – to discuss a broader vision for the 
design of its future energy sector. This should go beyond the existing 
working-level discussion forums. 
The ongoing structural transformation of the European energy 
system requires a parallel structural transformation of the policy 
framework within which the system develops. This should become a 
priority of the EU Energy Union initiative.
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To involve all major stakeholders and ensure a transparent and 
well-resourced discussion the European Council should ask the European 
Commission to produce a new green paper on the organisation of the 
(digitalised) European energy sector in the twenty-first century.
Like the 1995 green paper ‘For a European Union Energy Policy’, 
it should be a consistent basis for upcoming legislation in different 
policy areas. This should not necessarily imply more EU oversight in 
all areas, but could also allow EU countries to experiment with new 
regulatory approaches when they follow some general principles (eg 
non-discrimination against foreign firms).
This is urgently needed. With the current level of policy uncertainty 
investors are unlikely to deliver the annual €379 billion of investments 
required between 2020 and 2030 to turn the EU’s commitment to the 
Paris Agreement into reality.
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9 Fintech in Europe: challenges 
and opportunities. 
Silvia Merler
9.1 Introduction
In recent years, ‘fintech’ has become a buzzword that indicates a 
broad range of technology-enabled and innovative financial activi-
ties. The rise of fintech has also caught the attention of policymakers, 
concerned in particular about the uncertain impact that this new 
disruptive business model will have on traditional banking and about 
the potential financial stability risks in a situation in which there are 
so far internationally agreed fintech regulatory standards. We look at 
the current fintech landscape in Europe and the regulatory initiatives 
that have been undertaken – mostly at national level. Europe appears 
to be unique in terms of the prevalence of competitive – as opposed to 
collaborative – fintech activities. However, there seem to be substantial 
differences in views in different European countries, with different 
national regulatory approaches. In the absence of internationally 
agreed regulatory standards for fintech, the distinction is between 
those national authorities that have acted within already existing 
frameworks, and those that have introduced new rules.
9.2 Fintech: an overview
The term fintech is often used to describe digital innovation and tech-
nology-enabled finance, but it covers a very diversified range of corpo-
rate structures, activities, business models and technologies. We can 
group them into four broad categories: activities related to payment 
systems, financial intermediation of different kinds, ancillary services 
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such as insurance and regulatory compliance, and the function of 
currency. Examples include75:
• Payment systems: 
 – Payment and billing tech (facilitate payments processing, sub-
scription billing software tools); 
 – Money transfer and remittance (peer-to-peer platforms to trans-
fer money between individuals across countries);
• Financial intermediation: 
 – Lending tech (eg peer-to-peer lending platforms, platforms 
using machine learning and algorithms to assess creditworthi-
ness); 
 – Personal finance and wealth management (tech companies that 
help individuals manage personal bills, accounts and/or credit, 
personal assets and investments); 
 – Equity crowdfunding (platforms allowing individuals to provide 
monetary contributions to support specific projects or compa-
nies in exchange for equity); 
 – Institutional and capital markets tech (providing tools to finan-
cial institutions or other institutional investors);
• Ancillary services: 
 – InsurTech (companies creating new underwriting, claims, dis-
tribution and brokerage platforms, or software-as-a-service to 
help insurers with IT issues); 
 – RegTech (application of digital technology to regulatory compli-
ance);
• Currency functions: blockchain/bitcoin (key software/technology 
firms in the distributed ledger area).
Figure 1 shows total global investment, including venture capital 
and mergers and acquisitions, in fintech companies. Total investment 
75  See also CBI (2016).
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in fintech declined globally in 2016, after a steady rise over previous 
years. Global investment in fintech companies was about $25bn in 
2016, spread across 1076 deals (KPMG, 2016). The slowdown in 2016 
might be a reflection of generalised uncertainty prevailing in the major 
fintech markets, because of political or economic events (Brexit in 
the United Kingdom, the presidential elections in the United States 
and the economic slowdown in China). When disaggregating the total 
investment figure, the decline seems attributable mostly to a slow-
down of M&A activity76. Interest in InsurTech seemed to grow substan-
tially during 2016, while investment in blockchain technologies saw 
some deceleration, as corporate investors shifted from direct invest-
ment in blockchain providers towards investing in blockchain-based 
projects.
Figure 1: Total global investment in fintech companies (2010-16)
Source: KPMG (2017). Note: this figure includes both venture capital investment and 
M&A activity.
76 Data from KPMG Pulse of Fintech showed that M&A deals in 2016 fell from $34 billion 
to $11 billion compared to 2015, but 2015 was an outlier in terms of M&A value at-
tributable to fintech. Total venture capital investment in 2016 instead increased from 
$12.7 billion to $13.6 billion, although deal activity dropped from 940 to 840 deals 
over the same period.
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Activity has evolved differently in different fintech geographical 
markets. The total number of fintech deals on the American continent 
dropped in 2016, and the value of fintech deals in the region fell more 
than 50 percent year-on-year. Investment in the US remains dominant, 
but funding is also increasingly reaching fintech in Brazil, Argentina 
and Mexico, while Canada experienced record growth in terms of both 
deal activity and value. In Europe, total fintech investment declined 
significantly in 2016, although the decline in the number of deals 
appears very small. As a consequence, Asia surpassed Europe as the 
second largest market in 2016. The total investment in Asian fintech 
reached a high of $8.6 billion, despite a slight decline in the number of 
deals. Most of this activity was driven by investment in China, which is 
dominant in online lending and is the biggest market for digital pay-
ments (The Economist, 2017).
Figure 2: Total global investment in Fintech companies, selected (2010-16)
Source: KPMG (2017). Note: this figure includes both venture capital investment and 
M&A activity.
Investment in fintech companies in Europe was $2.2 billion in 2016, 
down from $10.9 billion in 2015. Most of the 2016 investment was 
venture capital (VC). The UK remained the dominant market, despite 
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experiencing a decrease in VC investment compared to the record 
levels reached in 2015. The second European market is Germany, 
which in 2016 recorded $376 million of VC investment. The Nordic 
market appears more volatile, with peaks of investment recorded in 
2011 and 2014 and $76 million invested in 2016. Europe also accounts 
for four private fintech start-ups valued at $1 billion or more. There 
are 22 such companies in the world (CBI, 2016). In Europe, two of 
them are located in the UK (Funding Circle and TransferWise), one in 
Sweden (Klarna) and one in the Netherlands (Adyen). 
Figure 3: Fintech venture investment, major European markets ($ millions)
Source: KPMG (2017).
9.3 Policy challenges
The ‘fintech revolution’ raises a series of policy concerns. One ques-
tion is how fintech will impact the traditional banking business model, 
and in particular how traditional banks will position themselves in 
the face of this new challenge. A second question is whether digital 
and technology-enabled financial activities require adaptations of 
the current regulatory framework. To date, in the European context 
regulatory action on fintech has been limited, and has been pursued 
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at national rather than EU level. Regulatory work on fintech will prove 
challenging, because it will need to provide for appropriate oversight 
while maintaining the conditions that make for a particularly dynamic 
and innovative environment. Third, there is the question of if and how 
this new sector could create financial stability risks. 
9.3.1 Fintech and traditional banking
Fintech is a disruptive technology, often introduced by new firms 
(start-ups) which, at least in the early phase of their development, 
can be expected to compete with the business model of the tradi-
tional banking sector. Competitive fintech essentially offers ser-
vices that have the potential to disrupt and replace incumbents. 
Incumbents can respond in different ways, for example by trying 
to be at the forefront of the technological innovations or at least by 
being fast adopters. This might entail buying the products of fintech 
start-ups or buying the start-ups themselves. In this case, fintech 
becomes collaborative, leveraging technology to offer products 
that can enhance traditional business models77. A recent report 
by Accenture (2016) shows that the balance between investment 
in competitive versus collaborative fintech companies remained 
steady from 2010 to 2015, with 62 percent of deals going to compet-
itive companies. The situation however varies in different markets 
(Figure 4). The North American market saw a shift towards more 
investment in collaborative fintech from 2010 to 2015. A similar 
trend was also visible in the Asian-Pacific region, where investment 
77 OnDeck is an example of company that has gone from a disruptive to a more collab-
orative approach. In 2011, when it was founded, OnDeck filled a gap with software 
that was able to underwrite small loans at a lower cost in a market from which banks 
were retreating (lending to SMEs). Since going public in 2014, it now partners with 
several large global retail banks, enabling them to offer small business borrowers the 
speed of an alternative lender. An example of a competitive company is Betterment, 
launched in 2010 as a low-fee, digital alternative to traditional investing. It has contin-
ued to grow and offers a traditional banking product that is more adapted to today’s 
customers’ needs (Accenture, 2016).
204 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
in collaborative fintech increased from 7 percent to 16 percent of 
the total from 2010 to 2015. In Europe, on the other hand, invest-
ment in collaborative fintech declined from 38 percent of the total 
to 14 percent. In the UK, more than 90 percent of investment has 
been directed to competitive fintech. 
Figure 4: Collaborative versus competitive fintech investment, major markets
Source: Accenture (2016).
Fintech companies do not seem to think that fintech will become 
dominant in the future. In 2015, the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) 
conducted parallel surveys of more than 100 senior bankers and 100 
fintech executives, to understand market participants’ views on the 
impact of fintech, including expectations for the evolution of the retail 
banking industry. The results show that 33 percent of respondents 
see the future as a mix of banks and fintech, with dominating in some 
sectors. For 46 percent of the responding fintech companies, however, 
banks are more likely to continue dominating (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Views on the future of banking, % of respondents
Source: EIU (2016).
Not all areas are perceived as equally threatened by the rise of 
fintech. PWC (2016) conducted a global survey of 544 respondents 
from top financial institutions in 46 countries. The majority of partici-
pants saw consumer banking and fund transfer and payments as areas 
most likely to be disrupted by 2020, because they are more vulnerable 
to the kind of disintermediation emerging through online platforms 
and technology-driven payments processes. Sixty-seven percent of 
respondents saw threats from fintech coming mostly in the form of 
“pressure on margins” and 59 percent from “loss of market share”. 
However, not everybody sees fintech as a threat. A 2016 survey run by 
Business Insider showed significant differences in views in different 
European countries. In France, 43 percent of interviewed banks appear 
to see fintech companies mostly as a threat; German banks are split, 
with 37 percent seeing fintech companies as a threat and 35 percent 
seeing them as possible collaborators; while 47 percent of Italian 
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banks see fintech companies as possible collaborators. About 20 per-
cent of the banks said that they would consider fintech firms as targets 
for possible acquisition. 
Figure 6: How European banks see fintech, % of respondents
Source: Business Insider (2016).
Overall, no immediate conclusion can be drawn about how the 
entry of new fintech players will impact the incumbent sector. Much 
will depend on how incumbents react and adapt their business 
models. Fintech certainly offers an opportunity for new start-ups to 
compete with incumbents, without having to bear the costs of their 
legacy IT systems and compliance-oriented business cultures. On 
the other hand, a strength of traditional banks is their economies of 
scale, which may be unavailable to start-ups unless they team up with 
incumbents (Coeuré, 2016). So fintech could be a positive shock for a 
sector that needs to restructure after the crisis. However, an important 
point for policymakers to consider is how to ensure a level playing field 
between entities providing similar financial services, to avoid market 
fragmentation, which might create challenges for a single EU market. 
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9.3.2 Fintech and regulation 
A second issue is that of regulation, in particular of whether fintech 
creates a need to adapt the current regulatory framework. The chal-
lenge in regulating fintech is how to allow innovation to develop with-
out hindering financial stability. There are currently no internation-
ally-agreed regulatory standards for fintech activities, while there is a 
distinction between those national authorities that have acted within 
already existing frameworks, and those that have introduced new rules 
specifically for fintech.
In the US, fintech companies looking to offer bank-like products 
or services across state lines have traditionally been required to 
apply for multiple state licenses. In December 2016, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) issued a white paper proposing 
to create a special-purpose national bank charter available to fintech 
companies that provide non-deposit banking products and services 
(Deloitte, 2017). Fintech firms are not directly supervised, examined 
or regulated by a federal banking regulatory agency, although they are 
subject to some federal regulations, particularly in the field of con-
sumer protection. The OCC’s proposal goes beyond consumer protec-
tion and focuses on prudential supervision, baseline safety, soundness 
and compliance, for fintech companies seeking a national charter 
(Clifford Chance, 2017). 
In Europe, several national authorities, the European Commission, 
the European Parliament, the European Central Bank and the 
European Securities and Markets Authority, have started regulatory 
initiatives related to fintech. Table A in the Appendix to this chapter 
lists some of the actions taken at national level. The UK is unsurpris-
ingly advanced on this issue, and the UK Financial Conduct Authority 
(FCA) has been the first regulator to launch a regulatory sandbox78 
78 The sandbox is described by the UK FCA as “a supervised space, open to both au-
thorised and unauthorised firms, that provides firms with reduced time-to-market 
at potentially lower cost, appropriate consumer protection safeguards built in to new 
products and services better access to finance”. See https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/reg-
ulatory-sandbox.
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initiative, allowing businesses to test innovative financial services 
without incurring all the normal regulatory consequences associated 
with those activities (Denmark is considering a similar option). In the 
context of Brexit, it is at the time of writing uncertain what the impact 
will be on London as a financial centre, and continental countries 
could seize the opportunity to attract fintech companies. France has 
already taken steps in this direction, introducing a ‘2WeekTicket’ 
licensing procedure for fintech companies in 2016. Similarly, the 
French Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR) said 
in September 2016 that the authorisation process would be enhanced 
and simplified for, among others, UK credit institutions, payment 
institutions and insurance companies. Other countries – including 
Germany, Italy, Ireland and Spain – do not currently envisage ‘light’ 
regulation for fintech companies. The European regulatory landscape 
currently shows significant fragmentation and national idiosyncra-
sies, so there is a strong rationale for an EU initiative. The European 
Commission acknowledged this diversity in a public consultation 
it published in March 2017, on the impact of technology on the 
European financial services sector. The Commission’s stance on fin-
tech relies on three principles:
• Technology neutrality: ensure that the same activity is subject to 
the same regulation irrespective of the way the service is delivered, 
so that innovation is enabled and the level-playing field preserved;
• Proportionality: reflecting the business model, size, systemic signifi-
cance, complexity and cross-border activities of regulated entities;
• Integrity enhancement: application of technologies to financial 
services should promote more market transparency to the benefit 
of consumers and businesses without creating unwarranted risks 
(eg market abuse, mis-selling, cyber security issues, systemic risks).
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Results from the Commission’s consultation were published in June 
2017, showing that most respondents agreed with the three princi-
ples proposed by the Commission and highlighting the perception 
of a need for further EU action. Seventy-four percent of respondents 
seemed to favour active involvement of regulators and/or supervisors 
to foster competition or collaboration, as appropriate, between dif-
ferent market players and new entrants. The Commission argued that 
the different approaches in EU countries are costly and could reduce 
the incentives for innovation. The Commission said it would investi-
gate the need for new licensing regimes for the relevant activities at 
EU level. More than half of respondents (53 percent) said that the EU 
should introduce new licensing categories for fintech activities, with 
harmonised regulatory and supervisory requirements, including pass-
porting of such activities across the EU single market. Fifty-two percent 
of respondents highlighted a need for guidelines or regulation at EU 
level to harmonise regulatory sandbox approaches in EU countries 
and 49 percent saw merits in developing a European regulatory sand-
box targeted specifically at fintech companies that want to operate 
cross-border. Speaking at a European Central Bank fintech workshop 
earlier in 2017, the Vice-Chair of the Single Supervisory Mechanism 
board said that the ECB is also working on fintech, including on a joint 
policy approach to bank licensing with national supervisors, to ensure 
that applications are treated in the same manner throughout the euro 
area, and that risks specific to fintech will be assessed appropriately 
and proportionately.
9.3.3 Fintech and financial stability 
Fintech could have significant implications for payments, settlement 
and financial stability. At present, the small size of fintech credit 
relative to traditional banks credit limits the direct impact of fintech 
on financial stability. However, if the share of fintech credit were to 
increase, it could bring both benefits and risks for financial stability. 
BIS (2017) identified as potential benefits the potential increase in 
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financial inclusion, more diversity in credit provision and efficiency 
pressures on incumbents. Among the risks, there is a potential deterio-
ration of lending standards, possibly increased pro-cyclicality of credit 
provision and the uncertain impact on the traditional banks. 
Fintech credit might create challenges for regulators in their task of 
monitoring. Regulatory and supervisory authorities rely heavily on the 
information contained in financial institutions’ balance sheets, and 
the concept of the bank balance sheet is central to current regulatory 
frameworks. In the case of non-bank peer-to-peer (P2P) lending firms, 
however, it is difficult to obtain sufficient information on financial 
intermediation from their balance sheets, and imposing constraints 
on those balance sheets might not be very effective in terms of influ-
encing these firms’ lending activities (Nakaso, 2016). Reliable and 
timely data might not be available because of the absence of regulatory 
reporting requirements and supervisory processes, and increasing 
the share of lending that occurs outside the prudential net might limit 
the effectiveness of macro-prudential policy measures (BIS, 2017). On 
the other hand, BIS (2017) argues that most P2P lending platforms are 
not leveraged like banks, their lending models do not entail bank-
like liquidity risks because investments and loans are typically dura-
tion-matched, and investors are unable to liquidate their investments 
before loan expiration.
Fintech also raises stability issues for the traditional banks, as 
highlighted by Single Supervisory Mechanism Vice-Chair Sabine 
Lautenschläger in a March 2017 speech (Lautenschläger, 2017). There 
is a risk that the squeeze on profits in the traditional sector under 
increased competition could induce banks to cut costs in areas such as 
risk management. On the other hand, the emergence of fintech could 
make bank funding less stable, as new products, tools and services 
enable depositors to be more easily mobile across banks. As a conse-
quence, deposits might become a less reliable and costlier source of 
funding for regular banks. As far as lending is concerned, the increas-
ing dis-intermediation could make risks associated with traditional 
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banking emerge, eg maturity and liquidity transformation risks. Lastly, 
some fintech companies also use new models to score the quality of 
loans, based on vast amounts of data and supposedly more precise 
than traditional approaches. BIS (2017) highlights that some banks 
have begun to use proprietary fintech credit risk models for their own 
lending, but there is no firm evidence so far of actual improvements in 
the performance of credit risk models, and they have not been tested 
in a severe recession or a crisis.
More generally, digitalisation could change our understanding of 
what is needed to ensure financial stability. Financial networks are 
becoming increasingly accessible through open gateways such as the 
internet and smartphones, and this makes financial stability prone 
to cyber threats, the number of which is increasing. A related issue is 
fintech and big data. By being decentralised and personalised, the new 
digital finance will rely on massive amounts of personal data which 
may allow the alignment of individual loan terms and risk factors, thus 
improving risk management and pricing (BIS, 2016). However, this 
might also raise issues of data protection. 
Lastly, an additional area for further research has to do with how 
decentralised financial activities, such as blockchain and distributed 
ledgers technology, could affect currencies and the tasks of central 
banks. The prevailing view seems to be that virtual currencies are 
unlikely to overwhelm sovereign currencies, because of the ‘trust’ 
which is indispensable to underpin a currency (Nakaso, 2016). BIS 
(2016) research however highlights several areas in which fintech 
could have an impact on central banks, their role in the payment 
system, the extent to which they have supervisory responsibilities for 
institutions in the network of digital currency or clearing services, 
their conduct of monetary policy, the issuance of physical currency 
and their role in maintaining financial stability. Broadbent (2016) also 
looks at these issues, focusing in particular on the challenging idea of 
central bank digital currency. 
212 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
9.4 Conclusion
The rise of technology-enabled finance (fintech) has spurred signifi-
cant interest from financial markets and policymakers, accompanied 
by concerns about the impact fintech could have on the established 
traditional banking business. Fintech activity slowed down in 2016, 
but this appears to be a consequence of political risks in 2016, and not 
to a general slowdown of the innovative trend. So there is good reason 
to believe that fintech will be central to the policy discussion in the 
coming years. 
Globally, the balance between competitive and collaborative 
fintech is in favour of the latter. In Europe, competitive fintech activity 
seems to prevail currently. Much of the impact of fintech on tradi-
tional banking will depend on the responses of incumbents. National 
attitudes towards fintech vary significantly in Europe, with the per-
ception of fintech ranging between a ‘threat’ and an ‘opportunity’. It 
is unsurprising to see different regulatory approaches in different EU 
countries. In the absence of internationally agreed regulatory stand-
ards for fintech activities, some national authorities have acted within 
already existing frameworks, while others have introduced new rules 
specifically for fintech. In the EU, France has been very active, explic-
itly trying to seize the opportunity of Brexit to attract fintech players. 
However, regulatory initiatives in EU countries are fragmented and 
with national idiosyncrasies, which the European Commission has 
rightly acknowledged to be costly, and potentially dis-incentivising for 
innovation. EU institutions have started working on this issue and this 
is a welcome development. The European Commission has set up a 
Financial Technology Task Force to formulate policy-oriented recom-
mendations during 2017. Ultimately, the goal will be to strike a balance 
between incentivising innovation and ensuring financial stability. To 
prevent regulatory developments in this new area resulting in a frag-
mented market, initiatives such as uniform EU licensing, passporting 
and EU-wide regulatory sandboxes for cross-border fintech appear to 
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be positive developments. Dealing with fintech at EU- level would help 
to prevent fragmentation and to ensure that regulatory requirements 
are harmonised across countries. This is important because fintech 
activities do potentially raise financial stability concerns at the macro 
level.
Appendix
Table A: National measures on fintech
Country Actions taken
Denmark The Danish FSA has set up a fintech task force to ensure that fintech 
initiatives receive appropriate guidance as to the type of licence 
necessary to carry out the contemplated business. The Danish FSA is 
also considering the potential introduction of a regulatory sandbox 
inspired by the UK and Singapore models.
France The AMF and ACPR have created a taskforce to offer a single point of 
entry for fintech start-ups and facilitate a simplified licensing process 
with the French authorities. The ACPR has created the “ACPR-FinTech 
Innovation Pole”, a team dedicated to fintech that intends to ease the 
filing and approval process for fintechs. The AMF and ACPR have 
also created an advisory body called the “Forum FinTech” to provide 
support to the fintech industry.
Following the result of the UK’s EU referendum, a “2WeekTicket” 
licensing procedure has been introduced by the AMF for fintech 
companies. This new programme called “AGiLITY”, is based on a 
quick pre-authorisation regime. Once the pre-authorisation has been 
obtained, the AMF commits to deliver a full authorisation within two 
months.
Similarly, the ACPR said in September 2016 stating that the 
authorisation process would be enhanced and simplified for, among 
others, English credit institutions, payment institutions and insurance 
companies. In December 2016 the Banque de France announced that 
it has launched a blockchain initiative and experiment with a group of 
banks and institutions.
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Germany BaFin provides general regulatory guidance for fintech companies 
and has created an internal task force. BaFin however has not started 
any initiatives to ease regulatory requirements for fintech companies, 
and has made it clear that fintech companies are expected to meet 
applicable legal requirements – i.e. if a business activity requires a 
banking financial service licence, the same would apply for a new 
market entrant.
Ireland Fintech is an important component of the Irish government’s strategy 
for Ireland’s international financial services sector for 2015 – 2020. 
The Central Bank of Ireland, however, has not introduced specifically 
light regulatory initiatives for fintech companies, and has made it 
clear that fintech companies are expected to meet all applicable legal 
requirements. Like in Germany, if a certain business activity requires 
a regulatory licence, the same requirements would apply for a new 
market entrant. 
Italy The Italian Government has adopted legislation including incentives 
to support innovative start-up companies. Fintech companies with 
an exclusive or prevalent goal of developing, producing or selling 
innovative products and services with high technological value would 
typically qualify.
The legislation does not impact licensing requirements, but provides 
for a number of incentives and derogations from the standard 
company law framework, including simplified procedures for 
incorporation and enhanced access to Italy’s State Guarantee Fund for 
SMEs. The Bank of Italy and Consob have also held round-tables and 
seminars with a number of Italian institutions to discuss fintech.
Luxembourg The CSSF - which was the first European supervisory authority to 
take a clear stand in favour of virtual currencies and their regulation 
- has established a dedicated division for financial innovation and 
technology. In order to foster innovation, several initiatives have been 
implemented at a national level by the CSSF and the Luxembourg 
legislator over the last year.
Netherlands The AFM and the DNB have set up an “InnovationHub” to support 
companies that seek to market innovative financial services or 
products but are uncertain about the rules to encourage innovation 
in the financial sector. From 1 January 2017, fintech companies are 
also able to apply to the AFM and DNB to request the application of a 
regulatory sandbox (decided case-by-case by the supervisor).
Other measures to encourage innovation in the financial services 
industry comprise partial authorisations (where certain licensing 
requirements are relaxed and activities of the licence holder may be 
limited), authorisations with requirements and restrictions (where the 
licence is tailored to allow for bespoke arrangements) and an opt-in 
banking licence (where the licence is limited to certain activities).
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Poland The Ministry of Development, Ministry of Digital Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance and Ministry of Health are developing a programme “From 
a paper to a digital Poland” to set the agenda for development of 
an e-state and digitisation of the economy. There are 13 streams 
operating within the programme, including the Blockchain and 
Cryptocurrency Stream, which is to focus on the implementation of 
distributed ledgers and promoting their application in business.
In addition, a working group composed of, among others, 
representatives of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Development 
and the PFSA is to perform a review of existing law and supervisory 
regulations in order to identify any possible regulatory barriers to 
the development of innovative technological offerings in the field of 
financial services.
Spain In December 2016 the CNMV launched a new fintech and innovation 
portal on its website for the purpose of assisting sponsors and 
financial companies on issues related to securities markets regulations 
and creating an informal forum for exchanging information on fintech 
initiatives.
UK In October 2014 the FCA launched Project Innovate, which provides 
direct support to innovative firms through an Innovation Hub and also 
targets policy and process improvement activities. These include the 
execution of international cooperation agreements for development 
of the fintech industry with the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission, the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Korean 
Financial Services Commission. 
In May 2016 the FCA was the first regulator to launch a regulatory 
sandbox initiative, allowing businesses to test out new, innovative 
financial services without incurring all the normal regulatory 
consequences of engaging in those activities.
The Bank of England launched a fintech accelerator in June 2016 to 
help it harness fintech innovations for central banking by working 
with successful applicants on areas such as cyber resilience, 
desensitisation of personal data and the capability of distributed 
ledger technology.
Fintech has also received backing from the UK government, 
including HM Treasury’s appointment of a fintech envoy and fintech 
roundtables being organised with relevant ministers and fintech firms.
In April 2017, HM Treasury published a regulatory innovation plan for 
financial services. The plan covers the work of the FCA, the Prudential 
Regulation Authority, the Payment Systems Regulator and the Bank 
of England and outlines how the approach of each to regulation will 
support and promote innovation and breaking down barriers to entry.
Source: Clifford Chance (2017).
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10 Strengthening cross-border 
e-commerce in the European 
Union
J. Scott Marcus, John Morales and Georgios Petropoulos
10.1 Introduction
Online purchasing is growing rapidly within the European Union, 
generating benefits for the broader European society. Europe lags 
other regions in many aspects of digital technology, and is by no 
means the front-runner in the technology of e-commerce; however, 
the EU is doing reasonably well in terms of use of e-commerce: 
“e-Commerce [sale of goods] is growing rapidly in the EU at an aver-
age annual growth rate of 22 percent, surpassing €200 billion in 2014 
and reaching a share of 7 percent of total retail sales” (European 
Commission, 2015).
Domestic e-commerce is doing well. Cross-border purchasing is 
also growing in terms of the revenues generated and the number of 
consumers who order across borders, but lags significantly behind 
domestic online purchasing (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: National and cross-border purchases by e-shoppers, EU, 2012 and 
2016, % individuals 
Source: Eurostat (2017). Note: % of individuals who bought or ordered goods or servic-
es over the internet for private use in the previous 12 months.
The imperfect integration of the European market in regard to dig-
ital services and online sales represents a substantial lost opportunity 
for Europe. With that in mind, this chapter asks three key questions:
• How great is the lost opportunity?
• What are the causes of lagging cross-border sales? 
• What can be done to strengthen the cross-border component of 
e-commerce?
10.1.1 The foregone benefits of cross-border e-commerce in the EU
The costs of these challenges to cross-border e-commerce within the 
EU have caught the attention of policymakers.
The focus of the European institutions to date has been on 
impediments within the EU/EEA, since these impediments clearly 
run counter to the established goals of the European single market. 
Impediments to online trade beyond the borders of the EU are clearly 
also an issue, to the extent that they imply (1) less ability for European 
producers to export, and (2) higher prices for European consumers 
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arising from gains in trade that could have been achieved, but were 
not. Since reducing these barriers would also tend to benefit the EU’s 
trading partners and global competitors, the impacts on European 
societal welfare are less clear-cut. In any event, it is probably appro-
priate for the EU institutions to attempt to mitigate impediments to 
e-commerce within Europe first, since they have more and better tools 
to deal with the intra-EU challenges.
A noteworthy recent study using state-of-the-art analytic tech-
niques found that if e-commerce sales within the European Union 
were as easy and cost-effective as domestic sales, retail prices would 
decrease across in all countries, both online (-1 percent on average) 
and offline (0.5 percent on average). Consumer surplus (CS) in the 
EU would increase by 1.2 percent, primarily based on the reduction of 
the price paid for goods and to a lesser degree on the ability of con-
sumers to choose from a wider range of goods and services. The study 
also finds an increase of producer surplus (PS) of 1.4 percent, not only 
by reason of increased consumption resulting from price elasticity 
of demand, but also because of the reduced costs of supply – many 
purchases that are made from ‘bricks and mortar’ retailers today 
would instead be made online. The cost of producing the goods would 
be unchanged, but the cost of making the sale online would be less 
than the cost of making the equivalent sale offline (Duch-Brown and 
Martens, 2016).
10.1.2 Impediments to cross-border online sales in the EU
It is useful to distinguish between supply-side barriers to cross-bor-
der online sales in the European Union versus demand-side barriers. 
Some barriers are primarily on the supply side and impact consum-
ers only indirectly. Barriers on the demand or consumption side, 
however, generally have direct impacts on suppliers as well.
On the demand side, consumer surveys on behalf of Google 
(Figure 2) show concerns about price (reported by 10 percent of 
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respondents in a simple average across EU countries79), delivery 
costs (14 percent), customer service (17 percent), possible difficulty 
with returns (23 percent), payment arrangements (11 percent), the 
complexity of possibly having to deal with a foreign language (11 
percent) and lack of trust in general (21 percent). These results are 
generally in line with surveys and consultations conducted on behalf 
of the European Commission. There are, however, significant dif-
ferences between EU countries for all characteristics, including the 
important aspects of price, delivery time and perceived challenges in 
dealing with customer service (Figure 3).
Figure 2: Reasons for not purchasing a product online from abroad, averages 
across EU countries (2014-15)
Source: Bruegel based on the ‘Consumer Barometer’, survey conducted on behalf of 
Google, at www.consumerbarometer.com, viewed 21 February 2017. Note: The question 
asked was: “Why have you never purchased a product online from abroad?” The data is 
based on a random survey conducted by telephone, and can be assumed to be reasona-
bly representative and free of systematic bias.
79 The data here covers the 28 EU member countries plus Switzerland and Ukraine.
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Figure 3: Reasons for not purchasing a product online from abroad (2014-15)
Source: Bruegel based on the ‘Consumer Barometer’, survey conducted on behalf of 
Google, at www.consumerbarometer.com, viewed 21 February 2017. Note: The question 
asked was: “Why have you never purchased a product online from abroad?” See also the 
note to Figure 2.
Firms that sell cross-border (or that have sold cross-border in the 
recent past) identified a range of challenges. Particularly prominent 
are delivery costs that are too high, the complexity of dealing with 
foreign taxation, concerns about data protection when selling abroad 
and payments from other countries that are not sufficiently secure 
(Figure 3) (TNS, 2015). More generally, lack of language skills and dif-
ferences in consumer protection also play a role. In sum, the concerns 
identified by businesses largely mirror those identified by European 
consumers, but the relative magnitude is not necessarily the same – for 
instance, suppliers appear to be more aware of delivery cost issues 
than consumers.
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Figure 4: Problems impacting companies that sell cross-border (2014)
Source: TNS (2015).
10.1.3 Measures to address impediments to cross-border online sales
Given the wide range of issues that impact consumers and merchants, 
no single measure can hope to solve the ‘problem’ of cross-border deliv-
ery; rather, a range of measures will need to be employed in order to 
unlock the full potential of cross-border sales in the European Union.
With this in mind, we feel that the Digital Single Market (DSM) 
Strategy (European Commission, 2015) that the European Commission 
published in May 2015 is directionally right. There are synergies – the 
whole is greater than the sum of its parts. This does not necessarily 
mean that these good intentions will lead to constructive and coherent 
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Delivery costs are too high
Resolving complaints and disputes
cross-border is too expensive
Guarantees and returns are too expensive
Dealing with foreign taxation is
too complicated or too costly
You don't know the rules which
have to be followed
Your company's internet connection
is not fast enough
You lack the language skills to deal
with foreign countries
You are concerned your data is not well protected
when selling abroad
Payments from other countries are not secured enough
For reasons of interoperability, you cannot
provide your products and/or services abroad
Clients abroad do not have a fast
enough Internet connection
Your products and/or services are
specific to your local market
Your suppliers request you to sell
abroad at a different price
Your suppliers do not allow you to use third platform
to sell your products and/or services
Your product labelling has to be adapted
Copyright prevents you from selling abroad
or is too expensive to sell abroad
Your suppliers restrict or forbid
you to sell abroad
For each of the following difficulties that may present itself when selling or trying to sell online to other EU
countries, can you tell me if it has been a major problem, a minor problem or not a problem at all? 
A major problem A minor problem Not a problem Not applicable DK/NA
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legislation. First, the details matter; merely being directionally right 
is not sufficient to assure good results. Second, the Commission has 
introduced separate legislative measures to deal with each of the 
problem areas that have been identified. As these measures proceed 
through the legislative process with little or no linkage to one another, 
there is a risk that well-intentioned but uncoordinated individual 
measures might undermine the effectiveness of the package as a 
whole, yielding a package that in the end achieves less than it might 
have. Recall that the Duch-Brown and Martens (2016) estimate of 
societal welfare gains (see section 10.1.1) is for fully effective and unre-
stricted online sales within the EU, but none of the DSM measures will 
in and of themselves produce this result, nor are all of them collec-
tively likely to fully achieve it.
Assuming that the United Kingdom leaves the EU as a result of the 
Brexit referendum of 23 June 2016, each of the DSM measures is likely 
to generate less in the way of benefits than was initially foreseen. The 
proportional impact is however likely to be far greater on the UK than 
on the EU80. The details are difficult to predict because the DSM legis-
lative measures are still being negotiated, and because of uncertainties 
in how the Article 50 Brexit process will play out in terms of the UK’s 
‘Great Repeal Bill’81 and the negotiations between the EU and the UK. 
We discuss in section 5 the issue of data transfers between the EU and 
the UK, because serious problems in this respect can be predicted with 
a fair degree of confidence.
In the remainder of this chapter, we provide more detailed insights 
80 Fullfact (2017) ‘Everything you might want to know about the UK’s trade with the 
EU’: “[A]bout 46% of the UK’s exports go to other EU countries, while somewhere be-
tween 8-17% of exports from other EU countries go to the UK (depending on how you 
measure it). The value of that trade to the UK and other EU countries’ economies – ex-
ports to the rest of the EU are worth about 13% of the UK’s economy, and exports from 
other EU countries to the UK are worth about 3-4% of the value of those countries’ 
economies taken as a whole”. Available at https://fullfact.org/europe/uk-eu-trade/.
81 For a preliminary draft, see ‘European Union (Withdrawal) Bill (HC Bill 5)’ 
at https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/cbill/2017-2019/0005/
cbill_2017-20190005_en_2.htm viewed 25 July 2017. 
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into measures that have been proposed to address each of the chal-
lenges identified in section 10.1.1: high delivery costs (section 10.2), 
international tax complexity (section 10.3), consumer protection 
(section 10.4) and data protection and data transfers (section  10.5). We 
follow with an overall discussion of the problem of geo-blocking in gen-
eral (section 10.6) before offering concluding thoughts (section 10.7).
10.2 Cross-border parcel delivery
Parcel delivery is a key issue for the online purchase of goods, to the 
extent that the goods need to be delivered to consumers. Of the €477 
billion in e-commerce purchases in Europe in 2015, 53 percent was for 
the purchase of goods (E-commerce Europe, 2015). As we have noted, 
merchants have identified the cost of cross-border parcel delivery as 
the single most significant impediment to cross-border online sales. 
Consumers (who do not always experience the cost of cross-border 
delivery directly, since it is often bundled into the price of the goods 
sold) have also identified the cost of cross-border delivery as a signifi-
cant concern.
10.2.1 Problems
The ability of Europe to fully capitalise on the opportunities offered by 
e-commerce appears to be limited by the high prices paid for the ship-
ment of goods across national boundaries within the European Union. 
Our concern here is with basic cross-border delivery services, not with 
express or courier services; our primary focus is on business-to-con-
sumer (B2C) shipments rather than business-to-business (B2B); and the 
concern is far greater for shipments by consumers, micro-enterprises 
and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) than for large shippers.
Our focus is on the national postal operators (NPOs), who continue 
to play a major role in these cross-border shipments, especially for 
SMEs. SMEs have been a core concern for European policy as regards 
cross-border e-commerce for some time. Based on Eurostat and other 
statistics, “15 percent of SMEs sell online compared with 35 percent of 
large enterprises; 7 percent of SMEs sell across borders compared with 
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21 percent of large enterprises”82.
Hard data on shipment modalities used by SMEs is quite limited, but a 
comprehensive study for the European Commission in 2011 found that:
“… market conditions are very different for large and small senders. 
Large senders operate in a competitive European cross-border parcels 
environment, and have much choice and bargaining power vis-a-vis 
suppliers. The prices they pay are negotiated. By contrast, many small 
senders tend to use the services of national postal operators, even in 
cases where they do have alternatives. As a result, they pay higher 
cross-border prices, as compared to domestic ones. These higher prices 
could be due to higher cross-border unit costs linked to the smaller scale 
of cross-border operations; and/or to insufficient competitive pressure, 
ie to the existence of market power” (FTI Consulting, 2011).
Inflated prices for cross-border delivery can negatively impact 
Europe in many ways:
• For B2C shipments, if the price of cross-border shipment is inflat-
ed, this price will ultimately be paid by the consumer one way or 
another and is likely to depress demand83. Purchases that might 
have been made but were not because of over-pricing84 represent a 
welfare loss to European society.
82 EurActiv and Digital Europe (2016) ‘How Digital is the EU in 2015?’ available at 
http://www.digitaleurope.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.
aspx?Command=Core_Download&entryID=921&PortalId=0&TabId=353, viewed 9 
April 2016. See also European Commission (2015): “While 17% of SMEs in the EU sell 
online (which is already very low), only 7% sell cross-border to other EU countries.”
83 This effect would operate through the price elasticity of demand. It is sometimes argued 
that the price that the consumer pays to the retail shipper is irrelevant because retailers 
offer free or discounted delivery. It is indeed fair to assume that the explicit delivery 
charge that the consumer sees does not necessarily bear much of a relationship to the 
(unknown) price paid by the retailer to the delivery service (see for instance Okholm et 
al (2016),  pages 21-24.). This is however rather beside the point. The retailer will consid-
er the true costs of shipping goods when it determines the price of the goods sold.
84 To an economist, this can be understood as a deadweight loss, and can be analysed 
using Harberger’s Triangle.
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• Consumers may look only on domestic websites instead of checking 
websites in other member states because they (rightly or wrongly) 
fear high delivery charges. Analogously, small shippers might decline 
to offer services in other member states because they lack the knowl-
edge or scale needed to offer services there. In both cases, potential 
gains in trade are foregone if a better or less expensive product that 
could have been purchased is not in fact purchased85.
• European competitiveness is lost relative to the EU’s global com-
petitors. That SMEs are strongly impacted is particularly worrisome 
given that Europe is to some extent seeking to catch up with B2C 
providers elsewhere that were quicker than European firms to 
capitalise on e-commerce opportunities. European firms seeking to 
achieve market entry in the face of competition from global giants 
like Amazon should not be needlessly hobbled by Europe’s own 
postal pricing arrangements.
• Shippers might be obliged to warehouse goods at more locations 
than would have been necessary if prices were more reflective of 
underlying costs86. This again represents a competitive disadvan-
tage in comparison with other regions of the world.
For the most common postal (cross-border) services, payments 
85 The desire to obtain these gains in trade is the reason why countries seek Free 
Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
86 It is sometimes argued that goods are not necessarily shipped from the country as-
sociated with the website (see Okholm et al (2016), page 11: “In fact, a large share of 
online transactions that are perceived as domestic by consumers involve a cross-bor-
der element.”). This is absolutely correct, and reflects a beneficial cost optimisation 
on the part of the shipper, but is somewhat irrelevant to the concern that fulfilment 
centres are not necessarily placed where they would be if the delivery were fully 
reflective of cost.
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between national postal operators (NPOs) at wholesale level are 
referred to as terminal dues (TDs). Terminal dues are relevant not only 
for letters, but also for small parcels (less than 2 kilogrammes) deliv-
ered as letter post. Inward Land Rates (ILRs) are the wholesale pay-
ments between NPOs for heavier parcels of between 2kg and 20kg (up 
to 31kg in some countries).
Many studies have concluded that non-discounted retail prices for 
cross-border parcel delivery are greatly in excess of domestic prices, 
and also greatly in excess of real cost by any reasonable measure87. 
One might have expected that over-pricing of delivery services to other 
NPOs at wholesale level would drive this over-pricing, but this appears 
not to be the case; on the contrary, wholesale TDs appear if anything to 
be set below the incremental cost of delivery to the NPO in the country 
to which the parcel is sent. In other words, they are too low, not too 
high. The clear conclusion must be that NPOs take a huge mark-up 
over the fees that they pay to other NPOs for delivery in the country to 
which a parcel is sent (Marcus and Petropoulos, 2016).
The depressed wholesale prices, coupled with large mark-ups in 
published retail prices, cause a range of problems and distortions. 
Of greatest importance for our analysis here is that they discourage 
cross-border sales by small and medium enterprises (SMEs) within the 
EU. A related problem is that they enable countries outside the EU that 
have postal services that are content to take a smaller mark-up over 
wholesale TD payments88 to use the resultant lower delivery prices 
to sell online to Europeans at lower prices than those achievable by 
European merchants, especially in comparison to smaller European 
merchants that have limited alternatives to the NPOs.
87 See for instance FTI Consulting (2011), Claes and Vergote (2016) (but see also Bors-
enberger and Chever, 2016), Campbell (2014b) and Marcus and Petropoulos (2016).
88 Countries that are classified as ‘developing’, including China, may legitimately quali-
fy for even lower TDs under the rules of the Universal Postal Union.
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10.2.2 Possible solutions
In its Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy, the European 
Commission rightly noted the importance of cutting the price paid 
for basic cross-border delivery by consumers and by small and 
medium sized retail shippers. Consumers and SMEs may have 
few alternatives to the National Postal Operators (NPOs), or may 
be unaware of the options that they have. These concerns led the 
Commission to put forward a legislative proposal in May 2016 
(European Commission, 2016).
With its legislative proposal, the Commission sought (1) to 
strengthen the data gathering powers of member state postal regula-
tory authorities, and to oblige them to collect data at both retail and 
wholesale levels; (2) to increase transparency of pricing for those 
who use cross-border parcel delivery services; (3) to oblige member 
state postal regulatory authorities to assess annually the affordability 
of these services; and (4) to open cross-border Terminal Dues (TD) 
and Inward Land Rates (ILR) arrangements to competitors.
The first three of these seem to clearly be beneficial and appro-
priate. It is the fourth element (the opening up of these wholesale 
arrangements to true competitors), however, that is likely to have 
greatest effect, albeit at some risk.
As previously noted, TD rates appear to be too low in comparison 
with real costs to the NPOs. Opening these provisions up to domestic 
and cross-border competitors potentially enables the competitor to 
utilise the NPO’s network at a cost below the true cost to the NPO 
itself. This would potentially enable competitors to beat the NPOs on 
price while using the NPO’s own network. In Figure 5, the left column 
represents the current situation and the centre column shows how 
competitors could potentially take advantage of below-cost TDs if 
they were to remain at present levels. NPOs will not permit this to 
happen if they have any choice in the matter. Once the NPOs are 
forced to make their cross-border facilities and pricing available to 
true competitors, they will be under substantial economic pressure 
230 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
to raise their wholesale TD charges to levels approximating true 
cost (as shown in the right column of Figure 5), which has generally 
been assumed to be in the neighbourhood of 70 percent of the basic 
domestic tariff. The NPOs are subject to some limitations in their 
ability to adjust wholesale TD rates, but we assume that this will 
happen in the end, and that the adjustments are likely to lead to a 
better and less distorted parcel delivery environment throughout the 
European Union/European Economic Area.
Figure 5: Relationship between wholesale cost, wholesale charges, and 
published retail price for parcel delivery by a National Postal Operator (NPO) 
under proposed EU rules
Source: Marcus and Petropoulos (2016a).
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10.3 Value added tax (VAT)
Lack of a fully harmonised, coherent system for the collection of value 
added tax (VAT) has been identified by merchants as a significant 
barrier to cross-border e-commerce. EU merchants ranked the cost 
and complexity of taxation fourth among impediments to cross-border 
sales in a 2014 Eurobarometer survey (TNS, 2015) (Figure 4), with 15 
percent rating it a serious problem and an additional 23 percent rating 
it a minor problem.
10.3.1 Problems
Merchants face numerous long-standing, well-known challenges.
• Every EU country sets its own VAT rates and rules;
• The shift in 2015 from country of origin to country of use was 
logical, but complicates matters greatly for cross-border online 
merchants since they are now subject to the rules of multiple 
member states;
• As a noteworthy example, virtual goods and physical goods are 
often subject to different VAT rates and rules;
• The Low Value Consignment Rule (LVCR) (which exempts small 
shipments from third countries from VAT) reduces the adminis-
trative burden on the member states, but also causes economic 
distortions, and disadvantages European e-merchants in compar-
ison with foreign merchants.
Different VAT rates and rules in each member state
Under the EU treaties, each member state retains the prerogative 
to set its own VAT rates and rules. Under the EU VAT Regulation, 
each member state is allowed up to two different reduced rates 
that it can apply to a limited number of products and services of its 
choice. Each member state can set its own standard VAT rate and its 
own reduced rates.
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Figure 6: Standard VAT rates among the EU member states
Source: Bruegel calculations based on European Commission (2016), ‘VAT Rates’, at:  
http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/vat-customs/buy-sell/vat-rates/index_
en.htm.
Figure 7: Reduced VAT rates among the EU member states
Source: Bruegel calculations based on European Commission (2016), ‘VAT Rates’, at:  
http://europa.eu/youreurope/business/vat-customs/buy-sell/vat-rates/index_
en.htm.
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In the past, these rate differentials encouraged a ‘race to the 
bottom’. Firms might choose to locate in low VAT member states in a 
practice known as competitive sourcing. Member state complaints 
of losses in tax revenue led the Council of the EU in 2015 to adopt the 
destination principle – the policy that ecommerce merchants would 
pay VAT in the member state of consumption, rather than in the 
member state of establishment of the firm. This change eliminated the 
problems posed by competitive sourcing, but imposed new burdens 
on e-commerce merchants.
The shift in 2015 from country of origin to country of use VAT rules complicated 
matters for merchants
Under the destination principle, firms operating across member 
state borders must navigate a different VAT system in each member 
state in which they do business. Because each member state has its 
own VAT rate, firms must constantly adjust their prices depending on 
the customer’s location.
In order to determine the correct VAT rate, the merchant must 
determine the consumer’s location, a process that can be surprisingly 
difficult. In e-commerce involving the transfer of digital goods such 
as video or music files, the firm cannot use a customer’s shipping 
address to determine which member state’s VAT system applies to the 
transaction. In these instances, firms use the customer’s IP address as 
a proxy for location. Unfortunately, IP addresses are relatively easy to 
falsify, and savvy customers could fake an IP address in a country with 
low VAT rates to decrease what they pay for a product. The shipping 
address (if the product is shipped) or the billing address might be of 
use, but no single indicator is perfect.
The costs associated with tracking the location of each customer 
present significant barriers to entry for SMEs. They limit the ability of 
SMEs to expand, and also are among the factors that contribute to sig-
nificant tax evasion as firms seek to avoid navigating the complex web 
of different compliance regulations (Næss-Schmidt et al, 2012).
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In an effort to reduce the burden on merchants, especially those 
that are SMEs, the European institutions put in place a Mini One-Stop-
Shop (MOSS) to enable merchants to opt to make a single payment to 
tax authorities in their country of identification (establishment), rather 
than individual payments to each member state where VAT is due. 
Many businesses welcomed this simplification, but it imposes burdens 
of its own, and it does not entirely solve the problem – it applies only to 
electronic services (not to goods), and the merchant must still identify 
the member state from which the order has been placed in order to 
charge the correct VAT rate. 
This problem runs deeper than a mere difference in rates. There are 
many differences in VAT practices among the member states. One exam-
ple is the different thresholds of turnover that each member state applies 
in determining (1) whether the firm is required to pay VAT at all, and 
(2) whether the firm is subject to the destination principle – if the firm in 
question is below the threshold, it can choose to pay VAT according to the 
rules of its country of establishment (Næss-Schmidt et al, 2012).
Virtual goods are often subject to different VAT rates and rules than physical goods
One might reasonably expect that goods and services that compete 
with one another (ie economic substitutes) would be taxed at the same 
rate in order to avoid distorting consumption patterns. Unfortunately, 
this is not always the case.
A 2012 Deloitte study for the European Parliament (Næss-Schmidt 
et al, 2012) found:
“In many EU Member States the supply of hardcopy newspapers, 
periodicals, books, brochures and similar items edited on printed mate-
rial are subject to a reduced VAT rate such as in Germany where a 19 
per cent VAT rate is applied to e-books compared to a 7 per cent VAT on 
paper books. On the other hand, digital newspapers, periodicals, books, 
brochures and other similar items published on other physical means of 
support (e.g. CDROM) or digital means (e.g. e-books) are subject to the 
standard VAT rate …”
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The Low Value Consignment Rule (LVCR) introduces distortions, 
and disadvantages European merchants
The Low Value Consignment Rule (LVCR), which exempts small 
shipments from third countries from VAT, reduces administrative 
burden on the member states, but also causes economic distortions, 
and disadvantages European e-merchants in comparison with foreign 
merchants. The LVCR waives VAT for goods below a given threshold of 
value. It was put in place in the 1980s to relieve the member state of the 
administrative burden of collecting VAT from foreign firms importing 
into the EU, on the theory that the minimal revenues collected would 
not cover the cost of collection.
The LVCR predates both the birth of e-commerce and of the single 
market itself. Today, online merchants are able to ship cheap goods 
into the EU. The LVCR provides these foreign firms with an unfair 
advantage at the expense of their European competitors. To remain 
competitive, many European firms that produce low-value goods have 
moved their bases of operation outside of the EU.
An EY study conducted on behalf of the European Commission 
describes some of the bizarre distortions resulting from the LVCR. At one 
point, half of all Danish language magazines were printed in the Åland 
Islands (Finnish islands with a special status outside the EU VAT system) 
and shipped to Denmark in order to avoid paying VAT. Distortions such 
as these are estimated to have cost member state governments more 
than €600 million in lost revenue in 2013 alone (EY, 2015).
10.3.2 Possible solutions
The European Commission proposed new legislation on VAT on 1 
December 2016 (European Commission, 2016a). Key elements of the 
Commission’s legislative proposal are:
• A broadening of the Mini One-Stop-Shop (MOSS) to cover not 
only services, but also to goods, and to all cross-border services to 
end-consumers;
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• Only businesses with cross border sales of more than €100,000 will 
be subject to the standard rules;
• Permission for member states to apply the same VAT rates to 
e-publications that they currently apply to printed publications. 
This helps to ensure the same rates and rules for physical and 
equivalent virtual goods;
• The LVCR will be eliminated, which is to say that foreign merchants 
will no longer benefit from a tax exemption that is unavailable to 
EU merchants89;
• The new One-Stop Shop (OSS) will also be extended to imports. 
Non-EU sellers can declare the VAT using the OSS, but a second 
simplification mechanism will be available to imports where the 
OSS is not used.
These measures respond directly to the problems that have been 
identified, and appear to have significant chance of ameliorating them.
10.4 Consumer protection
European consumers are generally well protected in the online world; 
however, current arrangements (1) are subject to fragmentation, which 
imposes burdens on online merchants; and (2) are subject to some 
gaps in consumer protection. There are thus impediments both on 
the supply side and on the demand side. Recall that surveys on behalf 
of Google (see section 10.1.1) showed consumer concerns about 
customer service (reported by 17 percent of respondents in a simple 
average across the member states), possible difficulty with returns 
(23 percent), the complexity of possibly having to deal with a foreign 
language (11 percent) and lack of trust in general (21 percent).
89 European micro-businesses tend to be exempt from VAT if their annual turn-over is 
sufficiently low.
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EU merchants ranked the cost of resolving disputes cross-border 
second and “not knowing the rules that have to be applied” fifth among 
impediments to cross-border sales in a 2014 Eurobarometer survey 
(TNS, 2015) (Figure 4). 
10.4.1 Problems
The Consumer Rights Directive (CRD)90 (together with a broad range of 
complementary legislative instruments) has done a great deal to har-
monise consumer protection arrangements across the member states 
and to ensure that all Europeans enjoy basic consumer rights.
Nonetheless, there are classic problems of fragmentation arising 
from minimum harmonisation of many aspects of the CRD. Member 
states can and do go beyond the provisions of the CRD, thus introduc-
ing challenging compliance issues for online merchants who seek to 
conduct business cross-border.
The Commission’s Impact Assessment (European Commission, 
2015a) expresses this complex concern as clearly as possible:
“The Consumer Rights Directive has fully harmonised certain rules 
for online sales of goods and supply of digital content (mainly pre-con-
tractual information requirements and the right of withdrawal). 
However, there are no specific EU rules to protect consumers against 
non-conforming digital content. There are only minimum harmonisa-
tion rules on the notion of conformity with the contract and on remedies 
for non-conforming goods (under the Consumer Sales and Guarantees 
Directive) the implementation of which some Member States have 
chosen to extend to digital content. In addition, for both digital content 
and goods there are minimum requirements on unfair standard 
90 Directive 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 
2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 
1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council 
Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and 
of the Council, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX-
:32011L0083. 
238 | BRUEGEL BLUPRINT 26
contract terms (under the Unfair Contract Terms Directive). Since 
these are minimum standards, Member States have the possibility 
to go further and add requirements in favour of consumers. Many 
Member States have used this possibility on different points and to 
a different extent.”
An odd corollary of this problem is that, despite generally good 
coverage overall, there are vexing gaps in coverage. Many of these flow 
once again from fragmentation in the legislative framework. Quoting 
again from the Commission’s Impact Assessment:
“The Rome I Regulation91 allows contracting parties to choose 
which law applies to their contract and determines which law 
applies in the absence of choice. A trader who “directs his activities” 
to consumers in another country may either apply the consumer’s 
national law or choose another law (in practice almost always the 
trader’s national law). In this latter case, however, the trader must 
also respect the mandatory consumer contract law rules of the con-
sumer’s country to the extent that those rules provide a higher level 
of consumer protection. When the trader does not direct his activities 
to consumers in a specific Member State but agrees to enter into a 
contract at the consumer’s own initiative, consumers do not bene-
fit from the more protective rules of their national law” (European 
Commission, 2015a).
10.4.2 Possible solutions
In its Impact Assessment (European Commission, 2015a) and in its 
legislative proposals, the Commission has reflected on various means 
of addressing these shortcomings in order both to ease the burdens 
on (small-scale) merchants, and to enhance consumer confidence in 
cross-border e-commerce.
91 Regulation (EC) No 593/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 
June 2008 on the law applicable to contractual obligations (Rome I), at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L:2008:177:TOC. 
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The Commission settled on the approach that is most comprehensive 
and probably best. Their proposed directive on supply of digital goods 
and contractual issues (which is at time of writing under discussion in 
the European Parliament) requires full harmonisation of consumer pro-
tection rules for all online sales (not just over the internet, but also for 
instance over the telephone). According to the proposed text, “Member 
States shall not maintain or introduce provisions diverging from those 
laid down in this Directive including more or less stringent provisions to 
ensure a different level of consumer protection”92. This serves not only to 
prevent, as much as possible, divergence among member states, but also 
to ensure that all offer basic guarantees of consumer protection.
The proposed directive attempts for instance to establish rules that 
are consistent across the member states as regards fitness for purpose 
(eg conformity with the contract), and as regards the consumer’s rights 
in dealing with defective goods (eg repair or replacement).
This approach imposes transition costs on merchants, and espe-
cially on small-scale merchants, but in the long term it is likely to offer 
substantial net benefits on both the demand side and on the supply 
side. Online merchants that operate cross-border will need to master 
only the consumer protection laws of their country of establishment. 
Consumers will know that their rights are substantially the same, no 
matter in which member state they make their online purchases.
These measures have the effect of reducing deadweight loss asso-
ciated with transaction costs for merchants and lack of confidence for 
consumers, thus enabling increased consumption. The Commission 
rightly predicts that this can be expected to increase societal welfare. 
We note, however, that the different measures being proposed (as 
discussed throughout this chapter) are mutually complementary, and 
that it is their combined effects that are most important.
92 European Commission (2015) ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on certain aspects concerning contracts for the online and other 
distance sales of goods’, COM(2015) 635 final.
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10.5 Data transfers and data protection
As noted in section 10.1.1, concerns that data is not sufficiently well pro-
tected when selling abroad featured prominently among issues raised by 
merchants. In a survey of EU companies that sell cross-border within the 
EU, or that did so in the past, 12 percent identified this as a major prob-
lem, and an additional 19 percent as a minor problem (TNS, 2015).
Many different technical and policy aspects intersect in this area. 
These concerns partly reflect a concern over cybersecurity; partly, a 
broad concern over consumer privacy; and partly, a more focused con-
cern over the legal permissibility of transferring data from one country 
to another.
Cybersecurity is a further, multi-faceted challenge that is likely to 
be prominent for decades to come. There is clearly an international 
dimension – forensically determining the country from which an attack 
comes can be difficult to impossible. Countries differ in regard to the 
quality of resources available at national level for cybersecurity and the 
effectiveness of their cooperation with their counterparts in other coun-
tries. At the same time, it is clear that all countries are vulnerable, both 
for domestic and cross-border online services. We have little more to 
say about it here, other than to acknowledge that it is a huge and vexing 
problem.
As regards data privacy, solutions need to balance consumer rights 
against business efficiency. The EU’s General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDPR), which takes effect from 25 May 2018, has done a great deal to 
create a more uniform and future-oriented overall approach to data 
privacy93. As regards online aspects, the ongoing review of the e-Privacy 
Directive will hopefully play a complementary role.
Cross-border data transfers between organisations in EU member 
states are generally permitted, and thus unproblematic, under Article 23 
of the GDPR.
93 The current EU privacy framework law (at the time of writing), Directive 95/46/EC, 
will be repealed as of that date.
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As an aside, we note that data transfers from the EU to the 
UK might become problematic in light of Brexit. If the UK is no 
longer an EU or EEA member state, it would raise issues that pre-
viously emerged in a legal case brought by Austrian privacy activ-
ist Maximilian Schrems. A European Court of Justice ruling on 6 
October 201594 invalidated data transfers from the EU to the US 
under an agreement that had existed since July 2000. The finding was 
that the personal data of EU users is not adequately protected when 
it is transferred to the US from the EU because US firms potentially 
make the data available to the US National Security Agency, for 
which the protections set out in the EU-US data transfer agreement 
were either unavailable or irrelevant95.
As long as the UK is an EU member state, transfers of personally 
identifiable data to the UK are governed by Article 23 of the GDPR, 
which permits member states to take liberties with data protection 
and data transfers when doing so “respects the essence of the fun-
damental rights and freedoms and is a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society to safeguard … national security”. 
If the UK were no longer an EU (or EEA) member state, it would 
become a third country relative to the GDPR, and transfers of per-
sonal data would instead be governed by Articles 45 through 49 of 
the GDPR. Article 45 of the GDPR is consistent with the Schrems 
judgement, but it establishes a much higher threshold for transfers 
94 As the EU Court of Justice’s press release notes: “United States public authorities 
are not themselves subject to [the agreement]. Furthermore, national security, public 
interest and law enforcement requirements of the United States prevail over the safe 
harbour scheme, so that United States undertakings are bound to disregard, without 
limitation, the protective rules laid down by that scheme where they conflict with such 
requirements. … ”. An additional concern was that “the persons concerned had no 
administrative or judicial means of redress enabling, in particular, the data relating 
to them to be accessed and … rectified or erased.” See http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
upload/docs/application/pdf/2015-10/cp150117en.pdf. The decision itself is avail-
able at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:62014CJ0362.
95 See also Marcus and Petropoulos (2015).
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of personal data. In order to establish an adequacy decision on the 
safeguards for transferred data, the European Commission would 
be obliged to take account of “the rule of law, respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, relevant legislation, both general 
and sectoral, including concerning public security, defence, national 
security and criminal law and the access of public authorities to 
personal data”. In light of the activities of its intelligence and secu-
rity services, the UK would be unlikely to get a free ride. It is highly 
probable that the UK would be obliged to enter into an agree-
ment very similar to the Privacy Shield, which was agreed in 2016 
between the EU and the United States (Marcus and Petropoulos, 
2016b).
10.6 Geo-blocking and copyright
Geo-blocking occurs when a merchant declines to make online 
sales to prospective customers in another member state. Geo-
blocking can occur at any of a number of points in the process of 
making an online purchase.
• The prospective customer might be prevented from accessing the 
e-commerce website;
• The prospective customer might be automatically re-routed to a 
website targeted at another member state;
• The prospective customer might not be permitted to pay for the 
goods or services;
• The prospective customer might be unable to arrange for delivery 
of the goods.
A survey conducted for the European Commission (2016b) found 
that the cumulative impact of these measures is enormous. About two-
thirds of attempts to order cross-border fail (Figure 8).
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Figure 8: Prevalence of different forms of geo-blocking (EU)
Source: GfK Mystery Shopping Survey, JRC/IPTS calculations (forthcoming), as quoted 
in the Commission’s Impact Assessment report.
Geo-blocking is widespread in Europe. The European Commission 
has determined that 36 percent of retailers in EU do not sell cross-bor-
der for at least one of the product categories they are selling (Figure 9) 
(European Commission, 2016b).
Figure 9: Respondents that do not sell cross-border in at least one product 
category for each of the member states
Source: European Commission (2016b).
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10.6.1 Problems
The European institutions are greatly discomforted by geo-blocking, 
and there can be no question that geo-blocking runs directly counter 
to the spirit of the single market. However, there can be legitimate 
business reasons to geo-block. Notably, cross-border online sales may 
incur higher transaction costs than domestic sales, and these costs 
typically place a proportionately greater burden on SMEs than on large 
companies. Public policy must take factors such as these into account.
In terms of economic theory, geo-blocking constitutes a form 
of vertical restraint. In vertical agreements, restraints may also be 
associated with benefits. According to the Chicago School doctrine, 
territorial restrictions in sales may be associated with better vertical 
coordination, and can have a positive impact on the value of the final 
product (because of a better match between local demand and the 
products and services offered). Moreover, part of the value can be 
appropriated by the local distributors and have a positive impact on 
the real economic activity at local level. As the post-Chicago school of 
thought has pointed out, however, vertical restraints may also reflect 
strategic exploitation of market power, possibly to the point of market 
foreclosure. In order to assess whether geo-blocking is justified or not, 
case-by-case analysis is required.
In practical terms, there are many different factors that might justify 
geo-blocking under specific circumstances. The decision to decline to serve 
consumers in certain countries might legitimately reflect, for instance:
• The regulatory and administrative burden of doing business in that 
country;
• Tax considerations;
• Lack of affordable, high-quality delivery services;
• Different technical specifications (eg labelling requirements) in 
different member states;
• Challenges in terms of fraud prevention;
• Specific obligations regarding advertising, tobacco, alcohol or gambling.
245 | REMAKING EUROPE
10.6.2 Possible solutions
The European Commission in May 201696 proposed a regulation that 
seeks to prohibit geo-blocking. The regulation addresses three main 
aspects of the problem:
• Article 3 would prohibit traders from preventing access to their online 
interface (eg their website), or from involuntarily rerouting the cus-
tomer to a different website, on the basis of the customer’s residence;
• Article 4 would prohibit certain traders from applying “different 
general conditions of access to their goods or services, for reasons 
related to the nationality, place of residence or place of establishment 
of the customer”;
• Article 5 would prohibit traders from applying “different conditions 
of payment for any sales of goods or provision of services”;
The scope of goods and services to which the proposed regulation 
would apply is quite narrow. To begin with, copyrighted digital content 
services (such as films, TV series, broadcasts of sport events, software, 
eBooks, online games and music) are excluded overall.
Furthermore, the non-discrimination obligations of Article 4 are 
restricted so as to cover only goods or services for which no physical 
delivery is required:
• In the case of selling of physical goods when they are not delivered 
cross-border to the member state of the customer by the trader or 
on his or her behalf; 
96 European Commission (2016) ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council on addressing geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination based 
on customers’ nationality, place of residence or place of establishment within the inter-
nal market and amending Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 and Directive 2009/22/EC’, 
COM (2016) 289 final.
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• In the provision of electronically supplied services, other than 
services whose main feature is the provision of access and use of 
copyright-protected works; 
• In services (other than those covered by the second situation), 
which are supplied to the customer at the premises of the trader or 
in a physical location where the trader operates (for example, hotel 
accommodation, leisure activities, car hire, festivals and so on)97.
Finally, the proposed regulation governs conduct relative to 
end-users of the goods or services; thus, it does not govern arrange-
ments between firms.
The regulation appears to be directionally appropriate. It addresses real 
concerns, based both on the mystery shopping tour (Figure 8), and also on 
the observation that 11 percent of consumers report concerns with payment 
arrangements in consumer surveys on behalf of Google (see section 10.1.1).
The exclusions are unfortunate, but the exclusion of goods requir-
ing shipment and of copyrighted audiovisual content services reflects 
valid concerns.
• In the case of goods, excluding those that require shipment avoids 
imposing non-discrimination obligations in cases where cross-bor-
der shipment costs are truly too large to ignore (see section 10.2.1). 
It is clear that prices to the end-user cannot be the same as in the 
case of domestic delivery98. 
97 This non-discrimination principle is in line with Article 20(2) of the Services Di-
rective, which prohibits discrimination based on nationality or place of residence 
except where those differences are directly justified by objective criteria. The pro-
visions attempt to strike a balance between, pursuing the Single Market objective 
and addressing the potentially harmful effects of price and other discrimination. 
However, as the Commission admits in the geo-blocking regulatory proposal, the 
Directive was not an effective intervention to achieve the pursued objectives.
98 Whether this price appears as a separate charge, or is included in the price of the 
goods or services, is not relevant here. What is relevant is the total effective price.
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• In the case of copyrighted audiovisual services, a substantial litera-
ture suggests that the current system of territorial restrictions plays 
an important role in enabling the financing the creation of new 
audiovisual content, and that a prohibition on territorial restrictions 
might therefore reduce the volume of new content produced99.
It might perhaps be possible to mitigate these gaps and shortcom-
ings in the proposed Regulation by means of narrowly and carefully 
crafted rules (Marcus and Petropoulos, 2017).
In the case of goods that require shipment (Marcus and 
Petropoulos, 2017a), one could consider including them within the 
scope of the non-discrimination obligations, but allowing the mer-
chant to charge a justifiably higher price. Specifically, the merchant 
might have to ensure that the price charged to cross-border custom-
ers would not be permitted to exceed the price charged to domestic 
customers by a sum greater than that by which the NPO’s published 
price for shipment of goods with the characteristics of the shipment in 
question (eg weight and volume) from the merchant’s member state 
of establishment to the member state to which shipment is requested 
exceeds the NPO’s published price for shipment of the same goods 
within the merchant’s member state of establishment.
There is an active debate about geo-blocking of copyrighted 
material, but it is not really a debate about copyright. There are com-
plexities with the copyright procedure and with collecting necessary 
rights across the member states, but the problem that is relevant to 
geo-blocking is for the most part not with the copyright procedure 
itself. In the context that we are discussing here, copyright is in most 
cases used as a means of enforcing geographic or temporal partition-
ing that has been decided for commercial reasons. The real questions 
are (1) whether those restrictions enhance or decrease societal welfare 
99 See CRA (2014), Oxera (2016) and Marcus and Petropoulos (2017).
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in the broadest sense, and (2) whether they are compatible with EU 
single market principles. The material in question might be subject to 
copyright, but these questions have very little to do with the copyright 
as such.
In the case of copyrighted audiovisual content, it might be possi-
ble to include within scope only works for which sufficient time has 
passed from the date of first theatrical release to enable most of the 
revenue to be extracted (perhaps two years). Alternatively, including 
only Transactional Video on Demand (TVoD) services might have only 
minimal adverse effect on the pre-financing model.
For other copyrighted digital content (music, e-books and games), 
inclusion within the scope of the proposed regulation is not likely to 
introduce serious problems; however, case by case analysis would be 
required. In the case of e-books, for example, it would be necessary 
to permit merchants to comply with member state laws that mandate 
fixed prices, as is already proposed by the Commission in the case of 
printed books (Marcus and Petropoulos, 2017).
10.7 Conclusions
As noted in section 10.1.3, we feel that the DSM strategy (European 
Commission, 2015) put forward by the European Commission is direc-
tionally right. Strengthening e-commerce with an interrelated barrage 
of measures is generally appropriate. There are synergies – the whole is 
greater than the sum of its parts.
This does not necessarily mean that these good intentions will lead 
to constructive and coherent legislation. For each of the proposed 
measures, the devil is in the detail, and these details are still, at the 
time of writing, being sorted out by the European Parliament and the 
Council of the EU.
The measures can also be distinguished in terms of (1) their relative 
importance, (2) the sequence in which they are enacted, and (3) the 
speed with which their effects are felt. Multiple surveys of merchants 
suggest that high cross-border parcel delivery prices from the NPOs, 
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divergent consumer protection rules, and divergent VAT regimes are 
their most serious problems (Figure 4). Imposition of a prohibition on 
geo-blocking for any class of goods or services should not take effect 
until the relevant parcel delivery, consumer protection, and VAT meas-
ures have taken effect. In other words, the sequence in which meas-
ures take effect could be important.
Carrying this thought a bit further, this initial set of measures might 
set the stage for a second round of legislation in the future. For exam-
ple, an extension of the prohibition on geo-blocking to include goods 
that require shipment would be ill-advised today, because too little is 
known about the wholesale and retail pricing arrangements among the 
NPOs, and between the NPOs and merchants. Such a measure might 
however be considered in a few years once data has been collected, 
and possibly in concert with complementary legislative measures.
Beyond this, we see a serious risk that the lack of coordination 
among the various legislative measures might lead to conflicts and 
problems. Well-intentioned changes to individual measures (for 
instance, attempts to retain member state consumer protection meas-
ures that go far beyond the requirements of EU directives) might well 
undermine the effectiveness of the package as a whole. If the legis-
lative package ultimately results in obligations for fairly small-scale 
merchants to make online cross-border sales, but fails to properly 
address the high transaction costs associated with cross-border sales, 
the net effect might be to reduce European societal welfare rather than 
to enhance it100. In other words, there is substantial risk that well-in-
tentioned but uncoordinated individual measures might undermine 
the effectiveness of the package as a whole, yielding a package that in 
the end achieves less than it might have.
100 Restricting such an obligation to passive sales does little to solve this problem.
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REMAKING EUROPE: THE NEW MANUFACTURING AS AN ENGINE FOR GROWTH
Reinhilde Veugelers
Manufacturing once provided Europe with many jobs that did not require 
high skills. The idea that such jobs can be revived is a central issue for many 
politicians and is behind the demand that products should be ‘made in’ the 
countries that consume them. But such rhetoric has as its reference point an 
old version of manufacturing, which has been supplanted by complex value 
chains and is highly automated and data driven. This new version of manu-
facturing also needs attention from politicians, but for different reasons than 
the provision of millions of old-style production-line jobs.
The policy discussion on the future of manufacturing requires an under-
standing of the changing role of manufacturing in Europe’s growth agenda. 
Europe needs to know how it can realise the potential for industrial rejuvenation. 
How well are European firms responding to the new opportunities for growth, 
and in which global value chains are they developing these new activities? Does 
Europe have the right conditions for its economies to create and capture value 
from the activities that contribute most strongly and sustainably to Europe’s 
growth and external competitiveness? This Blueprint helps to provide some of 
the answers. The evidence in this volume shows that the challenge for European 
policymakers is how to promote and attract those high-value added activities 
within global chains that are the basis for sustainable growth and competitive-
ness. Such activities are not necessarily production related, but will increasingly 
have service-like characteristics and do not necessarily require all the activities 
of the whole value chain to be located at home.
Reinhilde Veugelers is a Senior Fellow at Bruegel, a professor in the the 
Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation at KULeuven and a 
member of the European Research Council Scientific Council. 
 Rue de la Charité 33, B-1210 Brussels 
(+32) 2 227 4210  
info@bruegel.org  
www.bruegel.org
